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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Several political theorists have described a change in the nature of the concept of the
political. In particular, subjects, modes of action, and ways of thinking which were once beyond
the scope of the political realm have become a part of it. The presence of these elements within
the political has broadened our contemporary understanding of the concept. As a result, the idea
of the political has been stretched beyond its initial meaning, and those considerations which are
classically political have languished from inattentiveness as they have been displaced by other
content. Theorists who have expressed concerns about the demise of the political have not
necessarily agreed upon the causal mechanism responsible for this change, or the character of the
change itself. What they have agreed upon is that the conception of politics has changed and that
this change impoverishes not just modern politics, but modern life as a whole. Within this work I
examine the notions that the political and the social are, or at least once were even if only
theoretically, distinct entities and that the social has become a component of the political.
The political realm has come to include modes of action and thought once foreign to that
realm. The content of politics has also been altered. Two of the most important aspects of this
change to the political realm have been the inclusion of the principles of economics and the use
of force, as modes of conduct, ways of thinking, and as subjects. There is theoretically, or
historically, a political point of view or mode of thought and action distinct from an approach to
life based upon economic principles. That political way of life has been replaced by the
economic approach emphasizing calculation, instrumental rationality, and the promotion of selfbenefiting action. The political mode of thought and action was also distinct from realms of life
that permitted the use of force as a means or the obsession over the use of force as a primary
issue under consideration. The changes that took place brought force’s raw power, coercion, and
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manipulation into politics displacing the use of persuasive speech as the primary means of
conducting affairs. The outcomes of these developments drastically altered not only politics, but
also life as a whole.
The scope of the problem I examine is vast. The political realm could no longer be
understood as a space of freedom. Politics would no longer viewed as a noble human endeavor.
The space and activity of politics became a space and activity associated with necessity rather
than freedom. Necessity must always be addressed and is most efficiently answered by the
employment of economic principles or the use of force than by free individuals engaging in
persuasive political discourse. The decline of the political realm as a space of action among free
and equal citizens precluded the possibility of persuading others to accept the force of the better
argument. Given the prominence of politics in determining the course of collective human
undertakings control over the most important decisions of the day has been lost.
Further obfuscating this already complex matter is the fact that the changes that have
occurred in the political realm and humanity’s alienation from its collective actions have gone
relatively unnoticed, save for academic treatises. The contemporary situation has even become
self-reinforcing, as self-disciplining behavior has become entrenched at the individual and
societal levels. Behavior has replaced action in the political realm and this has been widely
accepted as the norm. The current understanding of politics emerged long ago and
contemporarily remains largely unquestioned aside from a sense of malaise associated with
politics. This inspires in many an aversion to the political realm and a preference instead for the
perceived safety and freedom of a life removed from politics. Freedom is no longer conceived
politically, but largely viewed as something that cannot be associated with political life.
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I accomplish my task of investigating this phenomenon by examining the works of three
prominent, although very different thinkers: Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and Michel
Foucault. My choice of thinkers was deliberate. Each of the three represents a different
theoretical approach applied to similar problems. The choice of Arendt may be somewhat
obvious, as it was she who coined the titular phrase “the rise of the social.” Her approach was
informed by her connection to German Existenzphilosophie and a profound interest in the nature
of politics in classical Greece. Arendt provided what was undoubtedly the most famous account
of the issue in The Human Condition (Arendt, 1958), though the theme was present in much of
her work. Arendt claimed that the political and the social had once been distinct areas of life, but
the “rise of the social” changed the relationship and occluded the political.
My choice to consider the works of the great critical theorist Jürgen Habermas may be
somewhat less obvious. However, his early work The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere (Habermas, 1962) is particularly pertinent. In that work Habermas described, in great
detail, the formation of the bourgeois public sphere and how, separate from social interests, it
was similar to a political realm in that individuals could debate as equals. However, social
interests were unleashed and the bourgeois public sphere’s existence came to an end, being
replaced by a mixed realm where private, social interests rather than shared reason dictated
debate. I also examine Habermas’s more mature thought which may be read as an effort to
theoretically recover the ideal form of public sphere typical of the era described in his Structural
Transformation.
If my choice of Arendt is obvious and my choice of Habermas less so, then my decision
to utilize the work of Michel Foucault may initially seem out of turn. However, the French
sociologist can be read as adopting different approaches than Arendt or Habermas while arriving
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at interconnected conclusions. For Foucault, the political, through the state, had enveloped the
social in order to gain greater control over individuals. Thus, the political realm came to entail
things that were previously not located within it. Enforcement mechanisms have also moved
beyond the state making the newly dominant modes of thought and action more pervasive.
Though these theorists described different processes, there is a common connecting thread: the
idea that the concept of the political has changed, and correspondingly that the relationship
between the political and nonpolitical realms of life have changed.
My purpose is to examine the work of each of these theorists who take markedly different
approaches to make the case that regardless of the perspective taken or the theoretical orientation
adopted the conclusion is similar, namely, that politics has changed. Beyond this basic notion of
change, considering the work of these three reveals a core common to each of their
understandings of the change that occurred in the political realm. Thinking through Arendt,
Habermas, and Foucault individually will allow me to draw out the crucial components of each
account. This reveals the common elements within a broader construction of the account of the
rise of the social and the critical change to politics. Having identified the changes that have
occurred and the difficulties they cause potential remedies can be considered and assessed.
Having provided a brief introduction to the topic and my rationale for the structure I have
chosen I proceed as follows in the remainder of this work. Chapter 2 considers the work of
Hannah Arendt. My account of Arendt begins with her analysis of classical Greece, where she
argued that the polis was distinct from the all that existed outside of it. With this distinction in
mind a portrait of Arendtian politics, as an idealized form of political interaction, is presented. I
then examine Arendt’s conception of the social as well as its rise. I include Arendt’s thoughts on
the relationship between politics and philosophy, the role of Hobbes’s thought, the importance of
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imperialism and totalitarianism, as well as the social question, which doomed the French
revolution. I then turn to Arendt’s thoughts on contemporary politics and the problematized
relationship between the political and the social.
In Chapter 3 I turn to the works of Jürgen Habermas whose idealized conception of
politics was typical not of ancient Greece but of the bourgeois public sphere. I chronicle
Habermas’s description of the creation, functioning, and decline of genuine politics. I discuss the
pathologies of modernity that Habermas identifies as symptoms of the rise of the social and the
alteration of the political realm. The colonization of the lifeworld emerges as an important
metaphor for the manner in which the contents and modes of action in the public sphere have
given way to their non-public counterparts. Manipulative and strategic communication replaced
true political communication under these conditions. I understand Habermas’s theory of
communicative action as offering the prospect of recovering an idealized form of politics and
offsetting the pathologies associated with the rise of the social.
I consider the work of Michel Foucault in Chapter 4. I wish to make an important caveat
from the outset. More so than with Arendt or Habermas, my account of Foucault considers
Foucauldian thought inclusive of a variety of scholars who adopted Foucault’s frequently novel
but often underdeveloped concepts. Specifically, I examine the Foucauldian concepts of
panopticism, biopolitics, and governmentality. I provide an understanding of each these concepts
that links them to the idea of the rise of the social and the alteration of the political in a manner
consistent with the accounts of Arendt and Habermas.
Chapter 5 serves as a conclusion; there I indicate some parallels between the works of
Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault. I present the core common to the three thinkers, namely, that
nonpolitical concerns have become incorporated into the political realm and altered politics.
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Considering the three important thinkers in unison makes a stronger case for the idea that politics
has changed in its content and mode of conduct and thought. I translate some of the theoretical
points made into practical examples from contemporary political life. Finally, I briefly consider
some potential remedies that may be capable of offsetting the negative components of the
changes that have occurred to the concept of the political.
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CHAPTER 2 HANNAH ARENDT
2.1 Introduction
Among the theorists considered, it was Hannah Arendt who provided the best-known
account of the social and its relationship to the political. Though Arendt’s work on the topic has
not consistently been well received, it was nonetheless an important, albeit controversial,
component of her thought. Despite the fact that Arendt’s thought did not neatly coincide with
either Habermas’s or Foucault’s, there are some similarities and areas of overlap. When
considered together, these prominent theorists coalesce around certain themes. Together they tell
a tale of a new understanding of the political, one that is markedly different from prior
understandings of that sphere of life: namely, that politics now includes content and ways of
thinking and doing which were previously excluded. This conception of contemporary politics
not only altered what politics, or the political, refers to, but by extension the way individuals live
both their private and public lives.
Arendt’s thought conveyed two different conceptions of the political and politics. The
first was the political as she claimed it classically existed, prior to the rise of the social: I refer to
this as Arendtian politics. This was an elevated notion of the political; it was a noble politics,
which Arendt viewed as “the highest level of human affairs.” Alternatively, the rise of the social
resulted in a baser form of the political. Arendt described this politics, contemporary politics, as
though it “was no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing counted
but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for domination” (Arendt, 1954a). Arendt
articulated these high and low, noble and base alternative conceptions of the political in several
works placing them in stark contrast to one another (Arendt, 1954a, 2005). The difference
between these contrasting meanings of the political was the effect of the rise of the social. This
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phenomenon changed the very meaning of the political. Arendt constructed her account of this
change over the course of her career.
My analysis of Arendt proceeds as follows. Initially, I present Arendt’s depiction of the
Greek world, as the distinctions inherent in that description permit Arendtian politics, which I
then discuss. Next, I outline the creation of the social, including the relationship between
philosophy and politics, the thought of Thomas Hobbes, and the world’s experiences with
imperialism and totalitarianism. The discussion includes the social question, which in Arendt’s
view doomed the French Revolution. The next step in my analysis is an examination of the rise
of the social, and its several component parts. The rise of the social brought content and modes
of thought that were once confined to the nonpolitical realms of life into politics. My
examination of the rise of the social also describes what Arendt believed politics had become,
having deviated from the idealized Arendtian politics. Finally, I touch upon some problems with
Arendt’s analysis and her notion of the “double face” of certain issues.
2.2 The Pre-Social World of Greek Distinctions
The logical starting point for the task at hand is Arendt’s The Human Condition (1958).
Many regard this work as Arendt’s magnum opus, and unsurprisingly it has received no shortage
of scholarly attention. Indeed, it seems that anyone undertaking work on Arendt has had to
contend with The Human Condition, a complex work. It is also, undoubtedly, the most famous
and complete articulation of Arendt’s thought on the rise of the social. The starting point for this
investigation will be Arendt’s well known, albeit idealized, account of the Classical world. This
seems the most appropriate starting point, as it is the beginning of Arendt’s theoretical timeline
of the social and its rise. Within this work, Arendt provided an account not just of the rise of the
social, but of what she envisioned the world, and the political, to be prior to that rise. An
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understanding of how Arendt viewed the political prior to the corrupting influence of the social
will provide a stark contrast to the alterations caused by the rise of the social.
The Human Condition was exemplary of the method closely associated with Arendt. She
began by considering the Greek city-state, and paid heed to the etymology of the concepts with
which her work was concerned. In Arendt’s view, Classical Greek society was one characterized
by a number of distinctions. The first characteristic distinction separated the public and the
private realms of life. The second set of distinctions was between the three components of the
vita activa, and to some degree, corresponded with the distinction between the public and private
realms. There was yet another pertinent distinction present in Arendt’s account of the Classical
world; this was between the bios politikos – or the vita activa – and the bios theoretikos. These
distinctions were crucial, as they constituted Arendt’s understanding of the political prior to the
rise of the social. In Arendt’s view, many of the ails of modernity can be traced to the erosion of
these distinctions, which permitted the rise of the social. The rise of the social described the
phenomena of the nonpolitical aspects of life entering the political realm. This being the case,
any understanding contemporary politics from the Arendtian perspective requires understanding
the nonpolitical categories since the erosion of these distinctions permitted what was previously
nonpolitical to enter into politics.
The Private, Animal Laborans, and Homo Faber
The Private Realm
Arendt’s first distinction was between the public polis and the private oikos. The private
oikos was pre-political and so a pre-public realm in several ways. The oikos was pre-political in
that it was, necessarily, first in human development. As Arendt wrote, “man is a ‘social’ before
he is a ‘political animal’” (Arendt, 1958, p. 32). In this sense, the private, familial man is more
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primitive than the public, political man. After all, other animals may lead private lives, but would
be incapable of creating and living in a public world, in Arendt’s sense. In this way, the oikos
was a requisite, but more primitive, animalistic portion of life.
The oikos, as private life, is prior to the public in that it provided for all of the necessities
of life, which allowed men to enter into the public sphere unconcerned with the basic necessities
of life. It was the place of biological and physical necessities. The oikos was the realm of life
concerned with food and shelter, for example. It was the location of biological necessities like
reproduction, parenting, and familial relations. All of these are necessary for life, but merely
precursors that make a public realm possible.
The oikos, being a pre-political realm, was directed by relationships based purely upon
the power of one member, the head of the household, over all other members. That single
individual used “prepolitical force” with which he “ruled over the family and its slaves” (Arendt,
1958, p. 32). This method of conducting the affairs of a group or a collective of individuals
would appear similar to a contemporary political order based purely on raw power. It would be
the tyranny of one over many. Arendt, however, believed that in antiquity it was not viewed as
political at all: “the whole concept of rule and being ruled, of government and power in the sense
in which we understand them as well as the regulated order attending them, was felt to be
prepolitical and to belong in the private rather than the public sphere” (1958, p. 32). The oikos
was an example of what contemporaries would consider a political mode of conducting affairs,
which was not considered so in Arendt’s Greece. The tyranny of the head of the household was
permitted because while within the household he was not among equals. The superior head of the
household need not concern himself with the opinions or desires of those who were his inferiors.
Despotism and force could rule anywhere outside of the political realm; Arendt believed that
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Thucydides’s famous observation was accurate. In all areas of life outside of politics, “the
strong did what they could and the weak suffered what they must” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 12).
Since the oikos was ruled by power and domination, it was a realm of life totally lacking
freedom. Obviously, the inferiors within the oikos could not experience freedom; the slaves,
children, and wives lived lives of total domination. The head of the household’s relationship to
freedom is far less obvious. The head of the oikos, solely as a member of the oikos, albeit as the
dominant member, was just as much a stranger to freedom as all those he ruled over. The private
was a realm characterized by a deprivation of freedom, which affected all within it equally. To
be solely private meant to be deprived of what made human life quintessentially human: “the
privation of privacy lies in the absence of others; as far as they are concerned, private man does
not appear, and therefore it is as though he did not exist. Whatever he does remains without
significance and consequence to others, and what matters to him is without interest to other
people” (Arendt, 1958, p. 58). The oikos was private, privacy meant isolation, and “to be isolated
is to be deprived of the capacity to act,” which was the only source of freedom (Arendt, 1958, p.
188). Action could only occur and have meaning in the presence of equals. “Everybody outside
the polis – slaves and barbarians – was aneu logou, deprived, of course, not of the faculty of
speech, but a way of life in which speech and only speech made sense and where the central
concern of all citizens was to talk to each other” (Arendt, 1958, p. 27). This went for all members
of the oikos, the only respite for the head of household was his additional, external role in the
public realm.
This description of the private realm would sound odd to most contemporary ears. Today
we view the private realm as a place of welcoming safety, a place that relieves the pressure
applied by others. Rather than believing that the public realm provides freedom, many feel that it
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has the opposite effect. Contemporaries feel restrained in public, forced to conform to societal
standards. Many even play roles that they have not chosen for themselves, but rather have been
defined for them. Individuals in these scenarios can only be who they truly are in private, and so
only experience what they believe to be freedom in that realm far away from the prying eyes of
publicity. This freedom is based upon the right to privacy, protecting individuals’ private lives
from governmental interference. This understanding of freedom could only be a modern one, a
result of the rise of the social.
Arendt’s description of the oikos is not meant to imply that the private realm was totally
without reason, or that it served no function whatsoever. It functioned quite well in meeting the
basic biological and physical needs. Its members were sheltered, fed, and clothed. Children were
produced and raised to continue the society. The oikos was quite capable of satisfying both
necessity and biology, although certainly in an inequitable manner. The different members of the
household certainly would have had their needs met to differing degrees based upon their status,
and the situations of subservient members would certainly have varied across households. This
was, after all, a system based upon patriarchy and slavery. The oikos did, however, operate on
the basis of its own type of logic, the logic embedded in the types of activities that took place
therein. An account of these activities requires an understanding of the second distinction that
characterized Arendt’s account of classical Greece.
Animal Laborans
An understanding of the second crucial distinction, the component parts of the vita
activa, is required to provide a full account of the private realm, and thus, to bring it into contrast
with the public realm, the polis. Arendt described the vita activa as consisting of three distinct
component parts, or modes of life. Arendt theorized three ideal types of individuals within the
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vita activa. These were labor, undertaken by the animal laborans, work, undertaken by homo
faber, and action, of which only the zoon politikon was capable. Animal laborans and homo
faber were associated with the private realm while zoon politikon was associated with the public
realm, and more specifically, politics within it. The first two components, animal laborans and
homo faber, were temporally prior and hierarchically inferior to the zoon politikon whose
existence they made possible.
The first component of the vita activa was labor, which was associated with, and
performed by animal laborans. Animal laborans was biologically human, but was not capable of
the sort of humanity Arendt associated with zoon politikon, as explained below. “The animal
laborans is indeed only one, at best the highest, of the animal species which populate the earth”
(Arendt, 1958, p. 84). These laborers were concerned with nothing more than the continual
satisfaction and creation of necessity. They are above other animals, but unlike the other forms
of human life, they always remain tied to nature. “The animal laborans, which with its body and
the help of tame animals nourishes life, may be the lord and master of all living creatures, but he
still remains the servant of nature and the earth” (Arendt, 1958, p. 139).
For these beings, life and its mere continuation was the highest good and the creation of
an abundance of basic necessities their modus operandi (Arendt, 1958, pp. 126, 208).
Acknowledging Marx, Arendt wrote: “the productivity of labor power produces objects only
incidentally and is primarily concerned with the means of its own reproduction; since its power
is not exhausted when its own reproduction has been secured, it can be used for the reproduction
of more than one life process, but it never ‘produces’ anything but life” (Arendt, 1958, p. 88). A
form of Malthusian trap, labor provides for the necessities of life, but nothing more. As labor
becomes more efficient, more life can be created and sustained, however, if this limited cycle
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continues endlessly, nothing higher than mere necessities would ever be produced. “This cycle
needs to be sustained through consumption, and the activity which provides the means of
consumption is laboring” (Arendt, 1958, p. 99). All products of labor are “fed into the human life
process almost immediately” (Arendt, 1958, p. 99). More necessities are produced, and thus, the
number of lives supported would increase, although the circumstances of those lives would never
move beyond the state of animal laborans.
In Arendt’s account of antiquity, there was a distinction between types of activity. Those
undertaken out of necessity were of strictly private concern and took place solely within the
confines of the oikos (Arendt, 1958, p. 85). Those activities were neither seen nor heard, and this
was the fate of animal laborans whose outputs were the mere labors of their bodies, which was
capable of nothing beyond meeting the necessities of life. “To labor meant to be enslaved by
necessity, and this enslavement was inherent in the conditions of human life” (Arendt, 1958, pp.
83-84). Arendt argued that the slaves of antiquity, were not primarily kept as a source of cheap
labor, as they were in later ages, but represented an “attempt to exclude labor from the conditions
of man’s life” (1958, p. 84). This exclusion, of not just labor, but also work, freed citizens’ lives
of necessary and slavish activities which must occur in private to enable a political life of public
concern.
This then was the mentalité, and the mode of being and doing most associated with the
oikos. As long as humans are as they are, they feel the constraint of necessity. The private realm
existed as a place where this necessity could be satisfied. Animal laborans, as those totally
confined to the darkness of the private sphere, were singularly concerned with nothing more than
the continual satisfaction of unceasing necessity. This was, at its core, a narrowly concerned
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continuation of itself. It was blind production for the purposes of the continuation of life. Arendt
wrote:
There is no lasting happiness outside the prescribed cycle of painful exhaustion and
pleasurable regeneration, and whatever throws this cycle out of balance —poverty and
misery where exhaustion is followed by wretchedness instead of regeneration, or great
riches and an entirely effortless life where boredom takes the place of exhaustion and
where the mills of necessity, of consumption and digestion, grind an impotent human
body mercilessly and barrenly to death—ruins the elemental happiness that comes from
being alive (1958, p. 109).
There was nothing satisfying outside the fulfillment of necessity and the continuation of the life
process. For animal laborans, laboring was the pursuit of happiness, which corresponded to the
pursuit of life (Arendt, 1958, p. 109). The satisfactions equated with life processes or physical
needs were best pursued in the private realm where such interests could be singularly pursued, as
opposed to the public realm where other matters could be raised.
Homo Faber
The second category within the vita activa was homo faber. Echoing Locke, Arendt
wrote that homo faber worked with their hands, rather than merely laboring with their bodies, as
was the case with animal laborans (1958, p. 136). Homo faber produced durable outputs, which
would outlast him, rather than being continually consumed out of necessity, as were the products
of animal laborans. Homo faber was the “fabricator of the world” whose ideals were
“permanence, stability, and durability” (Arendt, 1958, p. 126). Rather than being immediately
consumed in an endless cycle of life, homo faber’s products could exist for significantly longer.
While the animal laborans remained subject to nature, homo faber mastered it and nature was
subjected to him. An “element of violation and violence is present in all fabrication, and homo
faber, the creator of the human artifice, has always been a destroyer of nature” (Arendt, 1958, p.
139). Rather than being of nature, “homo faber conducts himself as lord and master of the whole
earth” (Arendt, 1958, p. 139).
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The final object produced justified the violence homo faber committed against nature.
“The end justifies the violence done to nature to win the material, as the wood justifies killing the
tree and the table justifies destroying the wood” (Arendt, 1958, p. 153). Homo faber was entirely
motivated by a means/ends mindset. All things produced were done so with an eye to their
usefulness. Taking an example from an end of carpentry, a chair “can show its usefulness only
by again becoming a means, either as a thing whose durability permits its use as a means for
comfortable living or as a means of exchange” (Arendt, 1958, p. 153). If a potential output of
production could not find a use, then it would simply not be produced in the first place.
Judgments about the utility of ends were determinative in all aspects of the production
process, not just the decision regarding what to fabricate. Such judgments were applied
universally: “tools are designed and implements invented, and the same end product organizes
the work process itself, decides about the needed specialists, the measure of cooperation, the
number of assistants, etc. During the work process, everything is judged in terms of suitability
and usefulness for the desired end, and for nothing else” (Arendt, 1958, p. 153). Homo faber as a
distinct category within the vita activa were defined by this mode of thinking. Just as animal
laborans were characterized by their unending laboring to fulfill necessity, homo faber was
characterized by unrelenting obsession with usefulness. The durability of the work as well as the
means/ends nature of homo faber differentiated that category from animal laborans. Whereas
animal laborans was concerned solely with the life process and the production of more labor
power, homo faber viewed additional labor as useful only in that it could be used to pursue a
“higher end,” namely objects of use or valuable in exchange (Arendt, 1958, p. 162).
The unrelenting nature of the means/ends mode of thinking was problematic. “The
trouble with the utility standard inherent in the very activity of fabrication is that the relationship
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between means and ends on which it relies is very much like a chain whose every end can serve
again as a means in some other context” (Arendt, 1958, pp. 153-154). No matter how useful one
of homo fabers’ fabrications proved to be, no end ever proved satisfactory. There was never truly
an end, merely another means to some end, more utility need always be found. Homo faber was
unable to grasp the distinction between usefulness and meaningfulness, always and only acting
“in order to” and never “for the sake of” (Arendt, 1958, p. 154).
Homo faber worked in isolation with rarely more than a few assistants; fabrication
occurred in the small-scale shops of the craftsman, rather than the large-scale factories that arose
after industrialization. This type of work was a private affair, contained almost entirely within
households, as was the labor of animal laborans. Unlike animal laborans, however, homo faber
was not an entirely private being, completely shut into the isolation of the oikos. Homo faber was
capable of emerging from his isolation, as when he appeared “as a merchant and trader and
establishes the exchange market in this capacity” (Arendt, 1958, p. 163). The exchange market
was a public realm of sorts. However, this sort of publicity was based entirely upon a desire for a
greater range of end options for the objects of fabrication. “Historically, the last public realm, the
last meeting place which is at least connected with the activity of homo faber, is the exchange
market on which his products are displayed” (Arendt, 1958, p. 162). That is, objects of
fabrication could find more, or higher ends, if they could become objects of exchange by taking
on value in addition to usefulness. The exchange market did not allow for the expression of
humanity or free interaction. “However, the people who meet on the exchange market are
primarily not persons but producers of products, and what they show there is never themselves,
not even their skills and qualities . . . but their products” (Arendt, 1958, p. 209). Thus, in this
public realm, inhabited more by commodities than by humans, the values placed upon the objects
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of fabrication were determinative of the values of their makers. This placed even more
importance upon the ends, which must be found for the objects of fabrication.
Furthermore, value in exchange came only from the opinion of others, as potential
partners in exchange. As Arendt put it, “[t]his value consists solely in the esteem of the public
realm where the things appear as commodities, and it is neither labor, nor work, nor capital, nor
profit, nor material, which bestows such value upon an object, but only and exclusively the
public realm where it appears to be esteemed, demanded, or neglected” (1958, p. 164).
Borrowing from Locke, Arendt noted that this value existed independent of intrinsic worth and
had everything to do with “marketable value” (1958, p. 164). In this way, value of a fabricated
object was entirely and arbitrarily determined based upon the collective perception of a
community of fabricators who comprised the exchange market. Since homo faber was connected
to a public solely through the objects of fabrication, the worth of the individual could be seen to
correspond to the value communally assigned to those fabrications. Thus, an individual was little
more than what he produced.
Animal laborans and homo faber, despite their differences, did share some characteristics
of great import. The first such characteristic was their outcome based orientation toward action.
As previously mentioned, each was motivated by generally known outcomes. Specifically,
animal laborans was motivated by necessity and the continuation of life processes, while homo
faber was motivated by an unending cycle of means and ends. This may be seen as a form of
rationality, in that it is goal directed. As Benhabib noted, even though Arendt never used the
terminology of Max Weber, his formal and instrumental rationality may loosely fit (Benhabib,
2000, p. 26; Weber, 1964, pp. 115-118, 181-309, 324-341). There were, of course, no formal,
institutionalized guidelines to be followed. However, the behaviors of both animal laborans and
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homo faber were predictable and goal orientated, so, in a way, uniform. Additionally, homo
faber organized fabrication based upon concerns about the efficiency of achieving ends of value.
These conditions inherent in their behavior made it somewhat uniform, in that deviations were
unlikely. Their activity was behavior in these senses, a sort of pre-institutional, informal
instrumentality, where future behavior could be reliably predicted.
Furthermore, the behavior of animal laborans and homo faber adhered to a form of
rationality in that it was limited and directed purely by necessity. The effort of animal laborans
was necessary in the most basic sense. As previously explained, animal laborans ensured the
continuation of the life processes. There were enough necessities produced that others, not
engaged in the laboring process, could consume them. Thus, animal laborans labored solely out
of necessity and the entirety of the products of the labor was necessary. Similarly, the fabrication
of homo faber was necessary, although in a less basic sense. As discussed above, fabrication and
mastery over nature was necessary for the creation of a common world. For these reasons, both
the labor of animal laborans and the work of homo faber were necessary if there was to be a
human world at all; it was necessary if any human relations or activity, beyond mere necessity,
beyond labor and work, were to be possible.
Animal laborans and homo faber were also similar in their orientation towards the
political and those who engaged in it, the yet to be discussed zoon politikon. Animal laborans
and homo faber were devoted to their own aims which produced, in their eyes real, tangible
results and:
Both, therefore, are, strictly speaking, unpolitical, and will incline to denounce action and
speech as idleness, idle busybody-ness and idle talk, and generally will judge public
activities in terms of their usefulness to supposedly higher ends – to make the world more
useful and more beautiful in the case of homo faber, to make life easier and longer in the
case of the animal laborans (Arendt, 1958, p. 208).
As will become apparent in the proceeding discussion, the action of zoon politikon was not
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oriented toward any specific end, but was important due to its primary byproduct, freedom. This
hostility to the political might make sense to contemporaries. After all, if there is a specific end
in mind, be it the production of necessities and continuation of life, or the fabrication of goods,
deliberation or debate of the political sort would not be the most efficient means of achieving
them. Indeed, politics is often considered the least efficient process for attaining any
predetermined end, and is in fact, often focused upon what end should be pursued, prior to any
concern about pursuing it. The tyranny of the oikos, and the rationality of both animal laborans
and homo faber would be far more efficient than any conception of politics.
Despite their belief that the political activity of the public realm was superfluous, both
animal laborans and homo faber had a need for that space. Arendt wrote, “for without a space of
appearance and without trusting in action and speech as a mode of being together, neither the
reality of one’s self, of one’s own identity, nor the reality of the surrounding world can be
established beyond doubt” (1958, p. 208). Arendt quoted Dante’s De Monarchia, “[t]hus,
nothing acts [unless by acting] it makes patent its latent self” (1958, p. 175).1 This is a starting
point for Arendt’s theory of action (Markell, 2006, p. 10). More fundamentally, it has a far more
basic impact upon the lives of animal laborans and homo faber, as individuals who do not truly
undertake action, but rather, labor and work respectively. Individuals must actualize and
articulate themselves in some way that can be viewed by others, only through this expression.
Humans, and the world, must be experienced by the senses of others in order to be considered
real. Moreover, those isolated in privacy did not exist as humans in the same way. The world
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1
The epigraphs to The Human Condition’s chapter on action have received some scholarly
attention. Markell provided an exegesis of Dante’s passage and its relationship to Arendt’s
thought (1992, p. 22). Gottlieb noted both the importance of Arendt’s use of Dante, and the
significance of the choices Arendt made in translating the passage (2006). Additionally, Thiele
argued that a proper understanding of Arendt required a consideration of not just the epigraph
from Dante, but also the preceding one from Isak Dinesen (2003, Ch. 4).
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must also be experienced and affirmed by common sensory perception in order to be affirmed
(Arendt, 1958, pp. 208-209).
2.3 Arendtian Politics
Arendt’s conception of what was classically, properly, and purely political was as
enigmatic as any component of her work. It was somewhat difficult to even narrow down a
proper term for the concept being discussed; Arendt herself never coined a phrase for this notion
of proper politics. I have settled upon Arendtian politics for several reasons. First, it was a
category unique to Arendt’s thought; no other theorist articulated a concept of politics with
precisely the same spirit. Second, using terms that assign the politics to any particular epoch or
physical location would be problematic, because such politics were never so confined, and
because Arendt’s account was idealized and not a completely accurate historical depiction.
Here, I provide an account of Arendtian politics in order to understand what they were, as
well as to permit an understanding of what Arendtian politics were not. This will provide a
contrast to what contemporary politics are, what politics have become with the rise of the social.
Contemporary politics, taking place after the rise of the social, in the broadest possible terms,
prohibits politics in the Arendtian sense. Thus, contemporary politics are an entirely new
category, far removed from what Arendt understood as the politics of past ages. The Arendtian
politics described here were the highest level of human affairs (Arendt, 1954a, 2005). They were
humans overcoming their base nature, being solely concerned with necessity and utility, and
engaging in something nobler.
Zoon Politikon and the Public Realm
The final category within Arendt’s tripartite distinction of the vita activa was zoon
politikon. A description of the zoon politikon will also provide a description of the political
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realm, the polis, because the activity undertaken by the zoon politikon constituted the polis. Put
another way, zoon politikon lived a bios politikos. Action defined the political realm just as the
labor of animal laborans and the work of homo faber characterized the private realm, the oikos,
as a place where necessities were met, means/ends rationality prevailed, and isolation and a lack
of freedom were pervasive. Additionally, the political realm was far different than the private
realm, in that violence and force were not permitted. Arendt’s concept of politics described here
was certainly idealized. Contained within it are several categories from Arendt’s distinctions.
The bios politikos was the political life, lived in the company of equals, where affairs were
conducted politically, which was distinct from the not yet discussed bios theoretikos, lived
internally. Additionally, zoon politikon represents the third category within Arendt’s vita activa,
and was distinct from animal laborans and homo faber.
Arendt drew upon Aristotle’s definition of bios politikos, which among all the
potentialities of humans, consisted only of praxis, action, and lexis, speech (Arendt, 1958, p. 25).
Given this understanding, these two capacities were given the highest significance among all
human capabilities. Action and speech were viewed as equal to one another, and both were
considered superior to another important, albeit less so, human capacity: thought (Arendt, 1958,
pp. 25-26). Therefore, the bios politikos was not just superior to the other components of the vita
activa, but to the bios theoretikos as well.
Arendtian politics, which she believed existed in ancient Greece, were conducted through
words, and “more fundamentally that finding the right words at the right moment, quite apart
from the information or communication they convey, is action” (Arendt, 1958, p. 26). Arendt
further explained the meaning of “great words” as words that “reply to striking blows,” to quote
the final line of Sophocles’s Antigone (1958, p. 25). Action then was made possible as a
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component part of speech. This was consistent with Aristotle’s definition of political man as
“zoon logon ekhon (‘a living being capable of speech’)” (Arendt, 1958, p. 27). Hence, Arendt’s
description of anyone existing outside of politics as being aneu logou, without speech, meaning
outside of a context where speech was of primary importance, and determinative of action
(Arendt, 1958, p. 27).
Essentially, the violence and force that was capable of ruling in the private realm could
not do so in public. This was because while the starkest imaginable inequalities existed in the
private realm the public realm was inhabited solely by equals. Free and equal individuals
inhabited the public “where to be free meant both not to be a subject to the necessity of life or to
the command of another and not to be in command oneself. It meant neither to rule or be ruled”
(Arendt, 1958, p. 32). None could command another, and so their only resort was persuasion.
This formulation would strike modern men as quite odd. Contemporarily, the political realm is
often understood as a realm where, at least in practice, some rule over others, a place where raw
power is frequently exerted, and coercion is the norm. In Arendt’s account the oddity of this
notion to contemporaries was the result of the change in our understanding of the political,
brought about by the rise of the social.
Individuals constituting zoon politikon, however, were not identical to one another and
the political realm was a realm of plurality. Plurality was absolutely necessary for speech and
action to occur and hence for the political to come into being. The two crucial aspects of plurality
were “equality and distinction” (Arendt, 1958, p. 175). If citizens were not equal, then they
would not be capable of understanding one another. In using the term equality Arendt had a
specific meaning in mind, the Greek isonomy, which she understood as meaning not equal

	
  

24
conditions, but rather a condition that made men equal.2 Isonomy represented a unique form of
government, characterized as a condition of “no-rule,” different from a democracy, characterized
as the rule of the majority (Arendt, 1963c, pp. 30-31). Any division of individuals into a
hierarchy of rule brought with it inequality and threatened the universal humanity that isonomy
signified. As Gottsegen observed, “[w]here there are rulers and ruled, or any formal divisions
within the citizen body which might potentially dichotomize along such lines, it is Arendt’s
concern that those in a position to rule will, first, come to monopolize the right of initiating
action, and the will come to dominate the field of action as well” (1994, p. 57). This condition of
artificial and restricted equality was present only within the public sphere and a necessary
condition for Arendtian politics. It was only there that men, potentially, had the ability to
perform equally well. Isonomy ceased to exist once one ventured outside of the political realm.
In other aspects of life people would be unequal, due to their unequal potentialities to excel
(Arendt, 1963c, p. 283; 1966, p. 301; 2003, pp. 45-46).
The other requirement for plurality, and thus Arendtian politics, was distinction. If
individuals were not distinct from one another, this too would preclude the possibility of action
and Arendtian politics. After all, if all were of like mind, deeds and speech would be wholly
unnecessary. “Signs and sounds to communicate immediate, identical needs and wants would be
enough” (Arendt, 1958, p. 176). For Arendt, reality was resultant of the recognition received
from others, and therefore, was dependent upon the presence of others and variety among
individuals (Arendt, 1958, p. 57). The public realm was a place of relation and differentiation.
Just as a negation of the isonomy requirement would threaten the possibility of Arendtian
politics, so to would the absence of an appropriate degree of distinction. Such a threat could be
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2
Arendt uses both isonomy and isonomie to represent this concept.
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the result of isolation or loneliness, signifying a total lack of distinction (Arendt, 1966, pp. 474479). After all, isolation from the recognition of equals was precisely the sort of deprivation
experienced in the darkness of the household. Alternatively, a threat to distinction could arise
with the formation of hostile factions, where individuals form groups around their lack of
distinction, while remaining distinct from and hostile toward other such groupings (Arendt,
1958, pp. 180, 203).
Furthermore, in Arendt’s distinction between the private and public realms, running
along the lines of the divisions within the vita activa, there was a difference in the content
appropriately found within each realm of life. As mentioned, those activities undertaken out of
necessity were of strictly private concern and took place solely within the confines of the oikos
(Arendt, 1958, p. 85). Those activities were neither seen nor heard. The head of the oikos freed
himself from such concerns, by subjugating others to perform necessitous activities, and was
thereby able to focus on public matters. Activities worthy of public-ness stood in contrast to
necessitous, private activities. Such public activities were worthy of being seen, heard,
recognized and remembered (Arendt, 1958, p. 85). Arendt wrote that the distinction could be
drawn by asking, with reference to Cicero, “is the greater amount of time and effort spent in
private or in public? Is the occupation motivated by cura private negotii or cura rei publicae,
care for private or for public business?” (1958, p. 85).
The Miracle of Politics
Arendtian political action was, in a word, miraculous. To engage in Arendtian politics,
then, was to work miracles. Arendt did not intend to intone any religious meaning, but rather
understood a miracle as a novel beginning. The importance of beginnings and natality in
Arendt’s work has been noted. Canovan wrote that Arendt was “preeminently the theorist of
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beginnings” (1998, p. vii). Kohn observed that the centrality of beginning in human affairs was
Arendt’s “deepest conviction, stated over and over throughout her works” (2000, p. 114). Of
miracles Arendt wrote, “every new beginning is by nature a miracle when seen and experienced
from the standpoint of the processes it necessarily interrupts” (2005). Furthermore, something
“new always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability,
which for all practical, everyday purposes amounts to certainty” and so would always seem
miraculous (Arendt, 1958, p. 178). Such a miracle was on par with the beginning of human life
and the world’s coming into being. Arendt articulated this position:
Man himself evidently has a most amazing and mysterious talent for working miracles.
The normal, hackneyed word our language provides for this talent is “action.” Action is
unique in that it sets in motion processes that in their automatism look very much like
natural processes, and action also marks the start of something, begins something new,
seizes the initiative, or, in Kantian terms, forges its own chain. The miracle of freedom is
inherent in this ability to make a beginning which itself is inherent in the fact that every
human being, simply by being born into a world that was there before him and will be
there after him, is himself a new beginning (2005, p. 113).
Political action, then, was the ability to work a miracle, and this was freedom from the existing
state of the world and ongoing chains of events. This understanding of political action, as miracle
working was far more than a mere choice between predetermined or externally imposed
alternatives, instead it was the creation of a new chain of events. It was, in this way, an
abandoning of the forgone conclusions of future occurrence. Arendt indicated that there were
three such types of action: “the experience of action as starting a new enterprise in pre-polis
Greece, the experience of foundation in Rome, and the Christian experience of acting and
forgiving as linked” (Arendt, 2005, p. 60).
Arendt’s use of “miracle” did not entail spiritual or prophetic implications. She
emphasized the possibility of starting something anew, of bringing novel creation into being, of
undertaking unprecedented action. To perform a miracle was to embark upon the unforeseen
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path. The possibility of performing political miracles took on different connotations in different
historical eras. Miraculous ability, then, came in three forms, of which only one was confined to
the Greek world, while the other two were added by later traditions. The first mode of political
action as miracle was the original, Greek, ability to create anew. In the Greek world beginnings
were emphasized and this could be seen in Achilles as the heroic “doer of great deeds and
speaker of great words” (Arendt, 1958, p. 25). The Greek archein means both “to begin” and “to
lead” (Arendt, 1958, pp. 177, 189, 224; 2005, pp. 46, 114, 126). The notion of man, as a
beginning, was recognized by Augustine, though Arendt believed that he had done little with this
realization (Arendt, 2005, p. 59). This was integrally tied to the notion of political action as
rebirth, the re-creation of the self. One was, in essence, born anew upon engaging in political
action.
This rebirth required the presence of others, since action had no meaning if none
observed it. It was, in essence, the entire point of the polis. Achilles’s actions had been seen,
because so many of his equals, other kings of Greece, had been present; however, with Achilles
dead, Troy razed, and the kings dispersed those actions would have been lost had they not been
immortalized by Homer nearly a century later. To remedy the danger of action losing its
meaning, and perhaps the dependence upon poets, the Greeks institutionalized the public space,
the agora, which Achilles had found in the military camp and on the battle field, this was the
polis (Arendt, 2005, p. 123). Since there was the potential for action to be made political through
poetry or history it may, at times, take on a narrative-like quality. As Benhabib put it “[n]arrative
action is ubiquitous, for it is the stuff out of which all human social life . . . is constituted”
(2000, pp. 107-113).
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The similarity to narrative, and the requirement of the presence of others, gave political
action a revelatory quality, “men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal
identities and thus make their appearance in the human world” (Arendt, 1958, p. 179). This led
some to see Arendt’s concept of political action as associated with theatricality, to varying
degrees. For example, Kateb saw a political actor as a sort of performer who was both selfexpressive, and self-surprising, who changed himself as well as the world around him (Kateb,
1983, p. 10). Alternatively, Kateb thought that the political actor could be seen as obsessively
wearing a mask, purposefully revealing less of himself, and more of what he wanted his fellow
citizens to see (Kateb, 1983, pp. 10-11). Similarly, Villa emphasized the aesthetic nature of
Arendt’s political action, thus linking her to Nietzsche (Villa, 1992, Ch. 3; 1996; 1999, Ch. 6).
This aesthetic propensity permitted the transcendence of the divided psychology of the self,
thereby resulting in the unity of the individual (Villa, 1996, p. 91).3 On this view, living
aesthetically also provided an escape from Silenus’s pessimistic view of life.4
Such views could be supported. However, viewing Arendt’s political action in this way
may be somewhat “misleading,” to use Villa’s own admission, since she opposed the conflation
politics and art, that many, including Nietzsche had wanted to accomplish (Villa, 1996, p. 108).
Furthermore, emphasizing this sort of performance, with its necessarily individualistic nature,
ignored a significant component of Arendt’s notion of political action, namely, the collective,
deliberative component emphasizing persuasive words between equals (Arendt, 1963c, 1968,
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Resolving the divided self would offer a superior alternative to the philosophers’ turning
inward since in Arendt’s view that could not lead to the unity of the individual since human
plurality began within the mind (Arendt, 1958, 1990, 2005).
4

Silenus was quoted in both Arendt and Nietzsche, “[N]ot to be born prevails over all meaning
uttered in words; by far the second-best for life, once it has appeared, is to go as swiftly as
possible whence it came” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 281; Nietzsche, 2000, p. 42). Interestingly, Kateb
frames Arendt’s entire project as an answer to Silenus’s statement (Kateb, 1983).
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2005). Owing a debt to Burke, Arendt described political action as “acting together in concert”
(Arendt, 1968, p. 143). These two components of action, the individual and the collective, have
been termed the expressive and the communicative by d’Entreves, or alternatively, the agonistic
and the associational by Benhabib (Benhabib, 1992, 2000; d'Entreves, 1994). Alternatively,
d’Entreves expressed the view that, depending upon which component was emphasized,
interpreters would arrive at different understandings of Arendt’s political action, viewing it either
as individual performance or collective deliberation (1994, p. 85). In emphasizing the individual
performance aspect an interpreter neglects the aspect of collectivity and deliberation, and vice
versa. Habermas, in particular, emphasized the deliberative nature of Arendt’s concept of politics
(1962). By contrast, Sennett focused on the aspect of theatricality (1974). Villa, correctly, argued
that viewing these components as in tension with one another arose from a contemporary
inability to grasp the long forgotten spirit of a bygone age. To emphasize one aspect over the
other is to do Arendt a disservice, since she “is not promoting hero worship, nor is she yearning
for the days of communal self-representation” (Villa, 1999, p. 154). Neither individuality, nor
collectivity should be stressed at the expense of the other, because they were intended to exist
harmoniously in Arendtian politics.
Arendt’s second type of miraculous political action was the Roman notion of honoring
and defending a founding. This has received little attention in the scholarly commentaries on
Arendt. This absence of commentary may be due to the fact that this subject stepped out of the
Hellenic world that Arendt was so famous for analyzing. The emphasis on founding was
uniquely Roman, however, it grew from seeds sown by the Greeks. While the Greeks honored
Achilles as the doer of great deeds, as a great initiator of enterprise, the Romans identified with
Hector. Hector went to his death, not for his own immortality, as Achilles had, but as a sacrifice
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for his home, the city of Troy. This reverence for home, and Rome’s connection to Hector and
Troy through Virgil’s Aeneid, and the suffering and difficulty in creating Rome led to the belief
in the sacredness of founding. It “made it a holy duty to preserve whatever had been handed
down from the ancestors” (Arendt, 2005, p. 49). The political genius of Rome was located in
both founding and the related concept of legislation (Arendt, 1958, p. 195).
Thus, in the Roman experience “political action consists in the foundation and
preservation of a civitas” (Arendt, 2005, p. 47). Rome’s initial founding took the form of a peace
treaty, the great innovation of Rome, which represented a negotiated agreement between the
wayfarer Aeneas and the natives (Arendt, 2005, p. 183). The Roman’s political feats were the
creation of new and expanded political arenas by incorporating one-time enemies into a political
realm, making friends of enemies, creating equals out of unequals (Arendt, 2005, p. 178). This
was miraculous in that it broke a chain of hostile events, warfare and unpolitical conflict, and
created an expanded political realm. Even if the treaty was, effectually, a mandate, the end result
was the same, a larger political sphere. This was contrary to the Greek view, in which
negotiation was a continuation of war by the means of “cunning and deception” (Arendt, 2005, p.
165).
The Roman approach emphasized law, lex, which was seen as a contract between parties,
be they domestic citizens or foreigners incorporated into the ever-expanding political realm. The
creation of law, as a contract required proposals and counterproposals, and thus speech was as
important to the Roman as it had been to the Greek (Arendt, 2005, p. 179). The Romans also saw
a role for a legislator in politics, as opposed to the Greek practice of employing an external
lawgiver. Legislation and peace treaty came together as one in Rome’s Twelve Tables, which
was, in essence, “a contract between two warring factions, the patricians and the plebes, that
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required the approval of the entire populace” (Arendt, 2005, p. 179). In essence, for Rome,
politics was honoring Rome’s founding by expanding upon it through agreement, which in
theory was based upon deliberative speech between various parties whose relationships had
previously been nonpolitical.
Forgiveness was the third and final miraculous action, albeit the furthest removed from
politics. Forgiving, like the two previous forms of miracles, forged a new chain of events. Due to
the high degree of uncertainty in human affairs all the consequences of actions can never be
foreseen. There are ripples that continue endlessly and the actor could be forever tied to them as
their initiator. As Arendt put it, “[w]ithout being forgiven, released from the consequences of
what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from
which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever”
(Arendt, 1958, p. 237). Arendt believed that forgiveness as a remedy to this problem, as a way to
break the chain of previous events and forge a new chain, was discovered by Jesus.5 The source
of the discovery should not limit its scope of application. Arendt correctly wrote that “[t]he fact
that he made this discovery in a religious context and articulated it in religious language is no
reason to take it any less seriously in a strictly secular sense” (Arendt, 1958, p. 238).
Forgiving was miraculous in the respect that it did “the seemingly impossible . . . to make
a new beginning where beginnings seemed to have become no longer possible” (Arendt, 2005, p.
58). Forgiveness contained what no other, albeit miraculous, action could: fresh starts where
action had already been undertaken. It “guarantees the continuity of the capacity for action,”
ensuring that individuals were not forever locked into a single chain of events (Arendt, 2005, p.
59). Therefore, it ensured that subsequent political action is not forever clouded, or precluded, or
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In Arendt’s view forgiveness was a Judeo-Christian innovation, Griswold disputed this, arguing
that forgiveness was present in Pagan Greece and Rome (Griswold, 2007).
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not free due to action previously undertaken. Put another way, forgiveness combats the
irreversibility of human affairs (Arendt, 1958, pp. 236-243). Time and causality, after all, move
only in one direction. Additionally, to forgive was to act “anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned
by the act which provoked it” (Arendt, 1958, p. 237). Without forgiving an action would spawn
mere behavior, as predetermined retaliatory processes ensued (Schaap, 2005; Young-Bruehl,
2006). In short, forgiving created the possibility of free action, a hallmark of Arendtian politics.
Freedom
Since “[t]he raison d’être of politics is freedom and its field of experience is action” and
action was the human ability to work miracles in concert with others, the question of what
precisely freedom was remains (Arendt, 1954a, p. 146). Policy outcomes were far less important
than the freedom created, experienced, and shared by citizens coming together as political actors.
Arendt wrote of the outcomes of politics: “[O]f the actual content of political life – of the joy
and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and
appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring
new and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new” (1954a, p. 263).
Therefore, the result of, and the reason for political action were far different from both labor and
work, which had definitive and defined outcomes, pursued in the most instrumentally rational
and efficient manner possible. For this reason, politics, and zoon politikon, ran afoul of the
opinions of animal laborans and homo faber who, as previously mentioned viewed politics as
superfluous and denounced them (Arendt, 1958, p. 208).
Unsurprisingly, Arendt referred to the Greeks as the first people to experience freedom,
as if they discovered it in their way of life. Arendt’s notion of freedom could be understood as
freedom of movement. “Freedom originally meant nothing more than being able to go where one
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please”, but this indicated something far more than mere freedom to move about (Arendt, 2005,
p. 121). This freedom of movement entailed several notions, being free from the household, free
from fear, and freedom of the mind. At the most basic level, being free to move about meant that
no one could restrain the individual with the capacity for movement, that none ruled over him.
Additionally, one capable of movement was free from the burdens of necessity and he need not
worry about the maintenance of his house (Arendt, 2005, p. 121). In these ways free individuals
were free in that they were not subject to anyone else’s rule. In the Greek system this meant that
they must be the heads of the their households and once they emerged into the public sphere they
were amongst equals, and had no superiors in any realm.
The equality required for the political realm to function required that men be free from
the necessities of life. This made the functioning of the private realm crucial. Only once the
necessities of life were removed from consideration could an individual meet with other citizens
as a free and equal member of the polis. Only then could he engage in politics, and be capable of
free action. Restrictive necessities were provided for by the private oikos, and only those whose
necessities were met could stand on equal footing with other citizens. Without animal laborans
laboring to meet human needs in the background of the oikos, citizens could not be free from
necessity, and thus, could not be free and equal in the political realm. The system was built upon
the slavery and exclusion of many so that a few citizens could be free and equal within the
political realm.
Due to the equality of those in the political realm, the despotic mode of rule, the
uncommanded commander of the private sphere was not possible in the political, the two were
“mutually exclusive” (Arendt, 1958, p. 28). While engaged in politics none could influence
others with violence, nor could they simply issue commands. As an interesting example of the
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extreme prohibition of force and violence, Arendt noted the Athenian practice of persuading the
condemned to consume hemlock, as was the case with Socrates. “[T]hus sparing the Athenian
citizen under all circumstances the indignity of physical violation” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 12). This
view can only be described as idealistic. While in the literal sense this practice may have been
free of physical violence between citizens, it was certainly not lacking in coercion, or even force.
How many of the convicted would have voluntarily decided to drink the hemlock had they not
experienced some coercion to do so, or been deprived of any alternative?
Freedom of movement also meant freedom from fear, because moving into the political
realm required courage, one of the earliest political virtues (Arendt, 2005, pp. 122-123). Entering
the political realm required daring, it was a risk to the individual’s life. The household was
secure, all needs were met there, and the head of household ruled as a despot. Arendt wrote that
the Greeks had a word for the fear of leaving the security of the household, philopsychia (Arendt,
2005, p. 122). The opposite of this, the political man, was heroic because he was willing to leave
the security of his despotism. As Odysseus was willing to risk his life for knowledge, by
listening to the Sirens’ song, which none had heard and survived, citizens risked themselves to
experience politics and freedom.
Finally, freedom of movement also meant the freedom of the movement of the mind,
which sounds quite odd, but was crucial to Arendtian politics. This freedom came from Homer
who, as the educator of Hellas, endowed the Greeks with this movement by recounting history
from both sides, that of the Trojans as well as the Greeks, that of Hector as well as Achilles
(Arendt, 2005, p. 167). Just as history, the political realm was common to all within it, and this
meant that there were many ways to view any particular subject. To truly understand a subject
one must have the “ability to see the same thing first from two opposing sides and then from all
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sides . . .” (Arendt, 2005, p. 167). This ability to see an issue from a multitude of perspectives
was, by definition, to see it politically and permitted true understanding. This was not just an
individual momentarily setting their interests aside, nor was it totally abandoning them.
Persuading fellow citizens through speech meant that individuals were not strictly bound to their
own mental or physical standpoint (Arendt, 2005, p. 168). Therefore, this freedom of movement
of the mind was required for Arendtian politics to be possible. Indeed, for something to be
political meant it was understood in this way, form many viewpoints.
The result of this freedom of movement and many-sided understanding was phronēsis, or
political reason. It was a collective understanding, characterized as reasoned and agreed upon
common sense, common in the sense of politically common to all (Arendt, 1954a, p. 221).
Phronēsis also possessed an added dimension of knowledge derived from experience rather than
from theory. Once political action had occurred, and phronēsis had been achieved there would,
presumably, necessarily be an additional step, implementation. There seems little point in free
and equal men doing great deeds, speaking great words, coming to agreement and then stopping.
However, this was precisely where Arendt’s process stopped, or at least where her interest
wavered. She merely alluded to the implementation stage without expounding upon it (Arendt,
1954a, p. 166; 1958, pp. 189, 222). This would likely be considered administration in her mind
and outside of the political realm.
Arendt wrote that, “[a]ction, to be free must be free from motive on one side, from its
intended goal as a predictable effect on the other” (Arendt, 1954a, p. 151). In order to be free,
and thus political, action needed to be able to transcend motives and goals (Arendt, 1954a, p.
151). Action must be depersonalized in that it must be “neither under the guidance of the
intellect nor under the dictate of the will” (Arendt, 1954a, p. 152). Political action, then, must not
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merely be the product of the forceful will, the calculating intellect, or, of course, the needs of the
body.
Arendt employed the concept of “acting from a principle” (Arendt, 1954a, p. 151). A
principle came from outside of the actor; it was an idea both generalizable in nature and
universally valid. A principle only came into being when an individual acted in accordance with
it, the “appearance of freedom, like the manifestation of principles, coincides with the
performing act” (Arendt, 1954a, pp. 152-153). Arendt provided a few examples of principles,
some dark like fear, distrust, hatred, but primarily her examples were nobler, like honor, glory,
love, equality, distinction, and excellence (Arendt, 1954a, p. 152). A principle was a peculiar
thing, it inspired and provided impetus for a political actor; however, without that individual’s
action the principle remained an ephemeral, nascent thing, which only came into being through
action. By way of example, Arendt wrote that a political actor did not pursue honor, rather he did
all things honorably. Put another way, all of his deeds were honorable ones (1954a, p. 241).
Remaining with the example of honor, an actor lived his life honorably, and did honorable deeds,
and in so doing brought honor into being. He was both motivated by and the creator of this
principle. He was willing to sacrifice his own private interests to live in accordance with his
principle and to sacrifice, depersonalize himself to bring it into being. This line of thinking led
Arendt to characterize the process as self-forgetting (1963c, p. 285).
If political action was characterized by its simultaneous loyalty to, and creation of a
principle, it could equally be characterized by its lack of functional, external goal seeking, since
the “[t]he raison d’être of politics is freedom” (Arendt, 1954a, p. 146). The subject of Arendtian
politics could be seen as not specifically directed toward achieving any particular ends. This led
some to view such politics as totally empty of content. For example, Kateb used the metaphor of
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politics as a game to describe the totally self-contained nature of the political (1983). However,
Kateb reduced the content of this game of Arendtian politics to contemporary power politics. He
wrote that “even when politics was not a class war” it was “a wargame, a conditioning for war”
(Kateb, 1983, p. 22). 6 This reduction was not consistent with Arendtian politics. Arendt
explicitly expressed the view that warfare was not properly political, that it was, at best, an issue
peripheral to politics, and that the fact that it had come to be conflated with politics was a result
of the rise of the social, as discussed below (Arendt, 1963a, 2005).
Moreover, though freedom from necessity was important to Arendtian politics, that
freedom was in no way the purpose of politics. Such freedom from necessity was actually the
meaning of politics, rather than the outcome. Put another way “politics and freedom are
identical, and wherever this kind of freedom does not exist, there is no political space in the true
sense” (Arendt, 2005, p. 129). In the presence of the demands of necessity, Arendtian politics
would simply not have existed; there would be no political realm, no polis, and no freedom. If
freedom was required for politics to come into existence, how then could freedom be created?
Not politically, since freedom was needed for the political to exist. In the Greek world the
creation of laws, and the conducting of foreign policy were the “means” of protecting a political
realm, but were not tantamount to politics. “They are phenomena peripheral to politics and
therefore not politics itself” (Arendt, 2005, p. 129).
The polis itself was not the definition of the political; rather it was one mode of
organizing what embodied the political. It was a specific form of human communal life wherein
“men in their freedom can interact with one another without compulsion, force, and rule over one
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Kateb was not alone in this regard. In an early review of The Human Condition Auden (1959)
expressed a similar view. More recently, Breen (2007) offered an interpretation of Arendtian
politics that included some aspects of violence and power.

	
  

38
another as equals, commanding and obeying one another only in emergencies – that is, in times
of war – but otherwise managing all their affairs by speaking with and persuading one another”
(Arendt, 2005, pp. 129-130). As such, the polis has become representative of the political, not
just to Arendt, but to many others as well. Life in the polis was distinct from all other forms of
communal life that had been experienced, the family for example, in that within the polis, unlike
other communities, there was freedom. Freedom was not acquired by virtue of political means,
but rather “being free and living in the polis were, in a certain sense, one and the same” (Arendt,
2005, pp. 45, 117). Again, Arendt expressed the view that freedom was not an end pursued by
politics, but was identical to political life. Freedom could be understood “negatively as not being
ruled or ruling, and positively as a space which can be created only by men” (Arendt, 2005, p.
116).
Politics and freedom were inextricably bound together, as well as being separated from
and opposed to both the necessities of life and the means of achieving any unchanging, specific
goals. It was clear from Arendt’s work that politics of this pure and idealized type did not exist in
all places or at all times. Arendtian politics may have existed for little more than fleeting
moments in the history of human civilization, though fleeting these historical moments were
crucial. These moments, such as the time in which the Greek polis existed, “set the standard,” by
which to determine “those epochs denied a full experience of political reality” (Arendt, 2005, pp.
116-117). Though these moments of Arendtian politics may be nearly impossible to imitate, the
concepts inherent within them became criteria by which to judge the politics that occur in all
other places and times. Since freedom and this form of the political were inseparable, judging
politics entailed judging the extent to which freedom was realized. Whenever the politics of the
age resembled those of the great historical moments the political realm embodied a form of
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politics close enough to the Arendtian standard that it was capable of action, miracles, and
freedom. Whenever the politics of the age were too far afield from the great moments, Arendtian
politics do not exist and neither do freedom, the possibility of action, or miracles. By Arendt’s
account the contemporary age was one characterized by impure politics and hence a lack of
freedom. Contemporary politics had strayed from their classical, Arendtian precursor as a result
of the rise of the social, and all of the changes entailed within that concept.
2.4 The Origins of the Social
Prior to a discussion of the social’s effects on the world, and Arendtian politics, it is
important to understand just where the social came from. Put another way, how was the social
unleashed upon politics, in the Arendtian sense? The roots of the social have been found in
Hobbes’s political thought, and grew during the world’s experience with imperialism and
totalitarianism. Finally, the appearance of the social question, which arose during the French
Revolution, and was championed by Marxist thought, thrust the social onto the political stage.
While those factors certainly played a role in the tale of the social, the story must begin before
Hobbes, before nineteenth century imperialism, and before twentieth century totalitarianism. To
get the full account requires looking back to Greek antiquity itself, and the conflict between
philosophy and politics. Once the conditions were properly suitable the social rose and changed
politics into something so different from the Arendtian conception that it is virtually
unrecognizable as politics.
The Philosophical Leveling
Arendt’s analysis of the conflict between philosophy and politics has been explored in its
own right;7 however, its connection to the rise of the social has been largely neglected. Stated
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See Kateb (1983), Badiou (2005, Ch. 1), Canovan (1992, Ch. 7), Dolan (2000), Honig (1993,
Ch. 4), Ling Lee (1997, Ch. 6), Parekh (1981), Pukkinen (2003), and Schaap (2012).
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simply, in Arendt’s account of the Hellenic world, philosophy and politics were hostile to one
another. As a result of this conflict the philosophers undertook a leveling of distinctions, putting
all components of the vita activa on par with one another in that they were all done out of
necessity. This destroyed the priority given to politics, which had placed it in a location above
work and labor. This destroyed all of the distinctions with the vita activa. The only surviving
distinction was that between the bios theoretikos and all other ways of life. This philosophical
position then became widespread in other, non-Greek philosophies, and in religion. This process
will be briefly recounted here.
It is important to understand that philosophy was not political. Philosophy was
unspeakable, without, words, aneu logon, just as were those outside the political realm (Arendt,
2005). Philosophers’ knowledge “cannot be imparted to the multitude in the conventional
manner of persuasion . . . because their revelation and perception are not communicable in
speech at all . . .” (Arendt, 1958, p. 20). Put another way, philosophy was not capable of the kind
of speech required for political action. For example, Socrates spoke at his trial, but was unable to
persuade the Athenian establishment, nor was he able to persuade his friends that he must remain
within the city (Plato, 1997a, 1997b). According to Arendt’s account of Plato, Socrates’s
mistake was employing dialectic, philosophical speech, which was incapable of persuading the
multitude, rather than rhetoric, political speech, which was designed for just that purpose
(Arendt, 2005, p. 13). This demonstrated that the political realm was unsuitable for philosophy.
This event led to Plato and the Sophists denunciation of doxa, opinion, in favor of truth,
which could only be discovered through philosophy. They doubted the ability of the polis and
politics to achieve appropriately just ends, believing reason and philosophy the superior
alternative. Plato portrayed the rebellion of contemplation, philosophy, against action, politics.
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This pitted the philosopher’s life of the mind against the citizen’s life of action within the polis
(Arendt, 2005, pp. 12-13).8 The moment Plato’s philosopher-king claimed the right to rule others
based upon his superior reason the political became threatened (Arendt, 1982, pp. 16-27). He
established what Arendt called a “tyranny of reason,” which did not use coercion, but
nonetheless threatened politics by installing a philosopher-king in place of isonomy (Arendt,
1954d, p. 107).9 This was in Villa’s words “Plato’s revenge on the polis for killing Socrates and
endangering his memory” (Villa, 1999, p. 217).
The “rise of political theory” negated distinctions that characterized Arendt’s classical
world, and heralded contemplation as the highest activity, razing the differences between labor,
work, and action and placing all in a subordinate condition to the bios theoretikos of the
philosophers (Arendt, 1958, p. 85). Theorizing became a new form of action above all others.
Politics was demoted to the level of necessity, and the zoon politikon, homo faber, and animal
laborans were made equal. Humans even at their most primitive were beings of association.
Political science as the study of associations could be seen as the master science to the degree
that it could explain humans on the most basic level and not because its association with the polis
as form of association elevated as a field of inquiry. The philosophers’ self-promotion to a
superior status was expanded upon by the advent of Christian political thought and particularly
with Augustine. Christianity placed religion, piety and religious contemplation, above all other
forms of activity. This made popularly available a way of life above the distinction between
public and private. While philosophy was only accessible to the few, religion was accessible to
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Arendt’s has been criticized for misreading Plato to accommodate her idealized view of the
Greek polis, and exaggerating Plato’s conflict with it (Hull, 2002, p. 33).
9

However, Plato abandoned statecraft in favor of soulcraft (Plato, 1968, 591c-592b). As Villa
noted this runs counter to Arendt’s account by abandoning the project of the ideal city in favor of
developing an ideal soul (1999, p. 198).
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the many and so the classical distinction could be abandoned by all men in favor of elevating
either philosophy or religion (Arendt, 1958, p. 85). In this manner, religion was philosophy for
the masses.
Moreover, philosophy also denied human plurality. Arendt believed that plurality was not
just an external fact, but existed within each individual. Philosophy denied this believing that
each individual could attain unity by turning inward and contemplating, arriving at truth. This
was the case with Plato’s philosopher capable of escaping the cave in that famous allegory
(Arendt, 2005). Plurality was also denied by maintaining that there was but one truth, one
appropriate form, and hence, politically one way of proceeding. In essence, the philosophers
conflated the beautiful with the good, the useful. This position was evidence by the Socratic
knowledge in virtue formula. The Republic’s craftsman analogy showed individuals imitating
transcendent ideas (Arendt, 1954d, p. 113; Plato, 1968, 596b). In utilizing this analogy “the ideas
become the unwavering, ‘absolute’ standards for political and moral behavior and judgment” and
this became the mode of proceeding with new “authoritarian forms of government” wherein the
“source of their authority, which legitimates the exercise of power, must be beyond the sphere of
power” (Arendt, 1954d, pp. 97-98, 110-111). Politics could no longer undertake action, but
should simply follow the standards created outside of the political realm, by the philosopher.
Politics must adhere to these “unvarying ‘yardsticks’” provided by philosophers (Villa, 1999, p.
93). Isonomy gave way to tyranny with the philosophy or religion playing the role of tyrant
(Arendt, 1954d, p. 111).
Politics no longer existed for its own sake, for freedom. It was merely an instrument for
implementing externally determined ideals. Thus, politics became a realm of means and ends,
like work, and operated most efficiently by command and coercion. It was necessity, like work
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and labor, needed to implement the true ideals of the philosopher or religionist, or more simply
to maintain order. The result was “a categorical system of means and ends, of ruling and being
ruled, of interests and moral standards” and in this new system “there is hardly any room for the
spirit of starting an enterprise, and together with others, seeing it through it its conclusion”
(Arendt, 2005, p. 45). In short, once this mode of thought took over the possibility of miracles
was destroyed. To borrow the Tocquevillian language the possibility of great politics was no
more, or to borrow Lincoln’s language there could be no great new birth of freedom as none
belonging to the family of the lion or the tribe of the eagle could emerge. This brought politics to
the level of the other components of the vita activa, and so made their methods appropriate to the
political realm. This was a crucial part of the rise of the social. It was not just the Greeks who
were responsible for this, but later philosophers as well. For example, in Arendt’s account, Marx
conflated all human activity with labor, the difference between classes of men was merely who
benefited from their labor (Arendt, 2005, pp. 90-92). Again, the importance of this position is
that all human activity is undertaken out of necessity.
Philosophy had favored the internal bios theoretikos over all components of the vita
activa. “They had discovered, in the activity of thought itself, a hidden human capacity for
turning away form the whole realm of human affairs which should not be taken too seriously by
men . . .” (Arendt, 1954b, p. 47). This resulted in turning inward, away from the public realm;
freedom was no longer found in the presence of others, but within oneself. Philosophy was not
accessible to all, nor would everyone accept the same philosophy, and many alternatives were
available. Arendt cited from a wide variety of thinkers from Christians like Tertullian and
Luther, to the quintessentially American Madison, to the radical Nietzsche who shared in the
belief that a life removed from politics was preferable to, and more human than, the bios
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politikos (Arendt, 2005, pp. 84-85). The political realm of equals was degraded in favor of
isolation. Arendt wrote that, “it does not matter if man in his solitude searches for truth, finally
attaining it in the speechless contemplation of the idea of ideas, or whether he cares for the
salvation of his soul.” What mattered was the preference for solitude to living together (Arendt,
2005, pp. 84-85). This rejection of the world, this loss of the world, and this alienation from the
world were related to the rise of the social.
Hobbesian Man
It was obvious from the tremendous effort Arendt devoted to the analysis of
totalitarianism that she cared deeply about it, which should not be surprising given her
experience as a refugee from Nazism. Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism has been the subject of
much commentary.10 However, few have directly linked The Origins of Totalitarianism to the
rise of the social. 11 Despite this relative lack of scholarly attention Arendt’s analysis of
totalitarianism played an important role in the rise of the social, bringing certain aspects of the
social into being. Though Arendt’s most direct engagement with the rise of the social is located
within The Human Condition the seeds of her thought on the topic were sown in The Origins of
Totalitarianism, which was written over a decade prior. Pitkin wrote that reading The Origins in
the light of The Human Condition made it seem as though Arendt’s argument had “had gone
underground, where it had begun to proliferate and diversify, sending up new shoots everywhere
in a rich but utterly unsystematic plethora of applications” (1998, p. 70).
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A number of Arendt scholars have explicitly dedicated effort to understanding her The Origins
of Totalitarianism. For example, see Baehr (2002), Beiner (2000), Benhabib (2000, Ch. 3),
Canovan (1992, Ch. 2), Canovan (2000), Dietz (2000), Kateb (1983, Ch. 2), Lang (1994),
McGowan (1998, Ch. 1), Stanley (1994).
11
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A component of the social and totalitarianism were born as twins with Thomas Hobbes as
their father. Hobbes’s thought represented a sea change for Arendt giving rise to two of the
phenomena of the modern age which concerned her the most. As Degryse and Leuven put it, for
Arendt, Hobbes “was the philosopher who ‘expressed the values of the new social class,’ the
bourgeoisie” (Arendt, 1966, p. 139; Degryse & Leuven, 2008, p. 243). Hobbes’s Leviathan was
the foundation of a new body politic, one that was based upon the needs of the bourgeoisie, who
were solitary and self-interested, and simultaneously the reconceptualization of man to fit neatly
into that category, and to be content with the Leviathan state (Arendt, 1966, pp. 139-140).12
Conceptualizing man in this way allowed Hobbes to conflate private interests with public
interests. As Arendt put it:
Hobbes’s Leviathan, exposed the only political theory according to which the state is
based not on some kind of constituting law—whether divine law, the law of nature, or the
law of social contract—which determines the rights and wrongs of the individual’s
interest with respect to public affairs, but on the individual interests themselves, so that
“the private interest is the same with the publique” (Arendt, 1966, p. 139).
The only common interest shared by these men is security and so the private interest of each is
the public interest of all: security. Men exchange their “political rights” in order to gain the
security they so desperately need to escape the state of nature (Arendt, 1966, p. 139).
Hobbesian man, his singular interest in, and passion for power after power, the things he
will give up to escape a life that is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” not only redefines
man, but a number of other important concepts as well. Law, equality, power, freedom, all those
things that comprised or resulted from politics took on new meanings and thus politics itself
become something entirely novel. Equality in Hobbes’s state of nature was the equality to kill or
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Arendt believed that Hobbes understood the inaccuracy of his portrayal of man, writing “it
would be a grave injustice to Hobbes and his dignity as a philosopher to consider this picture of
man an attempt at psychological realism or philosophical truth” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 62).
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to be killed, thus all men were equal in their desperation for security. Upon entering society men
were equal in their subjugation to the state. Law was not reasonably debated and agreed upon by
citizens but was beyond question and laid down by the state. Law now “emanated from the
power monopoly of the state (and is not established by man according to human standards of
right and wrong)” (Arendt, 1966, p. 139). Law was constructed, followed, and made legitimate
by the fact that it was mandated by the state. “In regard to the law of the state—that is, the
accumulated power of society as monopolized by the state—there is no question of right or
wrong, but only absolute obedience, the blind conformism of bourgeois society” (Arendt, 1966,
p. 141). Citizens capable of creating law were now mere subjects of it.
Power was no longer shared among equals, with none being commander or commanded.
Power was nearly devoid of anything other than economic content. It was, according to Arendt’s
analysis of Hobbes, “the accumulated control that permits the individual to fix prices and
regulate supply and demand in such a way that they contribute to his own advantage” (Arendt,
1966, p. 141). Under such conditions “only chance can decide who will succeed” (Arendt, 1966,
p. 141). This sort of world bore little resemblance to the world as it had previously existed, in
Arendt’s account of the Greek polis, for example.
Freedom also took on “modern” meaning and came to be understood “as freedom from
politics, the liberty not to engage in politics” (Arendt, 1966, p. 139). Arendt described this
condition as follows: “The highest purpose of politics, ‘the end of government,’ was the guaranty
of security; security, in turn, made freedom possible, and the word ‘freedom’ designated a
quintessence of activities which occurred outside the political realm” (Arendt, 1966, p. 141).
Classically, freedom was only possible within the political realm; it was now only possible
outside of it. Freedom, then, was freedom from precisely what had previously defined it. The
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state, and the act of governing, which only it could engage in, was the new location of politics:
“For government, which since the beginning of the modern age had been identified with the total
domain of the political, was now considered to be the appointed protector not so much of
freedom as of the life process, the interests of society and its individuals” (Arendt, 1966, p. 141).
In Arendt’s view it was clear that politics had taken on a new meaning, incorporating once
excluded private elements. Necessity was the primary concern, Arendtian politics was removed
from life, and thus, individuals were deprived of the freedom, equality, and power that they once
shared within it.
Hobbesian man need not concern himself with the public good, as men previously had.
The common good was nothing more than the sum of individual private goods (Arendt, 1954a, p.
148). Thus, “[t]he transformation of the family man from a responsible member of society,
interested in all public affairs, to a ‘bourgeois’ concerned only with his private existence and
knowing no civic virtue, is an international modern phenomenon” (Arendt, 1954a, p. 148). Man
was socialized so as to fit into bourgeoisie society (Arendt, 1958, p. 35). This change, arising
from Hobbes, this loss of concern and responsibility for the common good altered politics
making it a mere function of society. Politics, as a function of society, existed to serve society
not to contradict or act against it. Politics, thus, came to serve the sum of individual interests;
serving any other concept of the good would be counter to its new definition as mere function.
Moreover, in Hobbes, society was understood in a limited way. Rather than the entire
“web of human relationships,” as Arendt defined society in The Human Condition, it denoted
only economic relationships. Politics, as a function of society, served but one aspect of society,
economic interests. These economic interests were isolated and individual. Correspondingly,
politics was utilized to protect and advance the economic interests of individuals. Under these
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conditions men did not take the political playing field as equals, since they were not economic
equals, indeed, the private sphere was a realm of inequality (Arendt, 1994, p. 129). For Arendt,
equality was no longer possible, as it could only arise through politics of the Arendtian sort,
where men became and interacted as equals. Arendt wrote: “Equality, in contrast to all that is
involved in mere existence, is not given us, but is the result of human organization insofar as it is
guided by the principle of justice. We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a
group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights” (1966, p.
143). Since individuals were economically unequal, politics came to promote the more powerful
interests. The ultimate form of this was imperialism.
Imperialism
Hobbes’s theory created a new notion of politics and a new understanding of man as
bourgeoisie and correspondingly a new understanding of politics. These changes could be
concretely seen developing at the level of the affairs and direction of state. This new bourgeois
man, concerned only with individual interests, was able to seize and direct politics through the
apparatuses of the parliamentary system. Arendt wrote that this system “allowed the liberal
bourgeoisie to gain control over the state machine” (Arendt, 1966, p. 301). 13 By Arendt’s
account the effects were felt most acutely in Germany, due to the deprivation experienced postWorld War I. The condition of deprivation experienced in that context naturally lent itself to a
preoccupation with individual necessity:
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
13
Arendt’s view on the subject is similar, to but distinguishable from, that of Marxists. The
similarity lies in the means by which the bourgeoisie were seen to seize power. However, their
views are distinguishable in that, for Arendt, “[i]mperialism must be considered the first stage in
political rule of the bourgeoisie rather than the last stage of capitalism” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 62).
Arendt was referring to, and to a degree polemicizing against, Lenin’s Imperialism: The Highest
Stage of Capitalism, which she explicitly mentioned elsewhere in The Origins of Totalitarianism
(Arendt, 1966, p. 19). Thus, for her, imperialism is not a purely economic movement, but one
containing political elements.
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Deprived of political rights, the individual, to whom public and official life manifest
itself in the guise of necessity, acquires a new and increased interest in his private life and
personal fate. Excluded from participation in the management of public affairs that
involve all citizens, the individual loses his rightful place in society and his natural
connection with his fellow men (Arendt, 1966, p. 301).
Arendt, unsurprisingly, understood participation as the crucial element of political rights
referenced above. Political rights, and freedom generally, “means the right ‘to be a participator in
government,’ or it means nothing” (Arendt, 1966, p. 97).
The imperialism Arendt had in mind was not just the 19th century origins of empire or
colonialism, but rather the onset of a the type of politics required by capitalism and its newly
emancipated people: the bourgeoisie (Arendt, 1963c, p. 218; 1966, p. 97). Crucially, the
bourgeoisie took little interest in matters that were traditionally political and were instead sated
by “every type of state that could be trusted with protection of property rights” (Canovan, 1992,
p. 29). The bourgeoisie preoccupation with economics resulted in a new impetus directing the
political affairs of state. The economy was restrained by the upper limit of domestic markets and
required additional territorial inputs if economic expansion was to continue. This warranted the
attention of the bourgeoisie who took newfound interest in the political affairs of state. In
essence “the nation-state had proved unfit to be the framework for the further growth of capitalist
economy,” and so with no other recourse they entered the political realm, redirecting the aims of
the state.
The acquisition of new markets and resources, in short economic concerns, became the
dominant foreign policy goal. Thus, language of the bourgeois businessman was integrated into
the political realm of foreign policy. Arendt wrote: “The bourgeoisie turned to politics out of
economic necessity; for it did not want to give up the capitalist system whose inherent law is
constant economic growth, it had to impose this law upon its home governments and to proclaim
expansion to be an ultimate political goal of foreign policy” (Arendt, 1966, p. 138). Power
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became intertwined with property, as only the accumulation of the former could ensure the safety
of the latter (Arendt, 1966, p. 124). However, the bourgeoisie never obtained absolute control
over the state. “National institutions resisted throughout the brutality and megalomania of
imperialist aspirations and bourgeois attempts to use the state and its instrument of violence for
its own economic purposes were always only half successful” (1966, p. 126). Being only half
successful led down the dark and unforeseen path to totalitarianism. The oppression and
exploitation of foreign peoples “aroused national consciousness and desire for sovereignty
among the conquered people, thereby defeating all genuine attempts at empire building” (Arendt,
1966, p. 137). The nationalism born in reaction to the only partially realized bourgeoisie push for
imperialism turned upon the conquering nation-state, destroying their rule of law and leading
them into the totalitarianism of the twentieth century and toward the rise of the social. Canovan
wrote “in a nutshell, Arendt’s claim was that twentieth-century totalitarianism had been made
possible by late nineteenth-century imperialism” (Arendt, 1966, p. 137) 14
Totalitarianism
Totalitarianism embodied the premise that “everything is possible,” (Arendt, 1966, pp.
vii, 303, 382, 387, 427, 436, 437, 440, 441, 459). However, in reality, everything is not possible,
as has been repeatedly demonstrated throughout history. The totalitarian attempt to make
everything possible was based upon fiction and domination. The result was inhuman atrocity,
millions of deaths, and world war. As important as these are, what is more important for the
purposes of my project is the manner in which totalitarianism was the root of some aspects of the

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
14
There were, to be sure, inaccuracies in Arendt’s claims about totalitarianism. Benhabib’s
critique of Arendt’s claim that imperialism led to totalitarianism was particularly interesting
(Benhabib, 2000, Ch. 3).
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social. Totalitarianism was the basis for the social by reducing humanity to a mass, by offering
an alternative to the reality of the world, and by making politics evil.
The first pillar of totalitarianism was fiction. The totalitarian movement created a
fictitious world through propaganda (Arendt, 1966, Ch. 11). The propaganda’s “form of
infallible prediction . . . has become more important than their content” (Arendt, 1966, p. 348).
The totalitarian must always be right and would stop at nothing in order to be so (Arendt, 1966,
p. 349). It would also, certainly, portray events in the light most consistent with its fictional
world. Thus, totalitarianism created a world in which it took on God-like prescience. Being
always correct, this fiction was far more consistent than the real world. In this way it isolated
people from the world, protecting them from “the never ending shocks which real life and real
experiences deal to human beings and their expectations” (Arendt, 1966, p. 343). The results
were to create a mass of people who were simultaneously gullible and cynical who “think that
everything was possible and that nothing was true” (Arendt, 1966, p. 369).
Regardless of the wicked content of the totalitarian fictional world, it had already dealt a
blow to Arendtian politics. A fictional world, even a pleasant one, denies the engagement with
the world necessary for politics and action to occur. Of course, the totalitarian fiction was not
pleasant, and hence, matters were even worse. However, Kateb interpreted Arendt’s claim that
anyone could become infallible, with a suitable fiction and the use of violence, as meaning that
she possessed too much faith in human ability to reshape the world (Arendt, 1966, p. 375; Kateb,
1983, p. 79). Canovan rightly pointed out that Kateb’s position overlooked such infallibility’s
“extinction of creativity, even on the part of the leaders themselves” (Canovan, 1992, p. 57). If
men can be made infallible and omni-prescient then there is no room for newness in the world,
miracles become unneeded and impossible.
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The second pillar of totalitarianism was total domination. “What is unprecedented in
totalitarianism is not primarily its ideological content, but the event of totalitarian domination
itself” (Arendt, 1953b, p. 80).15 Using what passed for politics at the time, which were certainly
not of the Arendtian sort, totalitarian regimes attempted to prove that everything is possible by
dominating every aspect of individual lives. Individuals were reduced to animal laborans, and
even their labor was dominated by public power (Arendt, 1966, p. 475). This destroyed any
distinction between public and private by making every aspect of human life the subject of
violent domination. This too was unprecedented: totalitarianism was “not content” with
destroying the capacity of individuals to be political actors by removing them from that realm,
but felt the need to additionally destroy their private lives (Arendt, 1966, p. 475). Totalitarian
governments are those “in which the totality of human life is claimed to be so totally politicized
that under them there is no longer any freedom whatsoever” (Arendt, 2005, p. 108). It is no
wonder then, that freedom was seen as incompatible with politics, and “cannot exist wherever
politics has not yet found its limit and its end” (Arendt, 2005, p. 109).
The totalitarian methods of absolute domination and fiction were most fully displayed in
the camps, which were the ultimate attempt to prove that everything is possible. The totalitarian
fiction was in full effect, creating a continuous stream of objective enemies, once one group was
eliminated the next was attacked (Arendt, 1966, p. 424). Once real enemies were eliminated
totalitarianism turned to objective enemies who were, using the Bolshevik language, “criminals
without a crime” (Arendt, 1966, p. xxxiii). These plans must be carried out to the greatest extent
possible to make reality consistent with fiction. During the midst of the largest war ever seen,
even while losing, Germany dedicated resources to exterminating objective enemies to complete
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
15
Baehr provided an analysis of Arendt’s notion of “unprecedented,” comparing her analysis to
that of sociologists, like Talcott Parsons (2002).
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as much of its fictitious project, and to the extent possible remain infallible (Arendt, 1966, p.
422).
Once individuals were identified as part of a group of objective enemies their humanity
was stripped away. First, the juridical person was killed off, they were no longer the subject of
rights (Arendt, 1966, p. 427). Second, the moral person was destroyed, martyrdom rendered
impossible, by making fate and punishment arbitrary they removed control over any aspect of
life and death, heroism was impossible (Arendt, 1966, p. 451). Finally, all individuality was
destroyed, every victim was identical to every other, incapable of action, and could in no way
control anyone’s fate (Arendt, 1966, pp. 452-452). Pitkin compared individuals in this state to
robots, an apt analogy (Pitkin 1998). Arendt used the phrase “living corpses” (Arendt, 1966, p.
451). Biological entity or robot, alive or a corpse, it is clear that humans in this state were not
capable of individual or collective action and hence not capable of humanity in Arendt’s sense of
the term.
Outside of the camps the situation was far less deadly, but only slightly less dire for the
prospects of political action. Arbitrariness was extended throughout society; ad hoc decrees took
the place of the rule of law or even the “never-resting, dynamic ‘will of the Fuhrer,’” for
example (Arendt, 1966, p. 365). This made everyone a potential criminal without a crime.
Furthermore, the constant fear of secret police, or their informants, had the desired effect of
keeping everyone isolated (Arendt, 1966, pp. 419-437). This fear made intimacy, self-disclosure,
and collective action impossible, and therefore, so was politics. Citizens, too, were reduced to a
mass with no agency and no ability to act in concert.
The Social Question
Arendt, in On Revolution, laments that the sciences of psychology and sociology have
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buried freedom, which was once accessible through Arendtian politics. In the portion of that
work titled “The Social Question” she traced the role of necessity in the history of revolutionary
thought as well as the proceeding “condensation of happenings into concepts” (Arendt, 1966, p.
124). The French Revolution was a watershed moment in the history of revolution in that it was a
physical necessity, which “appeared now perhaps for the first time in the full light of history,”
rather than as historical necessity. Arendt’s unique interpretation of the French Revolution was
contrasted with the prior American Revolution which she viewed as a political revolution based
upon common deliberation in a public realm (Arendt, 1966, p. 127). The French Revolution was
viewed as a social revolution, though that exact term was not used. “The inescapable fact was
that liberation from tyranny spelled freedom only for the few and was hardly felt by the many
who remained loaded down by their misery” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 59). Thus, once the yoke of
tyranny was cast off the revolutionaries faced the perhaps more difficult task of liberating those
in misery from the burden of their unmet necessities (Arendt, 1963c, p. 59).
The French Revolution set the stage for the clash between the necessities of historical
processes and life processes. The life processes represented the bodily needs which were the
concerns of all humans, but occupied varying degrees of attention within individual lives. The
French Revolution may have begun as a political affair but changed course once the poor
engaged the cause. They were driven by the unmet, or very difficult to meet, bodily necessities,
required for life to persist. Social theorists share in common a concern with necessity, with life
processes: “they see a multitude – the factual plurality of a nation, or a people or society – in the
image of one supernatural body driven by one superhuman, irresistible ‘general will’” (Arendt,
1963c, p. 74). The social question arose with the existence of poverty, a thoroughly
dehumanizing force. Poverty differed from deprivation in that the former was a constant state of
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acute misery and unmet need where individuals were totally at the mercy of the biological
dictates of their bodies, while the latter may be more fleeting or may be more easily alleviated
(Arendt, 1963c, p. 60).
Of the poor, Arendt wrote “[w]hen they appeared on the scene of politics, necessity
appeared with them, and the result was that the power of the old regime became impotent and the
new republic was stillborn; freedom had to be surrendered to necessity, to the urgency of the life
process itself” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 74). The revolutionary government was taken hostage by the
necessities of the people. Robespierre recognized this and announced that “‘everything which is
necessary to maintain life must be common good and only the surplus can be recognized as
private property’” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 60). Liberty, as he conceived it, was dragged down from its
privileged position and in its place up went the demands of the Sans-Culottes who were
concerned with “‘dress, food and the reproduction of their species’” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 60).
Arendt blamed this change for unleashing the terror that ensued and dooming the Revolution.
Robespierre himself viewed this as a failure lamenting that they had missed “‘the moment to
found freedom’” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 60).
Therefore, as far as Arendt was concerned, the French Revolution missed its historical
moment not due to ongoing battle with an entrenched tyrant, but because it was distracted by
necessity and the need to alleviate poverty. The happiness and the welfare of the people replaced
freedom as the ultimate goal. This, not the creation of freedom, was the truly historical moment
of the French Revolution and would influence all subsequent revolutions. “The Transformation
of the Rights of Man into the rights of Sans-Culottes was the turning point not only of the French
Revolution but of all revolutions that were to follow” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 60). Dress, food, and
life became the true underlying principles of revolution, replacing ideals of liberté, égalité,
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fraternité present at the outset.
In On Revolution Arendt presented an original albeit controversial view of Marx, as her
views on Marx nearly always were.16 Marx was “the greatest theorist the revolutions ever had”
(Arendt, 1963c, pp. 60-61). Marx stood above all others as the theorist of necessity. He was more
concerned with history than politics. Thus, he ignored the intentions of the revolutionaries, the
foundation of freedom, in favor of emphasizing what he saw as objective forces of revolutionary
events. Having come to these conclusions Arendt viewed Marx as anti-political, caring more
about necessity. Arendt wrote that Marx “became convinced that the reason why the French
Revolution had failed to found freedom was that it had failed to solve the social question”
(Arendt, 1963c, p. 61). Marx’s conclusion was that freedom was not possible if poverty existed.
“His most explosive and indeed most original contribution to the cause of revolution was that he
interpreted the compelling needs of mass poverty in political terms as an uprising, not for the
sake of bread or wealth, but for the sake of freedom as well” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 61). Marx
learned that poverty can be a “political force of the first order” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 62). To make
social conditions political Marx transformed the social question into a political question. His
vehicle for this was the notion of exploitation wherein one class possesses the means of violence
and uses them to rule over subordinate classes.
The social question brought private concerns over necessity into the public realm. This
meant that whenever and wherever the social question arose politics would cease to be Arendtian
and become a politics contaminated by social concerns. This doomed revolutions, and Arendtian
politics generally. The rise of the social could, in part, be viewed as the creation of conditions
under which social questions are constantly posed, thereby dooming Arendtian politics.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
16
One commentator called Arendt’s reading of Marx “mistaken and gross distortion” (R. J.
Bernstein, 1986, p. 247).
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2.5 Contemporary Politics and the Rise of the Social
The question seems obvious given Arendt’s account discussed thus far: what is the
meaning of politics in the contemporary world given its distance from idealized Arendtian
politics? Arendtian politics, action, the ability to perform miracles, freedom, and isonomy were
all based upon the critical concept of human plurality. However the rise of the social was a
multifaceted concept, which manifested itself as the rise of content and modes of thought once
previously confined to the private realm, the rise of conformity, the rise of alienation, and the
rise of raw power. Given that these things preclude the possibility of Arendtian politics, what are
contemporary politics? The word is still used, many dedicate time and massive amounts of
resources to it, there are a plethora of media outlets obsessed with it, some content of life has
always been designated political. Nevertheless, it is clear that what is contemporarily known as
politics differs greatly from Arendtian politics.
The answer to the question, what are contemporary politics would be best answered with
a description of the rise of the social. More explicitly, Arendtian politics was replaced by the rise
of the social. “More than any elaborate theory, this unconscious substitution of the social for the
political betrays the extent to which the original Greek understanding of politics had been lost”
(Arendt, 1958, p. 23). To borrow from Wolin, who was critical of Arendt, what had occurred was
“sublimation of the political into forms of association which earlier thought had believed to be
nonpolitical” (Wolin, 2004, p. 385). Contemporary politics, then, would be precisely what will
be described as the rise of the social’s content. All that was characteristic of Arendtian politics
has been replaced in contemporary politics by what the rise of the social brought with it.
Introductory Remarks on the Social
Arendt defined the social in a unique way. As Pitkin noted her use of the term did not
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reflect standard definitions associated with either the social, or society (1998, p. 177). Arendt had
several original understandings of the social that became apparent from her use of the term. Her
usage of the social occurred primarily in her discussion of its rise, indeed, it seems as though the
social took on a unique meaning when its rise, rather than just its being, was the subject. It was
the social’s rise, not its mere existence that brought about a change in what was considered the
political, Arendtian politics, a change that was certainly detrimental in Arendt’s view. This rise,
and the accompanying precluding of Arendtian politics, may be understood through the three
approaches outlined below.
Broadly speaking Arendt’s rise of the social can be understood in three, not necessarily
mutually exclusive ways. The first was the rise of the private. Things that were once confined to
the private realms of life became public and entered politics. The private component of the rise
of the social included the rise of both content and mentalities that were private in Arendt’s
account of Greek dichotomies. The increased important of economics as both subject and means
was one obvious component of Arendt’s thesis. One aspect of the rise of the social was economic
interests being admitted into politics as well as economic modes of thinking and operating.
Additionally, the rise of the private included the rise of other non-economic factors that,
according to Arendt, were previously located in the private realm. Finally, the rise of the private
included the rise of, and incorporation of violence and coercion into politics. Violence and
coercion as elements of force had been confined to the private realm and were never permitted in
politics.
The second understanding of Arendt’s discussion of the rise of the social was somewhat
more nuanced, humanist, and less apparent from a cursory reading of Arendt. This reading
moves the concerns of the economically dichotomous Cold War combatants to the background.
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This more subtle meaning was informed by Arendt’s other work, not just The Human Condition.
It was concerned with notions of freedom, human plurality, individuality, participation, and
empowerment. The social was here seen as a totalizing, normalizing, disciplinary power, which
created an oppressive conformity. Since freedom was only possible through pluralistic
participation, once plurality and individuality were destroyed freedom became impossible. The
social, then, was a force that exerted its power over individuals to bring about conformity, a
problem previously noted by prominent liberals like John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville.
This understanding of the social did not so much concern itself with the content of politics as
with the very possibility of politics.

Conformity and totalization, by definition, precluded

Arendtian politics.
The third understanding of the rise of the social was associated with one particular and
influential scholar, Hannah Pitkin. Pitkin’s The Attack of the Blob was devoted entirely to an
exploration of Arendt’s concept of the social. In that work Pitkin supported a broader
understanding of Arendt’s rise of the social, as something akin to a form of alienation. The rise
of the social brought about a condition wherein collectives of individuals were unable to control,
or at times even influence, the large-scale consequences of their collective actions. This was a
world in which politics has become meaningless in that the social has rendered it incapable of
directing the collective affairs of human beings. Human agency had become meaningless and
society, perhaps even the world, drifted aimlessly beyond the direction of mankind. World
alienation had become universalized and total.
All three views of the social have prominent proponents and textual support. All three
views are correct to a degree. The social, its rise, and its effect on politics can be best understood
as a combination of all three of these components. The rise of the social does indeed affect the
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substance of politics. Things that were once excluded from the public realm have found a place
within it. Once private concerns and modes of thought are a large part, but certainly not all of
this. Additionally, the rise of the social threatens the very possibility of Arendtian politics. The
social is a totalizing, disciplinary power, which creates conformity, thus precluding the
possibility of plurality and individuality, which are required for Arendtian politics. The
combination of an alteration of the substance of politics and the prevention of the possibility of
action may result in the extreme form of alienation described by Pitkin.
The Rise of the Private
Any understanding of Arendt’s definition of the social begins with her calling it the
“curiously hybrid realm where private interests assume public significance” (Arendt, 1958, p.
35). The classical Greek distinction between the private and the public realms gave way, and the
two were combined. The once private, particular, at times even individual, concerns of the
private realm entered into the public realm. Arendt’s question, which would have been
determinative in the Greek polis and the Roman civitas, cura private negotii or cura rei publicae,
was no longer so. Private interest had become public business, and those dedicated to the public
business necessarily found themselves dealing with private interests. This development “has not
only blurred the old borderline between private and political, it has also changed almost beyond
recognition the meaning of the two terms and their significance for the life of the individual and
the citizen” (Arendt, 1958, p. 38). The political had been overrun by concerns that were once
private, and as a result politics of the Arendtian sort languished from inattentiveness.
In rephrasing and expanding upon what has already been said, Arendt wrote, “[s]ociety is
the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes
public significance and where the activities concerned with sheer survival are permitted to
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appear in public” (Arendt, 1958, p. 46). What precisely was private and became public? It was a
mixture of a number of elements. One element was economics. This included private economic
concerns, like the poverty of the social question. However, it was not just the alleviation of
poverty that was pursued politically. Additionally, the wealthy sought to protect their economic
interests through political means. With the rise of economic interest came the rise of economic
modes of thinking. The exchange market became a base model for non-economic human
relationships. However, the private things that became public would not just be limited to
economic interests. Other interests that were private in the system of Arendt’s Greek distinctions,
like biology, sex, and reproduction, for example, became public. Finally, nonpolitical methods
once restricted to the private realm entered into the public realm and politics, namely raw power,
or force and coercion.
The Rise of Economics
Political science itself has given way to “‘national economy’ or ‘social economy’ or
Volkswirtschaft’” (Arendt, 1958, p. 28). The political science that remained took a novel and
previously impossible form, “‘political economy’ would have been a contradiction in terms:
whatever was ‘economic,’ related to the life of the individual and the survival of the species, was
a non-political, household affair by definition” (Arendt, 1958, p. 29). Consistent with this, rather
than being viewed as a collective of individuals, citizens, or actors, people were viewed as a
“collective of families economically organized into the facsimile of one super-human family is
what we call ‘society,’ and its political form of organization is called ‘nation’" (Arendt, 1958, pp.
28-29). People, as mere members of society, were those “whose everyday affairs have to be
taken care of by a gigantic, nation-wide administration of housekeeping” (Arendt, 1958, p. 28).
Housekeeping had once been confined to the private realm, its intrusion into the political realm

	
  

62
brought with it the concerns associated with necessity. In essence, the social question was
routinized as a public matter and came to be popularly thought of as political. The necessitous
content of the social question was no longer raised solely during periodic revolutions, but came
to be an everyday occurrence.
One aspect of the rise of the social was the rise of the economic, which consisted of
modes of thought, and ways of behaving, which were classically confined to the privacy of the
household, and so, were out of place in the public realm. Benhabib referred to this component of
the rise of the social as “the rise of commodity exchange” (Benhabib, 2000, p. 25). This was
detrimental to the political. Kateb concisely phrased the idea: “the enemy of politics is
economics” (Kateb, 1983, p. 117). The economic acquisition of needs based upon market
exchange stepped into a new realm. However, the relationship between politics and economics
was not as simple as Kateb’s concise phrasing. From the Arendtian perspective economics is
certainly the enemy of politics in a number of ways, but it is not economics in its entirety that is
the enemy.
After all, Arendt described economics as previously existing within the private realm, and
therefore, existing in a somewhat harmonious, yet dichotomous, relationship with the political.
Additionally, managing a political community, even one arcane and outdated as the Greek polis,
must involve management of the state’s economic affairs. Furthermore, the content of Arendtian
politics was always objective and aimed at the “world of things in which men move, which
physically lie between them and out of which arise their specific, objective, worldly interests”
(Arendt, 1958, p. 182). Exchange between entities was both a necessary component of
economics and within “the field of action” (Arendt, 1958, pp. 209, 214). Collective economic
interests may even be pursued in a manner consistent with political action; as was the case with
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the early days of the labor movement which translated its pursuit of economic interests into a
“full-fledged political battle” (Arendt, 1958, p. 219). Economics, then, need not be the enemy of
politics, when private, economic concerns remained limited to certain areas of life, or when those
interests were pursued in a political manner, the two may, at least theoretically, exist in harmony.
However, economics may also be rightly viewed as the enemy of politics for several
reasons. First, economics become the enemy of politics when they stepped outside of the limits
assigned to them by Arendt’s Greek distinctions. Benhabib provided an illuminating comparison
between Arendt’s views and the work of Hungarian economist Karl Polanyi (Benhabib, 2000,
24-25). Polanyi wrote of a process of demystification, which occurred when economic relations
were freed from any of the normative restraints which had previously bound them. This
disembedded economics from the institutions which once housed them, e. g. the private realm,
Greek oikos in Arendt’s thought (Polanyi, 1971). 17 The result was that exchange relations
became standard conduct in all areas of life. It was not economic exchange per se that was the
enemy of politics, but rather the mindset of economic exchange applied universally to all human
interaction. This was a mentalité expanding into an inappropriate context. To use Habermas’s
metaphor, it was a colonization of the political. It was as though an imperialist nation colonized
others and imposed not only its way of life, but its very way of thinking upon its subjects.
The economic functions were once located within the household where items were
produced and consumed within the same walls. This changed when homo faber came “out of his
isolation” and became a “merchant and trader and establishes the exchange market in this
capacity” (Arendt, 1958, p. 163). However, economic exchange required publicness, the market
was a place where individuals met and interacted with one another via what was common to
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Benhabib also noted that the Marxist approach provided an account similar to Polanyi’s
(Benhabib 2000, pp. 24-25).
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them. It was, essentially, a form of public sphere. Arendt did recognize the publicness of the
economic exchange market, but even when it and the accompanying mindset were confined by
historical limits they were located within a public realm of a less ideal sort. “Historically, the last
public realm, the last meeting place which is at least connected with the activity of homo faber,
is the exchange market on which his products are displayed” (Arendt, 1958, p. 162). Even
animal laborans have access to this market as "owners of their labor power” which was sold,
leading to Marx’s self-alienation and degradation of men into commodities (Arendt, 1958, p.
162). A public realm based upon exchange could never be like the political realm, capable of
producing freedom, because it could never meet the requirements of equality. If men were
equalized to bring them onto equal footing, then the sole purpose of exchange would be negated
and the exchange market would vanish. Inequality of conditions was a necessary condition for
the existence of an exchange market, and it was precisely that market creating inequality that
eliminated the possibility of truly free action. All the outputs of man became subject to economic
exchange. All individuals came to be viewed as producers in all areas of life. There was no room
left for politics characterized by action and primarily creating nothing but freedom.
Moreover, recall that values in exchange markets were determined by homo faber’s
standards of utility, and that in exchange markets individuals are totally defined by their products
(Arendt, 1958, pp. 164, 209). If this mentality were applied to all areas of life, the value of an
individual human life would be reduced to the value of its outputs. There would be no intrinsic
value to anything; rather a thing, activity, or person would only be as valuable as others deemed
its contribution for exchanges. This could lead to dark consequences for those things deemed to
be of low value by exchange market logic.

	
  

65
Within the broad concept of the rise of the social only a portion is specifically economic.
Within the economic portion of the rise of the social, there is a still smaller part that directly
addresses the welfare state as such. Arendt certainly expressed the view that the welfare portion
of the welfare state had begun to take up too much of what passed for politics. Concern over the
private household conditions of individuals had “overshadowed the political realm ever since the
beginning of the modern age” (Arendt, 1954a, p. 155). In essence, the social question, and
related questions became ever present in politics. The social as related to the social question and
phenomena like poverty was the most easily accessible understanding of the rise of the social,
and as such, has been the most commonly held. If this portion of the rise of the social was taken
as the entirety it may be viewed as simply taking a stance within the antinomies of the Cold War
era, which pitted the free West against the centrally planned communist East. The substance of
politics had changed from that of Arendtian politics to include private economic matters that had
not been previously included, and currently ought not to be included. If the argument was
reduced to simply a statement that the private economics of the household should not be a part of
the political, then it should be excluded from public concern. The economic affairs of the
household were matters of public concern, controlled, and perhaps equalized to varying degrees
by socialism, communism, and even a Western style welfare state. The Arendtian conception of
the political would have excluded these concerns and left them in the dark private realm, unseen
and uncared for by others. On this reading then Arendt could be portrayed as something of an
extreme conservative, an advocate of radical economic freedom. Economics would be entirely
beyond the pale of public concern, perhaps even outside of public knowledge.
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The Rise of Other Private Concerns
With the ascent of the social component of the rise of the private it was not just economic
concerns and modes of thought that increased in importance, but other once private concerns
came to be incorporated into politics as well. The animalist and bare components of life also
ascended, human biology for example. Agamben observed that “today politics knows no value . .
. other than life” (1998, p. 10). With the view that life, its reproduction, its end, and its
continuation were of public value, those concerns entered the political realm. Agamben went on
to argue that Arendt, along with Foucault, understood that “at the threshold of the modern era,
natural life begins to be included in the mechanisms and calculations of state power and politics
turns into biopolitics” (1998, p. 3).
Arendt, never to my knowledge, used the term biopolitics. In fact, biopolitics like
“political economy” was a contradiction. Whatever was biological was outside of Arendtian
politics since it was associated with the necessities of life, with labor, and therefore, was the
concern of animal laborans and so confined to the private realm. Such concerns would certainly
never enter into Arendtian politics. The most extreme example of biopolitics would become
totalitarian domination. Certainly totalitarianism sought to politically dominate all biological
aspects of life.
Since necessities like biological concerns were a subject of politics, then there could be
no freedom. Individuals would merely need to advance their interests in meeting their own
necessities, and by any definition doing something out of necessity would not be doing it freely.
Moreover, if the very existence and continuation of life was to be a political concern then it
seems unlikely that things could be understood in the manner consistent with Arendtian politics,
seen from many viewpoints. It strains credulity to think that an individual could see and
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understand any issue from the viewpoint of ending their own life, or limiting reproductive
choices. Making such matters political implies that such a viewpoint would be valid and present
in the political realm. It makes the issues such as whether some individuals’ lives should be
ended, or whether some should have their reproductive choices taken out of their own hands,
political issues which are open to being decided in any direction. When individuals enter a
political realm where these issues are open for debate and may directly affect them, it is no
wonder that they vehemently advance their own private interests and are incapable of
understanding the issue from alternative points of view.
An Interlude on Little Rock
Although Arendt was concerned with the political preoccupation with the social, and
contended that household economics were classically non-political, this argument need not be
taken to conservative extremes. Consider one of Arendt’s controversial pieces: Reflections on
Little Rock. Arendt, to a degree, invited misunderstandings of the conservative sort by objecting
to measures like mandatory school desegregation, which she addressed in Reflections on Little
Rock, she even defended the position against her critics, before finally reconsidering (Arendt,
1959b, 2003). However, Arendt was not motivated by any sort of disregard for the plight of the
disenfranchised or downtrodden.

Arendt was acutely aware of the difficulties facing

“unwelcomed children” (Arendt, 1958, pp. 175-181, 243-247; LeBeau, 2004). As a Jewish child
in prewar Germany she experienced discrimination at the hands of classmates and anti-Semitic
teachers, from whom her parents did all they could to protect her (Young-Bruehl, 1984, pp. 1112). Additionally, Arendt had, albeit temporarily, experienced life as a stateless person, perhaps
the most extreme form of disenfranchisement. This period of her life occurred between 1933,
when she fled the Nazi regime, and 1951, when she successfully obtained American citizenship
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(Young-Bruehl, 1984, p. 113). Arendt felt compelled to write her Reflections after seeing images
of Elizabeth Eckford being accosted while simply attempting to attend school (LeBeau, 2004, pp.
54-55). Arendt was empathetic and considered the issue from the perspectives of both white and
black mothers (Arendt, 2003, pp. 193-194).
Still, despite personal experiences and careful consideration Arendt objected to mandated
school desegregation for several reasons. Arendt did believe that desegregation of public space
and resources was appropriate (Arendt, 2003, p. 207). However, she also believed that mandated
school desegregation was inappropriate “in that parents have the right to determine in which
group their child should acquire its education” (Arendt, 1959a, cited by; Bernasconi, 1996).
Arendt’s objection was that mandatory desegregation ran afoul of familial territory thereby
circumventing that most basic of human institution’s ability to protect children, as her own
parents had protected her. Additionally, Arendt believed that all should be free to associate or not
based upon a free choice, as this had always been the nature of societies:
What equality is to the body politic—its innermost principle—discrimination is to
society. . . . In American society, people group together, and therefore discriminate
against each other, along lines of profession, income and ethnic origin, while in Europe
the lines run along class origin, education, and manners. . . At any rate, without
discrimination of some sort, society would simply cease to exist and very important
possibilities of free association and group formation would disappear (Arendt, 2003, p.
205).
Mandated desegregation endangered the discrimination, or less unfortunately worded,
organization around specific characteristics, which was a universal principle across societies.
Additionally, it violated freedom of association. All this could have threatened the possibility of
an Arendtian political realm. Berkowitz described her position as follows:
What offends Arendt in the Little Rock case is not the ideal of desegregation, but the
danger that well-intentioned governmental attacks on social discrimination will erode the
walls of privacy that nourish the possibility of thinking and of acting—and thus of
plurality. Since the space for solitary thought depends on the protection of a vibrant
private realm, the protection of privacy is a necessary first step in the cultivation of
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thoughtful political action (2010, p. 242).
Additionally, and perhaps mistakenly, Arendt believed that mandated desegregation made the
intended beneficiaries worse off by placing them in a more humiliating situation than their
previous one, destroying their pride and identity by forcing them into places and groups where
they were unwelcomed (Arendt, 2003, pp. 194-195). For Arendt, in this context, being a pariah, a
dignified outsider who was still able to participate, was preferable to being a parvenu, who
completely assimilated and thereby denied their identity and past.
Furthermore, powerless and voiceless children should be protected and not be forced to
bear the weight of a yoke, which would be properly placed upon the backs of adults as fullfledged citizens. Forcing children to deal with such a serious issue allowed adults to abdicate
their responsibility, which “implicitly denies their responsibility for the world into which they
have borne their children and refuses the duty of guiding them into it. Have we now come to the
point where it is the children who are being asked to change or improve the world? And do we
intend to have our political battles fought out in the school yards?” (Arendt, 2003, p. 204).
Young Elizabeth Eckford should not have been forced to play the hero or the martyr, and which
she would be was decidedly unclear in the moment. Arendt lamented the fact that neither her
parents nor the NAACP appeared on the scene to take the brunt of the backlash (Arendt, 2003, p.
203).
Arendt actually opposed forced segregation in all areas of life and critiqued Southerners
for abandoning both children and the laws by letting the mob seize control (Arendt, 2003, p.
202). She even personally avoided traveling to the South because she found the situation there
“unbearable” (Arendt, 2003). Despite her thoroughly principled position against segregation and
inequality and against mandated desegregation, her views on race were wanting in some
respects. For example, she proposed a constitutional amendment to prohibit any institutionalized
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segregation or inequality; however, as Bernasconi argued, this would have done nothing to
address the non-institutionalized, but equally problematic racism (Bernasconi, 1996).
Moreover, in contrast to Arendt’s principled stand, Reflections also included a number of
considerably less principled practical objections to mandated school desegregation. Arendt
objected to desegregation of this sort at that moment because other issues, like antimiscegenation laws were more blatant violations of the Constitution and a better starting point
for the Civil Rights Movement (Arendt, 2003). Bernasconi again found Arendt’s position
meaningless on the same grounds: if the underlying racism were not addressed virtually no one
would take advantage of the new law, or would have engaged in legal activity and still been the
target of racist discrimination (Bernasconi, 1996). Arendt expressed an additional practical, and
somewhat dark concern, that addressing segregation and discrimination would worsen racial
tensions, wishing to avoid a “danger point” she recommended caution in any attempt to address
the issue (Arendt, 2003, p. 200). It is unclear just how change would be achieved if Arendt’s
recommendations were followed, but it is clear that even at her most controversial she was not an
extreme conservative unconcerned with the unfortunate, believing that any inequalities should
remain outside of the light of the public realm. These are positions that could only be held by a
caricature of the real Arendt.
Finally, in defending Arendt against a partial, and thus an incorrect, interpretation, it must
be noted that Arendt thoroughly reconsidered her position on Little Rock. Some years later
Dante Germino recounted a 1964 conversation with Arendt in which “she indicated that she had
reversed her stand on racial integration of the public schools in the United States” (Germino,
1967, p. 142 n. 31). After the publication of Reflections Arendt’s position was criticized by the
novelist Ralph Ellison who claimed that she misunderstood the situation and its importance
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(Ellison, 1965). Arendt responded to this critique with a letter, in which she admitted to having
gone in “an entirely wrong direction” and that she had failed to understand “the ideal of
sacrifice” (Arendt, 1965).18 Arendt had not understood all of the nuances of the situation, nor had
she “grasped the element of stark violence, of elementary, bodily fear in the situation” (Arendt,
1965). Perhaps Arendt had altered her stance and her view of the situation; perhaps she no longer
believed that black children were being forced to play the parvenu. Alternatively, she may have
been unable to translate her experiences with European anti-Semitism into an understanding of
American racism, a problem not uncommon among European intellectuals.
The Rise of Force
As previously discussed, in Arendt’s characterization of Greek society the private realm
was a realm of violence and coercion. It was a realm where the will was advanced by any means
necessary. Part of the rise of private has been the rise of advancing one’s interest by any means
necessary, including power and coercion. Part of this was due to the fact that individuals, being
narrowly self-interested and primarily concerned with advancing their own interests do not
behave as if they are among equals, although they do behave equally in a manner not yet
discussed. Since only their own interests matter they are free to advance those interests however
they please. They also need not even attempt to understand issues politically from multiple
perspectives, just as the head of household had no need to understand the positions of his
inferiors.
Issues are approached from an individual’s own viewpoint and an individual’s own
perceived interests are decisive in determining the position adopted. Little effort is made to view
political issues, or the world, from vantage points other than one’s own. Relatedly, as individuals
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For more on the Arendt/Ellison exchange see Elizabeth Young-Bruehl (1984, Ch. 7).
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only approach issues from their own interests they continually stretch contemporary politics to
incorporate issues not part of Arendtian politics. Cicero’s cura private negotii or cura rei
publicae standard was no longer applied. Anything of private importance to an individual can be
brought into public. For example, the once private life processes of animal laborans may be
brought into public and pursued by any means.
Along with the rise of the private came the rise of the economic mentalité. Exchange
moved beyond the limits of the market for labor and commodities and was integrated into all
areas of life. Life, in the presence of others, became subject to market exchange processes. This
meant that individuals, or like-minded groups, could pursue their private, interests by economic
means, means in which all were not equal, and so could be viewed as forceful and coercive. It
should not seem odd that politics should suffer the same fate as other areas of life.
Unsurprisingly, Arendt held a negative view of this type of development. She viewed the
everyday politics of interest groups promoting their own narrow self-interests by pressuring
elected officials as tantamount to bribery and intimidation tactics. Arendt saw the system as one
rife with “corruption” and the everyday processes of contemporary politics as “blackmail”
(Arendt, 1963c, pp. 245-245, 273).
It takes little imagination to understand how strongly Arendt would condemn the further
proliferation of money and special interests in politics. Citizens United, McCutcheon, and Super
PACs, among other developments have solidified and expanded the place of money in politics.
Anonymous and unlimited donations have combined a level of unaccountability associated with
bureaucracy with the “corruption” of politics. There may be accountability, but to whom officials
are accountable and what extent is unknown, making the entire system more shadowy than ever
before. Arendt would also find it strange and terrifying that corporations, or any nonhuman

	
  

73
entity, are considered “people” for political purposes. To equate money with speech
demonstrates the extent to which the social realm has invaded the political realm. Speech, as a
component of the bios politikos, was something of which only humans were capable. The
mistaken belief that a nonhuman entity would ever be assigned a humanity-defining trait would
be terrifying. This mistake would not only degrade politics, but also degrade the very notion of
humanity. Surely, anything nonhuman must be aneu logon.
In addition to nonpolitical efforts at furthering interests by any means necessary, by
power and means based on inequalities like economics, power has come into politics in another
way. Namely power has become a primary subject of politics. “[M]arginal phenomena” like
power “now manifestly become central to the entire realm of politics” (Arendt, 2005, p. 134).
The modern nation-state has taken its role to be defending society from enemies, through the use
of force over which it has exclusive control (Arendt, 2005, p. 143). Contemporarily, people
believe “that the substance of politics is brute force” and “that domination is the central concept
of all political theory” (2005, p. 192). Arendt lamented the fact that wars have come to be seen as
the quintessentially political experience of the modern age and that this has led to violence being
equated with political action (Arendt, 2005, p. 152). Ever concerned with possibility of the
annihilation of humanity, as were many during the Cold War, Arendt was disturbed by the fact
that politics had become synonymous with the application of that possibility. A primary topic of
politics had become warfare, the very thing that by definition involved force and violence, rather
than speech and understanding. Violence and the use of force had become both the subject and
the method of contemporary politics. It was not that war was politics by other means, as
Clausewitz formulated it, or that politics was war by other means, as Foucault believed. Instead,
war was politics, and politics war.
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For Arendt, the modern conception of power was summarized by Mao Tse-tung’s
proclamation that “power grows out of the barrel of a gun” (Arendt, 1970, p. 11). This notion of
power was a deplorable modern appropriation of the term to signify violence and could be
distinguished from true power, strength, and force (Arendt, 1968, pp. 143-155). Power, in the
sense of the Greek kratia, was a collective acting in concert to achieve a political purpose. Power
could arise only in situations where a group interacted freely and communicatively. There must
exist a number of openly debating individuals, which “is not accidental, because human power
corresponds to the condition of plurality to begin with” (Arendt, 1958, p. 201).

Power

understood in this manner is distinguishable from strength, which can exist in a single individual,
force which is natural and not a human creation, and most importantly violence which is based
on coercion rather than persuasion. Mao’s modern assertion about power demonstrated the
conflation of power with violence. Violence was once excluded from politics, but has worked its
way into the political realm to the exclusion of the Greek/Arendtian conception of power. Power
as violence does not grow solely from the barrel of a gun instead it exists when any form
coercion, manipulation, or strategy is exercised in place of free debate oriented toward
understanding and persuasion.
The Rise of Conformism
If the rise of the private component of the rise of the social can be understood as the rise
of economic interests, exchange, necessity and the accompanying modes of thought, then the
conformism component can be understood as the rise of a totalizing, disciplinary force associated
with mass society. This aspect of the rise of the social grew out of the totalitarian experience of
the twentieth century. The rise of mass society negated human plurality and the possibility of
heroic action and so eliminated the possibility for action and freedom along with it. Thus, it
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meant that the conditions for Arendtian politics could no longer be satisfied. With Arendtian
politics no longer possible, whatever was to be called political bore little resemblance to its
previous incarnation.
Arendt wrote:
It is decisive that society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action, which
formerly was excluded from the household. Instead, society expects from each of its
members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of
which tend to "normalize" its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous
action or outstanding achievement (1958, p. 40).
Action was replaced with mere behavior. Rather than heroic distinction, doing great deeds and
speaking great words individuals were left with only the opportunity to behave as expected.
Using the terminology that Pitkin found so useful, fear of being a pariah and flaunting societal
expectations had compelled all to become parvenus (1998). Society has created a Procrustean
bed into which any would-be Achilles is forced. Without action Arendtian politics were not
possible, without them there was no possibility for freedom.
This aspect of the rise of the social was connected to the rise of economics. Individuals
were expected to behave as economic actors, homo economicus, who were narrowly selfinterested and motivated by maximizing their own economic interests. Therefore, society
expects, in fact nearly demands, behavior of this sort in all areas of life, including the political
realm. It was assumed by all that individuals were motivated by their private economic interests,
were incapable of understanding the issues from all sides, political understanding in the
Arendtian sense. As with this example, the economic aspect of the rise of the social, the
behavioral demands make all the other components of the rise of the social self-reinforcing.
The individual, heroic aspect of life was moved form the public to the private realm.
Arendt wrote that mass society “equalizes under all circumstances, and the victory of equality in
the modern world is only the political and legal recognition of the fact that society has conquered
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the public realm, and that distinction and difference have become private matters of the
individual” (Arendt, 1958, p. 41).19 As previously noted a number of authors have pointed out
the tension in Arendtian politics between individual, heroic action and collective, peer based
dialogue (Benhabib, 1992, 2000; d'Entreves, 1994; Villa, 1999). It would seem that this tension
had been practically resolved with the rise of the social tipping the scales in favor of the
communal, equality aspect of politics at the expense of the heroic, action aspect. However, recall
that the heroic nature of action was self-disclosing, and required an audience, who were perhaps
more like participants. This requirement could not be met in the privacy of the public realm.
Such confinement of action would deprive it of the necessary viewers, players, co-actors, etc.
Since acting would not be possible in private it was not possible at all.
Additionally, the equality resulting from the rise of behavior was not of the sort found in
Arendtian politics. This phenomenon did not ensure equality in the political arena; indeed such
equality could be understood as having equal opportunity to participate in now banished action.
Instead the rise of behavior would have the effect of making individuals equal in their tastes,
manners modes of life, etc. Most crucially, it made them equal in that they were equally
unpolitical. Put another way, the rise of behavior, as a component part of the rise of the social,
made individuals equal in their inability to initiate or engage in political action. Individuals
became equally incapable of performing miracles, or for that matter even witnessing miracles
since none could perform them.
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Undoubtedly, Arendt was bringing a new perspective to the study of “mass society” that was
being explored by prominent sociologists at the time. For example, see William Kornhauser
(1960); Riesman, Glazer, and Denney (1961); and Daniel Bell (1960).
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Arendt also noted the danger that the rise of conformism and mass society could pose to
individuals who did not conform. She wrote that when equality became pervasive it was seldom
understood as nonpolitical principle, but that out of one hundred:
[T]here are ninety-nine chances that it will be mistaken for an innate quality of every
individual who is “normal” if he is like everybody else and “abnormal” if he happens to
be different. This perversion of equality from a political into a social concept is all the
more dangerous when a society leaves but little space for special groups and individuals,
for then their differences become all the more conspicuous (Arendt, 1966, p. 54).
Arendt had personally felt the danger of conformism in several ways. First, she was personally
aware of the Jewish experience, particularly in Europe (Arendt, 1966, 1974, 1978; YoungBruehl, 1984). In addition to Arendt’s experience as a German-Jew, she felt the threat of
conformism in America as McCarthyism threatened potential deportation due to her husband’s
prior Communist connections (Young-Bruehl, 1984, pp. 274-275).
Though America and Europe did not have the same experiences with totalitarianism both,
nevertheless, experience this danger. In fact, America had a longer history of conformism due to
its mass, rather than class based society (Arendt, 1954c). America also suffered from what
Tocqueville had diagnosed as democratic or administrative despotism, the pressure of conformity
(Tocqueville, 1969, pp. 691, 693).20 As Arendt understood it, “under the conditions of majority
rule, society itself would be the oppressor, with no room left for individual freedom” (Arendt,
1954c, p. 609). Arendt wrote to Jaspers informing him that she had become somewhat
disillusioned with America, where conformism was a “clear and present danger” and “selfcensorship” was rampant (Arendt, 1953a). If self-expression was not possible, then neither was
action based upon speech. There was certainly no possibility of miracles.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
20
Pitkin provided a detailed analysis of the parallels and connections between Democracy in
America and The Human Conditions (1998, Ch. 7).
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In Tocqueville’s account, this despotism would lead to a society of isolated individuals.
“Each one of them, withdrawn into himself, is almost unaware of the fate of the rest” and as
citizens have less and less connection to one another the political community falls apart
(Tocqueville, 1969, p. 692). This led to a further difficulty for politics since “to be isolated is to
be deprived of the capacity to act” and an individual who “isolates himself . . . forfeits power and
becomes impotent” (Arendt, 1958, pp. 188, 201). However, freedom was now experienced only
in private beyond the prying eyes of society and its behavioral pressures. Fear of societal
pressure, or apathy could lead to a withdrawal from the public realm and the neglect of public
issues. There was a connection between this withdrawal, this turning inward for the sake of
freedom from others and the conflict Arendt perceived between philosophy and politics. Just like
the ancient philosopher the modern individual found freedom only in his isolation. This is yet
another way the rise of conformism and behavior prohibited Arendtian politics.
The Rise of Alienation
Hannah Pitkin’s The Attack of the Blob wove together all of the existing understandings
of Arendt’s rise of the social to create a meta-understanding. Pitkin utilized the cinematic
metaphor of a gigantic, ever growing, and ever consuming, alien Blob that threatened earth to
describe Arendt’s social. The result was alienation on a worldwide scale. Pitkin summarized her
position by writing that:
The social . . . should be understood as the absence of politics where politics belongs, a
condition in which a collectivity of people – for whatever reason – cannot (or at any rate
do not) effectively take charge of the overall resultants of what they are severally doing.
The large-scale outcomes of their activities happen independent of any human agency, as
if these people had been swallowed by some Blob (1998, p. 252).
Pitkin’s somewhat unfortunate metaphor of the person-swallowing blob was comprised of the
private, including the economic mindset and necessity, the rise of behavior, including conformity
and isolation, and the rise of an institutional structure prohibitive of human agency. Thus, the
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only mode of government possible was the modern social form, the bureaucratic rule by nobody,
in which all governmental functions were essentially automated with no room for discretion or
plural exercise of power.
Pitkin undertook both a genealogy of the Blob and a psychological biographical account
of Arendt’s constructing of it (Pitkin, 1998, pp. 18, 36, 177). The result was what Pitkin termed
an “unmythologized” understanding (1998, p. 252). Pitkin’s analysis made the point that Arendt
“gradually worked herself into a highly idiosyncratic use of the phrase,” [the social]. However,
Pitkin did not imply that Arendt’s use was illegitimate (Pitkin, 1998, p. 201). Pitkin’s puzzle was
not just how to describe the social blob, but how to get people to recognize their own failure to
“take charge of what they are doing in the world” (Pitkin, 1998, p. 196). In short, how do people
recognize that the blob has consumed them?
This understanding was characterized by the rise of the private interests, wherein people
care little for the communal concerns, but instead are motivated by self-interests which were
previously confined to the private sphere. Similarly, concerns about necessity have become
public rather than private. Additionally, Pitkin discussed conformity and how it, in Arendt’s
words, resulted in behavior rather than action. What Pitkin saw as the components of the blob
created a mass of individuals whose distinctions had been leveled and were brought into a state
of equality, better understood as conformity. She saw this condition as so totally equal in
behavior that none could truly act in Arendt’s sense of the word, in the sense of working
miracles.
Finally, Pitkin believed that all of these components resulted in an institutional, rather
than potentially confusing social, structure that prevented Arendtian politics, and created a new
form of alienation. Quoting Arendt, Pitkin wrote that the web of human relationships had
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become characterized as “the social kind of ‘unitedness of many into one is basically
antipolitical; it is the very opposite of togetherness’ characterizing political membership’”
(Arendt, 1958, p. 214; Pitkin, 1998, p. 194). Individuals were merely capable of living together
in conformity; action was no longer possible.
Pitkin’s work was a masterful account of Arendt concept of the social. It combined all of
the previously discussed points to conclude that a form of world alienation was the result of the
social. Under that condition individuals were unable to act. Pitkin’s result was a now familiar
one; with the possibility of action precluded Arendtian politics were impossible. Without politics
freedom was impossible. All this occurred as a result of the rise of the social.
The rise of the social changed politics in the manner just discussed. It brought private
concerns, mentalities, and methods into the political realm. This precluded the possibility of
Arendtian politics, action, miracles, and freedom. Contemporary politics then includes all of
those aspects of private life. Additionally, the rise of the social included the rise of conformism,
which also made Arendtian politics impossible. Finally, as Pitkin argued, the rise of the social
included the rise of alienation. It created a world without agency or action, and worst of all, this
alienation hides itself. In short, the rise of the social changed politics from the Arendtian sort to
an unrecognizable realm that, contemporarily, is characterized by all of the aspects of the rise of
the social just described.
2.6 Bureaucracy and Prejudice
With the change from Arendtian politics to contemporary politics, which include the
various components of the rise of the social there came two, not yet discussed developments.
First, the rise of the social entailed a new form of government, bureaucracy. Second, the nature
of contemporary politics generated hostility toward the public sphere. Arendt argued that the
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nature of contemporary politics that she found so objectionable has been off-putting to others as
well.
Government has long been a concept integrallty related to politics. If Arendtian politics is
associated with the form of government she identified as isonomy in the Greek city-state, then
contemporary politics is associated with the form of government she called bureaucracy. For
Arendt, the concept of bureaucratic rule was a modern and, in a way, a terrifying concept:
As we know from the most social form of government, that is, from bureaucracy (the last
stage of government in the nation-state just as one-man rule in benevolent despotism and
absolutism was its first), the rule by nobody is not necessarily no-rule; it may indeed,
under certain circumstances, even turn out to be one of its crudest and most tyrannical
versions (Arendt, 1958, p. 40).
Bureaucracy took ruling, and all of government and politics, out of the hands of individuals and
placed it in “invisible hands” (Arendt, 1958, p. 45). Obviously, individuals cannot undertake
political action if they have been removed from government. The loss of control and the futility
of attempted action resulted in alienation from government and politics.
Bureaucracy was terrifying from Arendt’s perspective because of a commonality between
it and tyranny. Both bureaucracy and tyranny were characterized by “arbitrary power”, which
“owes no one any responsibility” (Arendt, 2005, pp. 77, 97). In extreme cases, the rule of nobody
permits evil, Nazi atrocities for example, because it provides a way of “explaining away the
responsibility of the doer for his deed,” it functions as a “kind of determinism” (Arendt, 1963b,
p. 290). When dealing with bureaucracy decisions are made via the applications of “universal
standards” after which there is no appeal, the universal standard is simply substituted for the will
of the tyrant (Arendt, 2005, p. 77). The example of Nazi atrocities is certainly an extreme
example and there is no reason to equate that possibility with every bureaucracy. It would be
ludicrous to assign the possibility of atrocities to the EPA, for example, despite claims that may
be made by extremist and sensationalist media outlets.
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More mundanely, decisions are made and enacted at a level far above individual citizens.
Through bureaucracy governments impose politics upon the citizenry. Arendtian politics could
certainly not be possible when individuals are never given the opportunity to discuss the issues.
Even the bureaucrats themselves are denied the opportunity to engage in anything resembling
Arendtian politics. After all, bureaucracy is the application of universal standards, which leaves
no room for action, debate, or freedom on the part of the bureaucrats. Rule following, or perhaps
worse, having the rules applied to you without recourse would be nearly the opposite of
Arendtian politics.
Perhaps contemporary individuals have sensed that there is something wrong with
politics, or perhaps a politics of this sort is just unappealing. Regardless, Arendt believed that
those who were not professional politicians, or professional political operatives, had developed a
prejudice against politics (Arendt, 2005). Contemporary politics, somewhat accurately in
Arendt’s eyes, has taken on negative connotations. As Arendt put it, the prejudice against
contemporary politics developed because of the beliefs that “domestic policy is a fabric of lies
and deceptions woven by shady interests and even shadier ideologies while foreign policy
vacillates between vapid propaganda and the exercise of raw power” (Arendt, 2005, p. 98).
Domestic politics have become viewed as “nothing more than a necessary evil for sustaining
life,” or furthering private, individual, self-interest (Arendt, 2005, p. 110). Foreign policy has
taken on the potential of unleashing annihilating, world destroying weapons, capable of
decimating not just enemies, but all of humanity (Arendt, 2005).
This prejudice against and aversion to politics is directed against contemporary politics,
rather than Arendtian politics. Conflating the current nature of politics with what politics could
be is dangerous. In doing so, “they throw the baby out with the bathwater, confuse politics with
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what would put an end to politics” (Arendt, 2005, p. 97). If the very notion of politics carries
such negative connotations and becomes so avoided then Arendtian politics would seem as bad
as the contemporary form of politics that has precluded its possibility. Arendt would likely argue
that these prejudices have become more justified over time, rather than lessening, and that
politics have degraded further, instead of moving back toward the ideal of Arendtian politics.
Considering Arendt’s view, it is not surprising that freedom seems incompatible with
contemporary politics. The question of “whether freedom does not first begin precisely where
politics ends” is raised (Arendt, 2005, p. 108).
2.7 Conclusion: Problematic Distinctions and the Double Face
One problematic piece of Arendt’s thought on the matter, which she herself
acknowledged, is distinguishing between the social and the political. Arendt’s concept of the rise
of the social, as distinct from the political, has been called “somewhat vague,” while the social
and political as general categories have been viewed as “too rigid” (Villa, 1999, p. 143; 2000, p.
19). Pitkin expressed the belief that what she viewed as Arendt’s idiosyncratic understanding of
the social as a category was “a single, isolated mistake by a great thinker . . .” (1998, p. 2). In
these views, the social is an odd category, which it may well be, encompassing many aspects not
associated with the everyday use of the word. Beyond the unique wording, however, exists a
more fundamental issue, that the social and the political are not as neatly separable and selfcontained as Arendt portrays them. Some overlap must exist and the line between the social and
the political, between administration and politics may be extremely difficult to draw. Arendt’s
distinction between the social and the political then has been viewed as “provocative and
disturbing,” not to mention “systematically misleading” (R. J. Bernstein, 1986, p. 247).
The problematic overlap between the social and the political runs deeper than a mere
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difficulty of drawing boundaries; it may challenge the very tenability of Arendtian politics. As
Mary McCarthy posed the question, “What is somebody supposed to do on the public stage, in
the public space if he does not concern himself with the social? That is, what’s left” (Arendt,
1979, p. 315)? Arendt’s immediate answer was unsatisfying, simply that there is something left,
but that this “something” is “utterly different” from moment to moment, from age to age (1979,
p. 316). Fair grounds for the content of Arendtian politics in one age may be social, or
antipolitical in another age. This unsatisfactory reply led some, like Jay and Botstein, to argue
that Arendtian politics was utterly devoid of content and would, therefore, be meaningless (1978,
p. 353).
Arendt responded further, after being pushed by Albrecht Wellmer, and admitted that
many issues may have a “double face,” and that one of the faces could be political and the other
face social, and hence left out of politics (1979, p. 318). The double faced, Janus-like nature of
issues signified that one side was not political, that it could be figured out with certainty and so
was appropriately the subject of administration rather than politics (Arendt, 1979, p. 317). The
other side or face of the issue could be political, and so the topic of public debate; however, it
would be detrimental to confuse the two faces. As Kateb put it, “[f]irst the effort to politicize
administration injures administration. Second, the effort to politicize administration injures
politics” (1983, p. 120).
The example Arendt provided was public housing. It would be debatable whether or not
public housing should be integrated, but not whether it was needed, or the specifics of each
housing unit (1979, pp. 318-319). Arendt expressed the belief that everyone was entitled to
decent housing. This was known with certainty and should not be subjected to public debate.
Furthermore, the precise square footage and number of bathrooms needed to constitute decent
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housing could also be determined with certainty and should not be publicly debated. These could
be determined and were the subject of administration, to be provided without doubt or question.
However, the question of whether it should be mandated whom public housing recipients lived
near could not be administratively determined. Thus, this type of question remained open to
public debate. Issues of administration in such matters would be associated with goal-oriented,
means/ends modes of conduct. Remaining with Arendt’s example, decent, and more than that
sufficiently decent housing should be provided as efficiently as possible. Though Arendt did not
mention school integration in the context of the double face, perhaps to avoid reopening a topic
that had caused her some grief, it is another example of just this sort of issue.21
Arendt may have been mistaken about the political nature of integration, or unclear as to
the lingering racism that would result from non-integration. If integration was ever an issue that
could be the subject of Arendtian politics, its time as such is certainly passed. The matter would
today be considered the subject of administration as integration and diversity have been proven
to tangible benefits for all those involved. Regardless Arendt’s reasoning this sort of position led
to a number of commentators viewing her in a negative light. In particular, some found her too
dismissive of feminist concerns. 22 Still other readers saw her as an outright racist. 23 For
example, Rich, a feminist, objected to Arendt and described reading The Human Condition:
The withholding of women from participation in the vita activa, the “common world,”
and the connection of this with reproductivity, is something from which she does not so
much turn her eyes as stare through unseeing. This “great work” is thus a kind of failure
for which masculine ideology has no name, precisely because in terms of that ideology it
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As previously mentioned, Bernasconi (1996) provided a detailed analysis of Arendt’s view of
race as a double-faced issue.
22
23

For example, see O’Brien (1981, pp. 93-115) and Rich (1979, pp. 203-214).

In addition to Bernasconi (1979, p. 212), a number of others have provided discussion of
Arendt’s potential racism. See Bohman (1996a) and Norton (1995).
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is successful, at the expense of truths the ideology considers irrelevant. To read such a
book, by a woman of large spirit and great erudition, can be painful, because it embodies
the tragedy of a female mind nourished on male ideologies (1979, p. 212).
Arendt would certainly disapprove of the feminist slogan that “the personal is political.”24
These criticisms, along with others, boiled down to the view that Arendt was elitist.
Replying to her Reflections one critic wrote that “Miss Arendt has always sought to dissociate
herself from the masses of people, she is an aristocrat, not a democrat at heart” (Spitz, 1959, p.
57). Her idealized version of politics was only possible for systems, which like the Greek polis,
refrained from including anything necessary. Such systems were characterized by “the exclusion
of the exploited by their exploiters, who can afford not to discuss economics, and devote
themselves to ‘higher things,’ because they live off the work of others” (Pitkin, 1981, p. 336).
Greek citizens were only free from necessity because they had excluded entire classes of people
from the public realm to provide necessities of life. Benhabib wrote:
If . . . the polis was only possible because large groups of human beings-like women,
slaves, children, laborers, noncitizen residents, all non-Greeks-were excluded from it
while they made possible through their labor for the daily necessities of life that “leisure
for politics” that the few enjoyed, then is the critique of the rise of the social, which
accompanied the emancipation of these groups from the shadowy interior of the
household” and by their entry into public life also a critique of political universalism as
such (Benhabib, 1992, p. 75)?
If large-scale exclusion, disenfranchisement, and even enslavement were required for Arendtian
politics then how could she not be elitist, anti-modernist and anti-democratic? The exclusion of
social issues from politics would only make matters worse.
The exclusion of social issues would impair the ability of certain groups to participate as
political equals. Arendtian politics then could not be for everyone. The existing social
arrangements favor some groups over others, excluding any discussion of them from the political
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Benhabib picked up on this point by titling her appendix “The Personal is not the Political,”
though it focused on the Arendt-Heidegger correspondence rather than feminism (2000).
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realm ensures that those arrangements are never altered. As Wolin put it, “[t]he ‘natural’ state of
society contains important distinctions of wealth, birth, and education that are typically extended
into political power. Thus social power is translated into political power which is then used to
increase social power” (1994, p. 289). Arendt would then be a theorist of the status quo, wishing
to forever cement the social and political relationships, as they exist at the outset. There would be
no room for anything progressive.
This was, however, not Arendt’s position, at least it need not be assumed to have been
her position. Arendt may not always been the most sensitive to race, or gender issues, in fact, she
may have grossly misread the racial issues in America. Despite this, viewing Arendt as a racist,
sexist, or elitist is unfair. Nor was Arendt’s distinction between the social and the political
simply a mistake. Arendt was guilty of the unwarranted assumption that in America issues of
basic rights, and social equality – since there was codified political equality – could be taken for
granted. As Hinchman and Hinchman put it, “[i]t is not that Arendt is indifferent to social justice,
but that she thinks, perhaps naively, that the demands of justice are (or should be) self-evident
and, to that extent unpolitical” (1994, p. 178). This possible naivety, or possible overestimation
of the sophistication of contemporary individuals’ understanding of justice opened Arendt to
such criticisms. Pitkin saw Arendt’s “banishing,” not spending enough time explicitly
addressing, justice from her work as a mistake because by doing so she “denied herself what
might well be the most powerful weapon in her cause” (1981, p. 340). This was a grave oversight
indeed.
However, Arendt’s position on matters like poverty was more straightforward than she
was given credit for and consistent with her unwarranted assumptions about justice. In On
Revolution Arendt, famously, described the social question. She wrote that it had doomed the
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French Revolution (Arendt, 1963c, p. 60). That Marx had attempted to turn the social question
into a political question and in doing so was mistaken (Arendt, 1963c, pp. 61-62). In her view
“[n]othing . . . could be more obsolete than to attempt to liberate mankind from poverty by
political means; nothing could be more futile and more dangerous” because it would fail and
because it brought necessity into politics and eliminated the possibility of freedom (Arendt,
1963c, p. 114). Elsewhere Arendt wrote that “[t]he whole record of revolutions – if we only
knew how to read it – demonstrates beyond doubt that every attempt to abolish poverty, i.e. to
abolish the so-called social question, with political means is doomed to failure and for this reason
leads to terror; terror, on the other hand, sends revolutions to their doom” (1963a, p. 17). Such
statements seem to play into the hands of those who charge Arendt with elitism. However, the
language is important. Just because Arendt did not believe the issue can be addressed politically,
lest there be disastrous consequences, did not mean that the issue should not be addressed at all.
Arendt thought that social issues, like poverty, decent housing, and education could be
addressed through administration and technology. Arendt believed that necessity, and all the
accompanying negative associations, would be alleviated and would even “force us to fight super
abundance” (1963a, p. 17). This would place “all economic matters on technical and scientific
grounds, outside all political, considerations” (1963a, p. 17). Alleviating necessity would be the
sphere of expert administrators who were practiced and efficient in such matters. In short, “the
wreckage of freedom on the rock of necessity . . . is no longer unavoidable” (Arendt, 1963a, p.
18). This position was based upon still more unwarranted assumptions. First, it assumed that the
technology to provide such necessity eliminating abundance had arrived. Second, that the
technology was politically neutral. Third, that there were no trade-offs to be made in determining
which necessities to eliminate, or which groups to benefit, that in effect all necessity could be
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eliminated simultaneously. Finally, Arendt believed that ensuring that technology was used for
these purposes was not itself a political issue (Arendt, 1963c, pp. 65-66, 117). Absent these
assumptions the alleviation of the social question would not remain on the administration side of
the double face, but would continue to contaminate politics. This may have been Arendt’s
blunder, not a callous attitude toward the impoverished or minorities, but too optimistic an
understanding of justice and human capabilities.
Still, even if Arendt was not an elitist, or anti-woman, or anti-black, and was overly
optimistic about modern the ability of modern technologies to provide more than enough of the
necessities of life, that does not mean that her version of politics was desirable or realistic.
Perhaps the double face Arendt perceived was illusory, and instead merely two sides of the same
face, and inseparable from one another. Along these lines Habermas noted, “the curious
perspective that Hannah Arendt adopts: a state which is relieved of the administrative processing
of social problems; a politics which is cleansed of socio-economic issues: an institutionalization
of public liberty which is independent of the organization of public wealth . . . this path is
unimaginable for any modern society” (Habermas, 1977, p. 15). Habermas is correct here; it
would simply be impossible, and even undesirable, to separate the social issues from the political
realm. Modern political systems would collapse if they attempted to entirely ignore social issues,
like poverty and other social questions of that ilk. Bureaucracy, the social form of government,
has proven itself time and again as the most efficient system to accomplish these ends. After all,
if the public was what was common to all, then nothing could be more common than necessities
which all need met.
This argument overlaps with another that must be mentioned, namely, whether Arendt
was an antimodernist, meaning that she longed for a system incompatible with contemporary
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values. The charge of antimodernism entails the claim that Arendt was so fond of the classical
world she described that she longed for a return to that way of life and so was elitist.
Alternatively, Arendt may have been a modernist who understood the plight of the exploited and
the disenfranchised. Perhaps Arendt was a combination of the two as result of the tension
between her German, Existenzphilosphie heritage and her experience as a Jewish German
woman (Benhabib, 1990, 2000). It would be possible to find either strand in Arendt’s thought
depending upon how she was read. Her work may be both simultaneously useful and dangerous.
As Lasch wrote, Arendt’s account may be useful in that “it resurrects a moral and educative
conception of politics that has been submerged by the modern definition of politics as
administration” (1983, p. ix). However, Arendt may simultaneously be seen as dangerous if her
thought advocates a “hierarchical distribution of power” (Lasch, 1983, p. x).
Regardless of whether Arendt is most accurately described as an antimodernist,
modernist, or reluctant modernist she offered an alternative way of understanding the meaning of
the political. She provided a new way to look at distinctions, in the classical Greek world, in the
contemporary divide between what is social and what is political, and in the
modernist/antimodernist dichotomy itself. Canovan made this point when she stated that “one of
the purposes behind her much criticized distinction between the ‘political’ and the ‘social’ is
precisely to enable her to make distinctions within ‘modernity’, and thereby to draw battle lines
in different places” (1992, p. 22) Acknowledging that Arendt’s account of history was
problematic, that there may be a way to read her as elitist, and that the double face is complex
does not mean that her work had nothing to offer. If nothing more it provided a thought
provoking account of what politics had become and raised the question of whether there was
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some way to improve upon it, even if that improvement involved comparison to an idyllic,
perhaps impossible vision.
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CHAPTER 3 JÜRGEN HABERMAS
3.1 Introduction
In this section I examine Jürgen Habermas’s thought as an alternative and compliment to
Arendt’s account of the rise of the social. Habermas’s reputation as perhaps the foremost theorist
of the public sphere warrants a consideration of his thought. While the theoretical parallels
between Habermas and Arendt’s analyses make an in-depth analysis of his thought indispensible
to understanding the phenomena at issue. Habermas’s Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere examined the development of the bourgeois public sphere. At its height the bourgeois
public sphere included a political realm that was, at least in Habermas’s idealized form, akin to
Arendt’s idealized conception of the Greek polis. It was a place where an ideal politics occurred
among free and equal individuals. As with Arendt’s polis, the functionality of Habermas’s
bourgeois political sphere was short lived. The political mode of action gave way to the rising
influence of formerly private considerations, mentalities, and means of communicating.
Habermas’s mature thought represented an effort to recover the idealized public sphere,
including the political sphere contained within it. His Theory of Communicative Action and the
affiliated concepts aimed for such a recovery as well as to offset the pathologies resulting from
the public sphere’s decline. Habermas’s mature thought also offered a fresh articulation of the
decline of the public at the hands of the social. Habermas detailed the altered form of
communication prevalent in what passed for a public sphere. Additionally, the colonization of
the lifeworld emerged as an important metaphor for the manner in which the contents and modes
of action in the public sphere had given way to their non-public counterparts.
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3.2 The Public Sphere
One of Habermas’s early major works, The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere, addressed the rise, proper function, and eventual decline of the bourgeois public sphere,
and with it politics. Supplementing The Structural Transformation with other works provides an
account of Habermas’s view of how the public sphere should function, and how political,
collective action should be undertaken within it. The early chapters of The Structural
Transformation, I-III, described the development of early capitalism and the creation of the
bourgeois public sphere. The middle chapters, IV-VI, described the decline of the public sphere,
with the growth of the welfare state. While the final chapter, VII, framed the entire endeavor
around the notions of publicity and public debate within political philosophy.
Generally speaking, a public sphere existed when citizens came together to express their
opinions on matters of general interest to all, and subjected those opinions to rational discussion
(Habermas, 1962, p. 27).25 This was the location of politics, set apart from the private sphere,
comprised of civil society and the family, and the state, which was characterized by police power
(Habermas, 1962, p. 30). Politics within this public sphere were characterized by the “people’s
public use of their reason” (Habermas, 1962, p. 27). This public sphere was open to all, and all
were regarded as equals while acting within it. Through the use of this reason, and the exposure
of subjective, individual opinions to it, “something approaching public opinion can be formed”
(Habermas, Lennox, & Lennox, 1974, p. 49).
For Habermas the bourgeois public sphere represented an idealized political realm,
occupying a place similar to that of the polis in Arendt’s thought. Habermas’s Frankfurt School
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References to Habermas’s Structural Transformation are to the 1989 English translation. The
original publication date of 1962 is used to signify its chronological location in Habermas’s
thought.
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colleagues had summarily dismissed the potential of this public sphere due to its bourgeois
nature (Habermas, 1986, p. 98). In Habermas’s early work, the conditions of the idealized
political realm grew out of the cultural realm as a place where people “knew of no authority
beside that of the better argument and because they felt themselves at one with all who were
willing to let themselves be convinced by arguments” (Habermas, 1962, p. 41). The force of the
better argument was able to carry the day in politics. One commentator characterized
Habermas’s view of this period as the heroic era of liberal democracy (Kellner, 2000).
Like Arendt, Habermas began his account with the ancient Greek distinction between the
public polis and the private oikos (1962, p. 3). Habermas viewed the Greek system as one in
which citizens, freed from the demands of necessity, came together to debate the affairs of state,
the application of law and the waging of war (1962, p. 52). Anything associated with mere
necessity was confined to the privacy of the household, which propped up its male head as a free
citizen. Within the private realm, the head of household exercised complete control over all
matters, and he needed not subject his opinions to debate or reason (Habermas, 1962, p. 6).
In Habermas’s account, the sharpness of the Greek distinction was maintained through
the Roman period, but by the medieval age had faded into ambiguity. Public concerns were
common to all, and in that way, the opposite of particular, private concerns that pertained to the
status of a specific lord. Simultaneously, a lord’s power to command was public and different
from the power of the head of the household who held sway only over his private realm. Most
importantly, the medieval public was not a sphere of debate among equals, as the idealized
Greek polis had been. Instead, this public was little more than a stage upon which the lord could
display himself and his power (Habermas, 1962, p. 7). Since the public functioned as mere
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audience, observing the lord’s display, politics was reduced to the whims of those lords and was
dictated to their inferiors.
After the medieval period, the vague public/private distinction changed yet retained its
ambiguity. While the feudal age witnessed the expansion of the lord’s power into new areas of
life, the early capitalist period saw the creation of the “nightwatchman” state (Habermas, 1962,
p. 144). In this period, the state moved away from society. The state’s publicness was the
counterpoint to privacy and autonomy, experienced by economic agents and members of
households. The town filled the space between these public and private realms, thus becoming
tantamount to a public sphere (Habermas, 1962, pp. 30, 31-32). Early capitalism revolved around
trade, centered in towns, rather than industrial production. As trade markets developed in towns,
they came to dominate the surrounding region without necessarily threatening the power of the
feudal lord (Habermas, 1962, p. 15). The feudal aristocracy even promoted trade, benefiting from
it, and consuming the luxuries it provided (Habermas, 1962, p. 16).
As capitalist trade expanded, the towns’ significance declined as the nature of
entrepreneurs changed. Burghers, the craftsmen and shopkeepers of a particular town, were
displaced as the dominant entrepreneurs by the newly formed bourgeoisie, comprised of
merchants, bankers, and manufacturers. The bourgeoisie’s interests were not geographically
confined to towns (Habermas, 1962, p. 23). This expanded range of economic interests had
important effects on political systems, requiring an expanded government with a standing army
and police force, as well as an expanded system of administration and taxation. This government,
unified throughout an expanded territory, ensured predictability of legal and tax regimes, thereby
allowing entrepreneurs to calculate risks and rewards. The lord and his private funds were
reduced to the status of merely another economic agent (Habermas, 1962, pp. 17-18). The state
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eventually turned from trade to production as the capitalist activity worthy of promotion
(Habermas, 1962, p. 19).
Correspondingly, the household lost its status as the primary locus of production.
Previously, economics had been a private concern, as when production was located in the Greek
oikos. Production, along with the other aspects of economics, were now important to the entirety
of the population and so a public concern and thus a subject of state action, through promotion
and regulation (Habermas, 1962, p. 19). The rise of joint stock companies, which required
collective funding, added further publicness to economics. A notion of privacy was retained in
that economic agents behaved autonomously as consumers and laborers. Thus, economics had
become a hybrid realm with both public and private components.
The new public realm was born of the interaction between the private lives of economic
agents, family members, and the public state. Under capitalism, the public was aware of itself
and its difference from the state; this enabled opposition to the state, differing from feudalism
where individuals were mere subjects. The public was comprised of citizens whose lives were
simultaneously private and publicly regulated by state policy. This public possessed the ability to
subject the state’s policies to rational debate and even critique, a feat never accomplished by the
feudal commons (Habermas, 1962, pp. 18, 23-24). According to Habermas, this type of public
had a political aspect and a literary aspect. The public sphere and its relationship to the state and
the private sphere and the content of each are shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1

Schema of Social Realms

Private Realm

Bourgeois Public Sphere

Civil Society (realm of
commodity exchange and
social labor)
Conjugal family’s internal
space (bourgeois
intellectuals

Public Sphere in the
political realm

Sphere of Public
Authority
State (realm of the
“police”)

Public sphere in the world
of letters (clubs, press)
(market of culture products)
“Town”

Court (courtly-noble
society)

(Habermas, 1962, p. 30).
The Literary Public Sphere
In Habermas’s account, the market economy was not the sole cause of the bourgeois
public sphere. The development of an information market was of equal importance. In the early
capitalist period merchants received pertinent information through private correspondence, or
“news letters” (Habermas, 1962, p. 16). A change occurred in the mid-seventeenth century with
the advent of “political journals”, which combed through “news letters” to find and publish
information of general interest. This included commercial information “about Imperial Diets,
wars, harvests, taxes, transports of precious metals, and . . . reports about foreign trade”, as well
as news about “miracle cures and thunderstorms, the murders, pestilences, and burnings”
(Habermas, 1962, pp. 20-21).
The state used these journals for official purposes, and in the process, directed them
toward the bourgeois public as the primary readership. The “political journals” started carrying
information that the government wanted to distribute and in this manner became instruments of
administration. Though these journals were laced with information that the government wanted
disseminated throughout the entirety of the population, only the “educated classes” read them.
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The bourgeois “doctors, pastors, officers, professors, and scholars” would read the journals and
then convey the information to the lower social classes (Habermas, 1962, p. 23).
Habermas argued that the situation changed with the rise of modern literature as the
state’s definition of a readership was no longer determinative. The press shifted from merely
conveying information to functioning as a medium of rational and critical debate. This ability
allowed the politically oriented citizen to demand that the state rationally justify its policies and
laws, and subject those positions to rational debate. However, in Habermas’s account, this ability
first developed in the realm of literature and art. The seventeenth century coffeehouses and
salons were public spaces for discussing all aspects of life, especially culture. Information
regarding commerce was exchanged in coffeehouses, and even a lowly shopkeeper could visit
frequently, thus gaining access to crucial business information. Additionally, the coffeehouse
exposed its patrons to novel ideas and debate. For example, Habermas opined that in the “Rotary
Club, presided over by Milton’s secretary, Marvell and Pepys met with Harrington who here
probably presented the republican ideas of his Oceana” (1962, p. 33). Whatever other purposes
the salons served, they also provided an arena for the presentation and critique of new works
(Habermas, 1962, p. 34).
Art also became more commercialized as a product for bourgeois consumption.
Referencing Walter Benjamin, Habermas noted that art lost its “aura of extraordinariness”
(Benjamin, 2008, p. 223; Habermas, 1962, p. 36). This could be contrasted with the feudal
system, under which art had been little more than a display of feudal power, or used to further
the aims of the state or church. Art had lost its role as mere representation by acquiring an
audience that desired and consumed cultural works for their own sake rather than for their
representational quality (Habermas, 1962, p. 39). These new cultural consumers constantly
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demanded new products (Habermas, 1992, p. 423). Consuming art, be it new or classical,
required the audience to express its opinions and tastes. Expression of subjective views entailed
exposing them to the views held by other members of the cultural public. In this way personal
preferences were exposed to debate and critique. Simultaneously, the professional art critic was
born. Whereas an aristocratic connoisseur had been able to talk over the ignorant audience, the
critic needed to both express expert opinion and have that opinion accepted by the bourgeois
audience. In this way, the public began to employ debate to legitimize authority, and to a degree,
control it (Habermas, 1962, pp. 40-41).
During the seventeenth century, the scope of the literary public expanded as “periodicals”
made the coffeehouse and salon experience available to a broader section of society. While
periodicals began with debates about art, literature, and culture, their scope soon widened to
include moral and social commentary and debate. As Habermas put it, Joseph Addison, for
example, “viewed himself as a censor of manners and morals; his essays concerned charities and
schools for the poor, the improvement of education, pleas for civilized conduct, polemics against
the vices of gambling, fanaticism and pedantry and against the tastelessness of the aesthetes and
eccentricities of the learned” (1962, p. 43). By reading and writing, processing and debating, the
bourgeois as audience and participant came to understand itself as a public. Periodicals combined
with salons and coffeehouses to instill the bourgeoisie with the ability to engage in and accept
the outcome of rational debate.
The novel was also essential in creating the substance of bourgeois subjectivity. The
novel, according to Habermas, was born out of letter writing. A key development was
Richardson’s Pamela (Richardson, 1740). That novel demonstrated the complexity of bourgeois
family life; it featured the interaction between coexisting privacy and publicity. It was out of this
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complex interaction that the political public sphere was born. At this point the outlook on human
affairs had shifted from the mindset of classical Greece to a modern one. The intimacy of the
family was now seen as allowing freedom and was the realm of individuals’ authentic selves.
Habermas wrote that around the mid-eighteenth century, the private letter that communicated
thoughts in total privacy between trusted acquaintances or relatives, was the most articulate
expression of what was “purely human” (1962, p. 48). It was at this point that privacy came to be
related to freedom in the contemporary manner.
Privacy even penetrated into the household, separating family members, in that each now
had their own room, their own private space. However, the bourgeois home and the letter each
possessed a component of publicity. The private quarters of individual family members existed
in the presence of the parlor where the family would expose itself to neighbors and in so doing
make itself public (Habermas, 1962, p. 45). Similarly, letters were exposed to wider audiences
when circulated, or even published (Habermas, 1962, p. 49). Exposure of the private to a
coexisting public had parallels in the exposure of subjective, personal taste to public opinions in
the world of art. Pamela was intended to represent a correspondence, and by telling a story in
this way, the bourgeois readers came to value a type of public intimacy (Habermas, 1962, pp. 5051).
Bourgeois intimacy was, however, merely an idea. Though the bourgeois believed
themselves autonomous, they did so only by ignoring their dependence upon property owners
and the economy more generally. Therefore, the intimacy was not real, and concealed the true
relationship between the private and public realms of life. Furthermore, this outlook ignored the
exclusivity of its nature; it was blind to the fact that the propertyless were not part of the
bourgeois. Despite its falsity and self-deceptive nature, it contained a kernel of truth in the
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premise that relationships between individuals were based upon their common humanity
(Habermas, 1962, p. 48). For example, letters, novels, and periodicals were public and available
to any who could purchase and read them (Habermas, 1962, p. 37). Additionally, entering the
salons and coffeehouses meant leaving social status at the door (Habermas, 1962, p. 36). This
removal from the prevalent social conditions made the public akin to the Greek polis by virtue of
the fact that it was removed from the realm of necessity and production (Habermas, 1962, p.
160). This demonstrated a fundamental tension ever present in the public, the conflation of the
bourgeois with humanity as a whole, or as Habermas phrased it: l’homme (1962).
The Political Public Sphere
The tension between the bourgeois and l’homme resurfaced in Habermas’s account of the
political public sphere. The truth contained within the bourgeois public sphere manifested in the
critical examination and legitimation of government. Habermas noted the condition of the
political public in 1784 Prussia where Frederick II rejected any private individual’s ability to
comment on public affairs of state. This was justified on the grounds that “a private person is not
at all capable of making such judgments, because he lacks complete knowledge of circumstances
and motives” (Habermas, 1962, p. 25). This position could be contrasted with developments in
France and Britain where politicians, thinkers, and jurists saw the need to justify a role for
private individuals’ opinions in government. For example, John Locke saw some role for
“conscience”, a notion of justice, in public opinion; however, he viewed it as unreflective and
uneducated, leading him to consider opinion to be closely related to personal preference, tainted
by prejudice (Habermas, 1962, pp. 91-92). Jean Jacques Rousseau similarly appealed to bons
sens in the formation of the general will, although he discounted public debate, believing that it
would mislead the simple minded (Habermas, 1962, pp. 98-99). In analyzing the American
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Revolution, Edmund Burke argued that legislation could not be justly applied “without regard to
the general opinion of those who are to be governed” (Habermas, 1962, p. 94). In a more elitist
move, French physiocrats tolerated absolutist government provided that it considered their
scholarly reflections (Habermas, 1962, p. 95).
Britain possessed both the most fully developed bourgeois public sphere and the most
advanced capitalist system. Once censorship was curtailed, journals became extensively involved
in political debate and commentary. England repealed the Licensing Act, doing away with the
primary forms of censorship, despite opposition from the monarchy over fears of the impact of
political discussion. The Whig politician Robert Harley drew prominent writers like Pope and
Swift into politics (Habermas, 1962, p. 59). This led to the creation of explicitly political and
satirical journals, like the Examiner, the Observer, and the Review, in the place of the literary and
moral journals, which had been only tangentially related to politics. There were two additional
crucial developments. First, in the early eighteenth century, government control over the political
press withered when the Tory Craftsman and Gentlemen’s Magazine entered the scene. The
representation of multiple sides of issues permitted genuine political debate (Habermas, 1962, p.
60). Second, in 1803, the press was granted access to the House of Commons and granted the
freedom to report on parliamentary affairs (Habermas, 1962, p. 62). These developments cleared
the way for the fourth estate. Bentham explained the connection between publicity and public
opinion by arguing that if parliament acted on behalf of the public, then the public could oversee
and contribute to its considerations (Habermas, 1962, p. 100).
The situation in Prussia was far removed from the one in Britain. In the former, the
public, and its ability to understand the affairs of state, was met with distrust. In the latter,
political entities responded to unfavorable election results and corruption by valuing the “public
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spirit”, “the sense of the people”, and “the common voice” (Habermas, 1962, pp. 63-64). The
British tendency grew stronger and more articulate. For example, in 1792, William Pitt’s elitism
was staunchly opposed by Charles Fox, who demanded that parliament give the public a means
of forming opinion which should then be respected by the government (Habermas, 1962, p. 66).
Again, the pattern of submitting subjective positions to rational examination and criticism
emerged. The physiocrats had argued that governmental activity should be subjected to the
reasoned positions of scholars. This was now taken a step further and parliamentary action
should engage with publicity, specifically, the laws it enacted should be based upon the public’s
reasoning, rather than solely arising from the will of the sovereign (Habermas, 1962, pp. 53-81).
The necessity of law being justified by public reason, rather than the subjective will of
the sovereign, or the interests of a dominant class, was an important theme (Habermas, 1962, p.
83). Much of the activities of the fully functional, mature political public sphere revolved around
ensuring that state control over individuals was properly rooted in that public. The “public
scrutiny of private people come together as public” was repeatedly applied to law and legal
reforms, and in Habermas’s view, was the function of the public sphere (Habermas, 1962, p. 76).
The legal reforms in question were primarily focused on creating a separation between the state
and the private realm, including the family and the economy. The bourgeois mind linked the
economy and the family as entities that had been controlled under feudalism but were now free
under capitalism. By way of example, in the early eighteenth century, British state intervention
in wages, training, and exchange was curtailed (Habermas, 1962, p. 77). This was characteristic
of the larger trend that saw the economy being regulated by the commodity exchange market
while interventionist and mercantilist policies declined (Habermas, 1962, p. 80). Rather than the
private realm of intimacy existing from time immemorial and now being freed from the
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constraints of feudalism, as the bourgeois believed, Habermas argued that it was newly
constituted in the capitalist period; privacy was, for him, a bourgeois theoretical construction.
In Habermas’s account, as detailed above, the political public mitigated the arbitrariness
of the sovereign will, by exposing it to rational, public debate and criticism (Habermas, 1962, p.
83). However, Habermas also identified a problematic ambiguity, namely, that the rationality
constituting public debate had become intertwined with a version of instrumental rationality.26
The perception of this ambiguity was rooted in Habermas’s belief that the bourgeois public’s
interest in the rationality of the legal system was concerned with instrumental predictability
rather than the inherent justice of dialogical reason (Habermas, 1962, p. 80). Moreover, the
bourgeois ideology embedded in the public sphere was based upon two faulty conflations. First,
as previously mentioned, it involved the conflation of the bourgeoisie with l’homme. It was
assumed that individuals in bourgeois economic positions represented humanity in its entirety.
Second, a system ordered on the basis of free market capitalism was conflated with a just and
natural society. This meant that the bourgeois political public valued and promoted only negative
rights, preventing interference with the private realm and emphasizing freedoms associated with
property ownership (Habermas, 1962, p. 83). These conflations were deceptively self-justifying.
In a market of many small-scale producers, none could become dominant or construct prohibitive
barriers to new producers entering the market. Correspondingly, the bourgeoisie did not believe
itself an exclusionary class, since any possessing the appropriate skill and fortune had the
opportunity to acquire property (Habermas, 1962, p. 87).
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See Schecter for an account of Habermas as a critic of instrumental rationality (2010, Ch. 6).
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The Philosophy of the Public Sphere
Habermas’s Interpretation of Kant
Habermas acknowledged a philosophical struggle around the concept of the public
sphere. In this struggle, Mill and Tocqueville argued in one direction, while Kant, Hegel, and
Marx promoted another. Habermas addressed this struggle in the pivotal fourth chapter of
Structural Transformation. Kant articulated the problem of government as the problem of
bringing morality and politics into unity with one another. Kant envisioned a society in which
citizens conformed to the rule of law because they recognized that the law was identical to their
moral duty; fear of punishment for disobedience was irrelevant. Such a society and its unity
could be achieved only through reason, and violence was not permitted in its creation
(Habermas, 1962, p. 103). This society embodied Kant’s notion of enlightenment (Habermas,
1962, p. 104; Kant, 1983a, p. 33). Enlightenment would free humanity from its self-imposed
tutelage, which included superstition, prejudice, and domination. Critical public reason,
publicity, counteracted this tutelage.
However, the realization of a just and enlightened society was problematic. The problem
arose from Kant’s distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal. The phenomenal
coincided with the empirical world, as humans collectively perceived it. The noumenal, on the
other hand, was independent of human perception, the world as it existed in itself; this could not
be articulated in the thought of the phenomenal realm. Humans were both phenomenal and
noumenal beings. Humans, as phenomenal beings, were perceptive of the world and physically
of the world. Humans, as noumenal beings, were rational and autonomous. The problem
unfolded in efforts to connect political domination and reason. As Habermas expressed it,
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domination was phenomenal, and politics a part of the res publica phanomenon; meanwhile,
reason was noumenal, and justice of the res publica noumenon (Habermas, 1962, p. 114).
Kant attempted to employ publicity in bringing the phenomenal and the noumenal into
unity with one another through two approaches. In the first approach, Kant attempted to create
the res publica noumenon from the res publica phanomenon. He did this by assuming that a
naturally occurring, historical order produced the juridical conditions necessary for a just society.
In the second approach, Kant attempted to show that the res publica noumenon, viewed as moral
progress, created the res publica phanomenon. Here, the juridical conditions necessary for a just
society could only come to exist through human action, specifically, educating the public and by
doing so creating moral progress.
Kant utilized a historical mechanism, “unsocial sociability”, to theorize autonomous
moral agency, and with it the possibility of a just society within existing societies (Kant, 1983c,
pp. 31-32). This mechanism was the notion that inevitable conflicts between societies, and
individuals within societies, ultimately brought about peace. For example, in a civil society,
some individuals may abandon their reason by succumbing to their own selfish motives.
However, these individuals must act publicly and doing so, theoretically, will check their
unreasonableness. Kant articulated the problematic conflation of the bourgeois with l’homme.
Since publicity operated through the functioning free market, and the agents within this market
were property owners, some were necessarily excluded from its freedom. Specifically, wagelaborers needed to sell their labor to make a living, and so in this condition were subject to
material necessity, and hence, unable to conduct themselves freely.
The publicity of free market capitalism forced the otherwise selfish bourgeoisie to behave
both rationally and morally. Additionally, noumenal freedom was only realized in the material
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security and freedom from necessity afforded property owners. However, this unifying,
moralizing solution was problematic in several ways. First, it may not have created anything
beyond a “pathologically enforced social union,” in essence the bourgeoisie may have been
outwardly moral, but nothing more (Habermas, 1962, p. 109). The just society was not to be
based on compulsion; though publicity was not the same as fear of legal punishment it was
compulsion nonetheless. Second, this unity presupposed an idealized form of free market
capitalism, one characterized by a never actually realized state of perfect competition. Absent
idealized capitalism, freedom was compromised.
Contemporarily, the notion of the publicity of capitalist market forcing morality upon its
actors has become even more problematic. Corporations and individuals now routinely hide
financial assets in offshore accounts, actors create straw men, and increase the opaqueness of an
already complex system. Additionally, electronic instruments execute economic activity at
speeds beyond human comprehension. The publicity of the marketplace cannot have the effect of
forcing participating entities into behaving morally when much of market behavior is unseen and
when seen done with such complexity and rapidity that it is essentially obscured. The decline of
the possibility of publicity created morality has also been experienced in politics. The entry of
anonymous and unlimited monetary sums into politics has subjected the processes of that realm
to the obscurities and complexities of the economic realm.
If “unsocial sociability” malfunctioned, then political action oriented toward humans as
phenomenal beings was required to bring about the juridical conditions for a just society. As
phenomenal beings, humans sought happiness over goodness. If humans were to freely accept a
political order, to realize the unity of politics and morality, then they must be happy within that
political order. Creating the requisite happiness meant that political action must concern itself
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with social welfare issues. As Habermas put it, the task of politics was “to make the public
satisfied with its condition” (Habermas, 1962, p. 113). In essence, social questions pressed for
answers.
Kant took the position that refining the morals of the populace would bring about the res
publica noumenon, this would, in turn, create the res publica phenomenon. The task of publicity,
then, was moral progress, to be accomplished by morally educating the public. This method of
creating the desired unity was also troublesome. It was unclear who would be the teachers of this
moral education. If it came from the state, then would the content of morality not merely be
redefined to bring it into unity with the prevailing politics? Was there already an existing group
of morally enlightened elites? If so, the hierarchical division between morally enlightened elites
and the unenlightened masses would replace the division between the bourgeois property owners
and the wage-laborers. Furthermore, whence came the morally enlightened elite? They would
need to understand the res publica noumenal prior to its actual creation. If publicity were to
survive public debate, then just society would have to be worked out in the process of that
debate, rather than being imposed upon it.
Habermas’s View of Marx and Hegel
Engaging Hegel, Habermas began considering the possibility that the bourgeois public
sphere had failed. Hegel did not assume free movement between classes, as Kant had, and so
gave greater weight to the conflict between the bourgeoisie and wage labor, or the
“disorganization of civil society” (Habermas, 1962, p. 119). This disorganization was crucial, if a
disorganized public were the basis for a state, then that state would merely reflect the public’s
disorganization and class conflicts. Hegel’s solution was to relegate the public sphere to a merely
educative role, stripping it of critical, formative function, and promoting government to a
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dominant position. Hegel placed governmental questions outside the scope of the general public,
in a move similar to Kant’s distinction between the morally enlightened elites and the
unenlightened masses. In Hegel’s view, public debate was capable of little more than showing
the public that the state was a common concern shared by all. This was the only position upon
which the conflicting, subjective interests of the disorganized public could ever agree
(Habermas, 1962, p. 120).
Marx both advanced and altered the Hegelian position. He grounded the concept of a
disorganized society in a new analysis, while simultaneously rejecting the need for a dominant
state. In his analysis, the view of the public sphere as an apolitical entity was based upon a false
consciousness, specifically, the conflation of the bourgeois with l’homme. Habermas’s analysis
was influenced by Marx’s, in that he recognized the very concept of bourgeois privacy as based
upon a system of negative rights that protected property and removed it from state interference
(Habermas, 1962, p. 125). However, the recognition that the public sphere was employed as an
instrument of class oppression did not warrant discarding it. Perhaps control of the public sphere
could be wrested from its bourgeois foundations: for example, the proletarian press was
expanding (Habermas, 1962, p. 126). As the bourgeois public sphere began to lose its strictly
bourgeois nature, becoming more inclusive, an important change occurred. Specifically, the
more inclusive public sphere grounded reason and autonomy upon a genuine public, rather than
upon a purely imagined privacy, as the bourgeois had. As a member of the public sphere, the
individual ceased to be solely a property owner and became a citizen. In Habermas’s account of
Marx, this subjected domination to reason by abolishing class based politics, and domination
could finally be based upon a truly inclusive public (Habermas, 1962, pp. 128-129).
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Habermas believed that Marx remained committed to a philosophical view of history that
saw the realization of a just society as part of a natural order. Marx was dedicated to Kant’s first
attempt to resolve the problems of the public sphere. This was the belief that autonomy and
reason would be brought about by the realization of a naturally just social and economic order.
Put another way, just as the bourgeois suffered from the self-deception that the private realm, as
they understood it, was always present and had been freed from the fetters of feudalism, Marxists
suffered from the deception that a just economic order was natural and would be realized once
the corruptions of capitalism were resolved (Habermas, 1962, p. 140). As Marxists pursued this
solution, liberal thought moved in a different, yet still problematic direction.
The Liberal Thought of Mill and Tocqueville
Mill and Tocqueville took the path not traveled by Marxists, favoring Kant’s other
solution. Liberal thinkers acknowledged the socialists’ ability to recognize the bourgeois
ideology inherent in the public sphere. However, liberals also recognized the failure to realize the
socialist vision. Their solution was to acknowledge the need for political reform to counteract the
injustices of bourgeois society (Habermas, 1962, pp. 130-131). Whereas Marx saw an inclusive
public sphere as resolving the disorganization that troubled Hegel, liberals believed that
inclusion only accentuated that disorganization.
Mill favored expanding the franchise and opposing the “aristocracy of money, gender,
and colour, against the minority democracy of the propertied, and against the plutocracy of the
grande bourgeoisie” (Habermas, 1962, p. 132). However, Mill viewed attempts to alter the
public sphere to include non-property owners’ criticism of the bourgeois as merely a new form
of conflict and domination. This inclusion was not the subjection of domination to rational
debate that was needed (Habermas, 1962, p. 131). Public opinion was viewed as little more than
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a collection of subjective opinions. As more subjective opinions and viewpoints were brought
into the public sphere, the result was bargain, compromise, and satisficing, rather than rational
debate leading to mutual consensus.
Worse yet, public opinion itself could assume a tyrannical form. Upon achieving a
critical mass, majority opinion demanded conformity and punished criticism and nonconformity.
Public opinion, then, may function to curb the power of the state; however, allowing it to direct
the state could be dangerous. This led Mill and Tocqueville to favor representative government.
As Mill put it, in that form of government political questions would be resolved “only by appeal
to views, formed after due consideration of a relatively small number of persons specially
educated for this task” (Habermas, 1962, p. 136). This carried with it a form of the exclusivity
and elitism similar to the class divisions along property lines that plagued the bourgeois public
sphere.
3.3 Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere
Social-Welfare and Mass Democracy
The concluding chapters of The Structural Transformation detailed the decline of the
public sphere and articulated an account of late capitalism. As Habermas wrote, “[t]he
communicative network of a public made up of rationally debating private citizens has collapsed
. . .” (Habermas, 1962, p. 247). Thus, the structural transformation represented Habermas’s
description of a decline in the properly functioning political sphere. Habermas pinpointed the
Great Depression of 1873 as a significant turning point in the history of the public sphere. This
international crisis cast doubt upon both the once assumed efficiency of capitalist economies and
the self-created yet prevalent bourgeois illusions (Habermas, 1962, p. 144). The nearly century
long success of capitalism was now seen as the result of historical circumstances and not a
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universally repeatable or natural phenomenon. As a result, the free market was no longer seen as
organized on the basis of naturally just principles. Furthermore, the false bourgeois beliefs that
anyone could move between classes and that free markets were characterized by perfect
competition between small, non-dominant producers were called into question as the result of the
rise of an oligopolistic economy.
These changes not only affected the belief systems of the bourgeois and other members
of society, but also state activity. In response to the crisis, the state became more active than it
had previously been (Habermas, 1962, pp. 236-237). The state cast off its limited role as a
“nightwatchman” to become more active. This development paralleled Arendt’s account of the
rise of housekeeping. No longer just a monitor of the existing order, the state increasingly began
to regulate the economy and sought to mitigate the inequities of capitalism. At this point, the
state became a major provider of goods and services. Simultaneously, the proletariat gained the
ability to challenge their economic relegation through legitimate channels, as they were granted
increased opportunities for political participation (Habermas, 1962, p. 146).
One of the themes in Habermas’s analysis of the late nineteenth century was the shift
from a liberal state, of the nightwatchman variety, to a more active state, of the social welfare
variety. Habermas characterized this shift as a change from private to public law. In the pre-shift
liberal state, constitutions primarily ensured the negative rights of the bourgeoisie through
private law. In that condition, the organization of society was left to what was believed to be the
natural, rational, and just functions of the free market. These bourgeois negative rights were
codified in the nineteenth century. The criticism was that despite being seen as politically
neutral, these rights actually had the effect of perpetuating the inequality between the property
owning bourgeois and the propertyless (Habermas, 1962, p. 224).
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The above criticism received a response in the shift from private to public law. The
public law of the state, which was newly reconstituted in its welfare form, provided protections
for the propertyless. This came in the form of increased regulation of the previously private areas
of life, for example, work, the family, and the economy. Additionally, the state redistributed
economic resources as well as other material goods, like housing (Habermas, 1962, p. 149).
Habermas did not view these developments as novel attempts to organize society recognizing
that the state had always organized society, even if that organization came from the state’s
decision not to intervene. Rather than being the natural condition independent of the state, the
stark inequalities of the capitalist system represented an artificial order maintained by the state
through its system of private law. As the shortcomings of market justice were recognized, state
intervention became necessary to ensure substantive justice, lest there be a political crisis of
unresolvable severity. Thus, state intervention was both necessary and justified to continue the
liberal tradition (Habermas, 1962, p. 224).
Public law went beyond providing positive rights and meeting social welfare needs, by
encouraging mass political participation. Since the state now monitored and organized society, it
should be answerable to all, not merely the bourgeoisie. The diverse and conflicting views of all
stratums of society should be included in such considerations, not merely the positions of
economically powerful interests (Habermas, 1962, pp. 229-230). The public sphere was to be
expanded, to include all members of society. However, Habermas believed that this never, in
fact, occurred and part of his task was to explain why this promise went unfulfilled.
While the new social welfare state, characterized by mass democracy, brought certain
improvements over its nightwatchman predecessor, it suffered from a critical flaw. It had the
effect of dissolving the hard won bourgeois distinctions between the public and private realms of

	
  

114
life. The result was what Habermas called an “interweaving of the public and private realm”
(Habermas et al., 1974, p. 54). The state increasingly became an actor in society, economic and
otherwise. Businesses and private organizations were enmeshed into state functions by
performing tasks on its behalf (Habermas, 1962, p. 197). The bourgeois public sphere, the realm
of rational debate and politics, had occupied the space that existed between the state and society.
As the relationship between those entities changed, so too did the nature of the public sphere.
Consider the similarities between the Greek polis and the functioning bourgeois public
sphere. The polis functioned as a realm of free debate because considerations of necessity were
excluded from it. Analogously, the bourgeois public sphere had functioned as a realm free from
considerations of necessity because such consideration and conflicts were confined to the
capitalist market. The issues that found their way into the public sphere, and once there subjected
to rational debate, were those of common concern to the entirety of the public sphere. They were
in this sense political. The assumption was that the bourgeois shared some common concerns
and that the natural, if fictional, justice of the marketplace resolved any nonpolitical conflicts. As
these conditions withered, the political public sphere changed. Collectives representing factional
interests, trade unions, political parties, joint stock corporations, and interest groups, for
example, replaced the individual members of the public. Additionally, economics entered the
public sphere both as substantive issues and as a mode of behavior. Economic interests entered
into public, political debate and this precluded the possibility of rational agreement of the sort
achieved in the bourgeois public sphere and the polis. The economic mode of resolving conflict,
bargaining, trading, and haggling, replaced rational criticism, debate, and consensus (Habermas,
1962, p. 198).
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Late Bourgeois Subjectivity
Habermas’s account of the decline of the public sphere was related to the matter of the
bourgeois subject, as the decline was not solely attributable to the inclusion of inequality in the
public sphere. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the economic component of
the private realm underwent a change. The nature of work was forever altered as capital became
ever more concentrated in fewer hands. Small-scale producers could not compete as large joint
stock companies began dominating the market. As a result, economic agents became less
autonomous as control was vested within corporate bureaucracies. Modern professional
managers rose to power as the primary corporate decision makers. The situation had become one
in which even those who exercised decision-making power did so only as detached bureaucratic
administrators rather than as property owners (Habermas, 1962, p. 152).
Large corporate entities sought control over the entirety of workers’ lives. A single
corporation dominated all aspects of life in a given town. It provided social and cultural
activities, housing, and pensions ensured dependence even after retirement (Habermas, 1962, pp.
154-157). Simultaneously, the role of the family was displaced as the welfare state assumed
more of its traditional functions, like education, care for the elderly, and healthcare, for example.
The mitigation of risk had shifted from the family to the state (Habermas, 1962, p. 157). With
these developments, income became more important than property. Consumption became an
important way of defining life, and depended upon the regularity and quantity of income,
displacing property as capital and even the events of the life cycle.
The result was a new conception of privacy and intimacy. The bourgeoisie notion of
privacy, and the private realm generally, faltered as it revolved around property and the
autonomy it had provided. The conflation of the bourgeois with l’homme had been revealed as
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faulty. The bourgeois considered man an autonomous being insofar as he was free to act however
he pleased. This autonomy was possible only when free from necessity and material concerns.
Man’s autonomy, rationality, and noumenal freedom had depended upon overlooking man’s
phenomenal nature and needs (Habermas, 1962, p. 160). The change in the nature of cultural
consumption revealed that freedom was inhibited under the late capitalist system.
The literary public had been based upon the market for both culture and information,
which had become affordably accessible and widely available through that market’s functions.
The value of cultural goods was determined by the critically and rationally debatable opinion of
the bourgeois. These opinions were not insulated and subjective, but rather rationally defended.
Modern forms of consumption replaced consumption based upon rational debate, and this led to
commodity fetishism, which entailed the penetration the market’s exchange relations into all
areas of life (Habermas, 1962, p. 161). Cultural works became “pre-digested” and were brought
down to match the sophistication of the masses, where they had previously increased consumers’
sophistication to match their own level (Habermas, 1962, p. 169).
The new type of cultural good allowed no role for critical reflection or rational debate.
Rational debate surrounding cultural goods disappeared as appeal to one’s own private subjective
preferences and prejudices became sufficient justification for consumption. Autonomy was no
longer associated with the use of reason and freedom from the demands of material necessity.
Instead it became synonymous to the pursuit of pleasure obtained by satisfying preferences.
Subjectivity was no longer connected to a rational public and was completely internalized
(Habermas, 1962, p. 171). Public defense of private opinion was no longer required, this was
echoed in the very structure of the home as the parlor fell out of fashion (Habermas, 1962, p.
157). Discussion was reduced to regurgitating pre-formed opinions, the critique of which was
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unwelcome and irrationally dismissed (Habermas, 1962, p. 246). Thus, modern culture,
including media, undermined the possibility of rational debate and reflection. Once lost in the
prefigurative cultural arena, these functions were soon lost in other areas of life, including
politics.
The Roles of Advertising and Media
Habermas detailed journalism’s transformation from its political nature in the eighteenth
century to its modern commercially driven embodiment (1962, pp. 180-189). The lynchpin was
the creation of constitutions marking the change from private to public law, from the liberal
nightwatchman state to the welfare state. Prior to the codification of the freedoms of expression
and the press, journalism either succumbed to political censorship or fixated upon the need for
free political expression (Habermas, 1962, p. 184). When focused upon freedom of political
expression, there was little opportunity for commercialization. The removal of state censorship
lessened the need for that focus, freeing media outlets to publish more profitable content.
Additionally, the media was affected by the transformation of commercial activity under the
welfare state.
Once free from censorship, the media found a new source of revenue in advertising.
Oligopolistic producers required advertising to stabilize markets, this was made more important
by mass-production of goods (Habermas, 1962, p. 189). Selling subscriptions ceased to be
publishers’ primary source of income, as subscription sales became mere instruments of selling
advertising space, as advertisements became the most important source of income. With this
development, the press changed; it no longer needed to address itself to, or foster, rational
debate. Instead, the press could find higher profits in appealing to readers as individual
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consumers. The goal became to publish whatever would sell issues, since circulation numbers
were directly tied to the profits realized through ad sales.
Advertising embodied a larger trend. Previously, the public sphere had been free from
private, economic competition. With the rise of advertising, that competition became public, as
its goal was to favorably present private interests and competitions to the public (Habermas,
1962, p. 192). While advertisements were the blatant presentation of private interests, public
relations were self-aware advertising that proceeded more subtly. Public relations addressed the
public as a collective entity attempting to defend positions, while advertising appealed to
individuals as consumers. Habermas’s examples of public relations included the responses from
the Pennsylvania Railroad and the Standard Oil Company to their social critics (1962, p. 193).
The commonality of advertising and public relations lay in the way both sought to procure public
support for private interests.
Advertising and public relations were, however, a far cry from the publicity of the fully
functional bourgeois public sphere. They appealed to a public that was an aggregate of
individuals, and rather than appealing to rational debate intentionally avoided it. Public relations
avoided debate by manipulating and selectively presenting facts to create erroneous appeals to
public interests, thereby presenting themselves as promoting objective rather than subjective
interests (Habermas, 1962, p. 194). Advertising and public relations, through their promotion of
private, subjective interests and their efforts to avoid rational debate, undermined the possibility
of a functional public sphere.
Politics
Due to its effectiveness, public relations became the dominant form of communication in
the political realm. This was furthered by the rise of the modern political party in the nineteenth
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century. Previously, elected representatives had been accountable to their constituents as comembers of their common public sphere, and as such subject to rational debate and criticism
(Habermas, 1962, p. 204). In that condition, political parties were informal organizations that
allowed their member representatives to engage in rational debate with their constituents
(Habermas, 1962, p. 202). In the nineteenth century, formal party apparatuses emerged which
initially appealed to class interests and then to as broad a segment of the population as possible.
As institutional formalism set in, parties organized bureaucratically and a class of professional
politicians arose. These professional political operatives were less accountable to their
constituents than to party as party membership took precedence over participation in the public
sphere. As the politician broke from his constituents, so too parties broke from the specific
interests they once represented. Parties utilized advertising, public relations, and propaganda to
garner support from as wide a swath of the population as possible (Habermas, 1962, pp. 203215). The primary goal of party politics was to attain and maintain power rather than promote the
public interest.
Parties were still dependent upon continued public approval of their platforms. However,
the newly developed techniques of political communication, advertising, public relations, and
propaganda, did much to avoid rational debate. In large part, debate was avoided by appeals to
unconscious inclinations and “real needs”, discontents, longings, prejudices, etc., of the
population (Habermas, 1962, pp. 217-218). Misjudging these real needs could result in rejection
and the loss of power. However, appealing to real needs did not necessarily require meeting
them. Rational reflection would have been capable of making obvious the objective interests
underlying the real needs, but this was avoided by the parties’ use of political communication
(Habermas, 1962, p. 219). Nor was the party capable of rationally reflecting upon or debating
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these needs. Rather than understanding, parties used positivistic methods to gauge opinion and
appeal to what voters thought they wanted (Habermas, 1962, p. 243).
The result was not the identification of the objective problem or the discovery of an
objective solution. These real needs were connected to the inequities of capitalism. A
combination of several developments allowed capitalism’s problems to go unrecognized. First,
the proletariat became more affluent and behaved primarily as consumers, even with respect to
the state, rather than as citizens (Habermas, 1962, p. 211). Second, political parties ceased to
represent specific classes in favor of seeking broadly based support, and took no part in
educating the electorate on class specific interests or conflicts (Habermas, 1962, p. 203).
Elections were no longer rational contests about the justice, equality, or the direction of society,
and were instead about capturing and maintaining political power.
Habermas was concerned with mass culture taking the place of autonomous individuals
capable of constituting a rational public. He cited Adorno who saw the prevailing mass culture
“as glorifying reduplication and justification of the state of affairs that exist anyway” embodied
by the pervasive slogan “become what you are” (Habermas, 1962, p. 216; seeHorkheimer &
Adorno, 2002). Habermas was also influenced by C. Wright Mills on this topic (Habermas,
1962, p. 249; Mills, 1956). As Habermas phrased it elsewhere, modern populations were
“allowed to do, in the consciousness of their freedom, what do they must” (1973, p. 196). The
population could not enter politics as rationally debating citizens, only as subjectively interested
consumers.
Reflective public opinion was replaced by a collective of individual prejudices and
preferences, as Habermas termed it, “non-public opinion” (1962, p. 211). Stated differently, “the
public opinion once emergent from [the rational public] has partly decomposed into the informal
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opinions of private citizens without a public and partly become concentrated into formal
opinions of publicistically effective institutions” (Habermas, 1962, p. 247).

Individual

preferences could not meet in rational debate because they were portrayed as a false public good
by political communications.
Habermas’s depiction of contemporary society was pessimistic. The potential of the
bourgeois public sphere had gone unfulfilled. Furthermore, the interconnectedness of society and
the state led to “refeudalisation” (Habermas, 1962, p. 231). Under that condition the public
ceased to be a sphere of rational debate to check and legitimate the use of power. Rather, the
nature of the public sphere became akin to what had been prevalent during feudalism. The public
sphere became a space for interest groups to display their power, as had the feudal lords of old.
One commentator wrote that, in Habermas’s account, “the interconnectedness between a sphere
of public debate and individual participation has been fractured and transmuted into that of a
realm of political information and spectacle, in which citizen-consumers ingest and absorb
passively entertainment and information” (Kellner, 2000, p. 265).
Since the state now sought to regulate once private concerns, those same concerns sought
to influence the state and this led to refeudalisation: “Large organizations strive for political
compromises with the state and with each other, excluding the public sphere whenever possible”
(Habermas et al., 1974, p. 54). These organizations took the form of special interest groups, trade
associations, corporations, and the political party, now more concerned with attaining and
maintaining power than with its constituents’ interests. These organizations solely promoted their
own interests, rather than attempting to determine the public good, and so were accompanied by
the rise of an economic mentalité. However, these politically dominant organizations could not
be too obvious in their domination. “But at the same time the large organizations must assure
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themselves of at least plebiscitary support from the mass of the population through an apparent
display of openness (demonstrative publizität)” (Habermas et al., 1974, p. 54). This publicness
did not imply the presence of a functioning political realm, in other words, publizität did not
entail öffentlichkeit. The mass appeal was achieved through public relations and propaganda,
which avoided debate by manipulating and carefully selecting facts to create erroneous appeals
to a false public good, thereby presenting these groups as promoting public rather than private
interests.
The now dominant organizations viewed this manipulation as necessary in order to avoid
the appearance of legitimation crises, which would otherwise be obvious as dominant
organizations controlled a system growing ever less responsive to a citizenry incapable of
critically debating or forming reasoned opinions in the same manner as the functioning bourgeois
political realm (Habermas, 1976a; 1996, p. 396). These organizations would use any means at
their disposal, be they those associated with the economic mentalité, manipulative public
relations or propaganda, or coercion. The end result was that the force of the better argument
could no longer carry the day, as the better argument would always run afoul of the promotion of
some private interest. Alternatively, private interests were made to appear as public good and all
claimed the force of the better argument for their own, while none recognized such claims from
others no matter their legitimacy. Habermas wrote that the political realm “becomes a field for
competition of interests, competitions which assume the form of violent conflict” and that the
“depoliticization of the mass of the population and the decline of the public realm as a political
institution are components of a system of domination . . ..” (1970b, p. 75; 1974, p. 54).
Despite a pessimistic depiction of the public sphere, Habermas did not end his analysis
there. Politics were not entirely futile, as the influence of political communications was not
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totally determinative of outcomes. Habermas identified two currents in the public sphere that
counteracted manipulative communications. First was the staged publicity of manipulative
communications, and second, the critical processes of public communication (Habermas, 1962,
p. 232). Although constrained in influence, Habermas believed that public spheres could exist
within bureaucracies (Habermas, 1962, p. 248). Even if rational debate amongst autonomous
citizens was no longer politically worthwhile, individuals could still exert some influence within
organizations and so to a lessened extent, affect the conflict of special interests. Therefore, state
structures could be checked, and possibly have their power legitimized, by the scrutiny of wellorganized and funded political parties and interest groups (Habermas, 1962, p. 233). These could
potentially function in a manner similar to the bourgeois public sphere. Habermas’s ideal of an
accountable welfare state could be realized by rational exchange between groups, where each
was rationally accountable to its membership (Habermas, 1962, p. 232). He defended the role
that rational debate could still play in furthering objective, public interests (Habermas, 1962, p.
234). Habermas suggested two ways of increasing the impact of rational debate. Equality could
be improved, which would render conflict over private access to resources less important, or
alternatively, the possibility of nuclear annihilation could overshadow insignificant private
interests and bring humanity together (Habermas, 1962, pp. 234-235).
Further Reflections on the Public Sphere
Thirty years after the publication of The Structural Transformation, Habermas offered his
thoughts on his earlier work as well as responses to some critics. Habermas’s philosophy had
undergone significant development and it was not surprising that he was unsatisfied with some
elements of his Structural Transformation. Despite expressing some dissatisfaction with his
previous analysis, Habermas largely confirmed the positions he had taken. He was especially

	
  

124
supportive of the importance of democracy and the necessity of rational criticism and debate in a
just, legitimate, and democratic society.
Habermas acknowledged critics who had recognized the disjointed nature of his account
(1992, p. 430). Specifically, Habermas had idealized the bourgeois public sphere, early on, and
later was overly pessimistic in describing its decline. Habermas admitted that he overly
simplified the shift from a “culture-debating public to a culture-consuming public” (1992, p.
438). Habermas explained away some of his previous simplicity and pessimism, attributing it to
the context of 1950s Germany. Both Douglas Kellner and Thomas McCarthy noted that the
entirety of the Frankfurt School was influenced by bearing witness to capitalism’s collapse into
monopoly, socialism’s collapse into Stalinism, and the recent tragedies of fascism (McCarthy
introduction in Habermas, 1984b, pp. xviii-xix; Kellner, 2000, p. 264). However, Habermas also
noted a theoretical problem with his account of human subjectivity. In some respects Habermas’s
retrospective self-critique echoed his critique of Adorno. The Structural Transformation failed to
account for the extent to which humans were embedded in the lifeworld, and in so doing,
downplayed humans’ mundane discursive abilities (Habermas, 1992, p. 437).
Habermas abandoned his belief that the rational debate of the public sphere had been
confined to a realm within bureaucratic organizations. The public sphere could, in a manner,
function in everyday actions within society. Habermas noted several examples of this mundane
rational activity. First was the impact of public discussion on voting choices (Habermas, 1992, p.
438). Second, he cited the fact that even mass media audiences were capable of critical responses
and activity, rather than being passive un-reasoning consumers (Habermas, 1992, p. 239).
However, the line of research this optimism relied upon has been critiqued as overstating the
independence of media consumers (Morley, 1995). Some have gone further than Habermas’s
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initial position, theorizing the existence of a media based feudalism where “political authority is
increasingly legitimated through media based acclamation”, and the public sphere is
“increasingly reduced to manipulative publicity that simulates a dialogue about issues and
candidates, evoking norms of communication with a visual hyperreality detached from actual
dialogue” (Warren, 1989, p. 528).
Habermas also noted associations which fostered rational public debate, as well as
providing a political check on governmental power, and even acting as a political resistance, as
was the case during the 1980s in Eastern Bloc nations (1992, pp. 454-455). These “voluntary
unions” were independent of both the economy and the state, and included “churches, cultural
associations . . . academies . . . independent media, sports and leisure clubs, debating societies,
groups of concerned citizens and grass-roots petitioning” (Habermas, 1992, p. 453). Despite
these reconsiderations, Habermas maintained his belief regarding the impact of mass media on
contemporary life. He noted that even the most important political events were such that their
“mode of occurrence” was televisual, as was the case with the break-up of the Soviet Union
(Habermas, 1992, p. 456).
On a larger scale, Habermas acknowledged that the he had erroneously treated society as
a “totality” in The Structural Transformation (1992, p. 443). This overlooked the extent to which
the bourgeois public sphere had been defined by its exclusivity. Habermas was aware of class
tensions and the exclusivity of the public sphere, and yet had focused upon its bourgeois nature.
By doing this, he believed that he had underestimated the rational activity that occurred within
the “plebian” public sphere (Habermas, 1962, p. xviii; 1992, p. 423). Other commentators noted
this weakness and described a “proletarian” public sphere (Negt & Kluge, 1972). This oversight
was crucial as it played a role in the very constitution of the public sphere (Calhoun, 1992, p. 37;
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Fraser, 1992). Habermas admitted that he had previously viewed the activity of the proletariat
was viewed as little more than the background for bourgeois action (1992, p. 427). Having
rethought his position Habermas acknowledged the existence of “competing public spheres”, and
the “pluralization of the public sphere” (1992, pp. 425-426).
Much like the proletariat, women had been excluded from consideration. Although
women may have been members of the literary public, playing a significant role in salon culture,
they were excluded from the political public. Certain aspects of the public sphere were generated
by this exclusion, as was the case with the exclusion of the proletariat. Habermas noted that it
was conceivable that his idealized public sphere had been patriarchal, depending upon the
exclusion and domination of women for its very existence (1992, p. 428). The short shrift given
women in Structural Transformation did not go unnoticed.27 Specifically, Fraser advocated a
reconsideration of what was appropriate substantive content for the public sphere (1997a, pp. 8589). For example, the concerns of minority groups may not be common to all but should be
considered public because they were inextricably linked to a just and democratic society
(Benhabib, 1992; Fraser, 1997a, pp. 85-89; 1997b).
Habermas also noted that the contrasts between the idealized public sphere and its
contemporary counterpart were portrayed in too stark a manner. He partially attributed this
pessimism to Adorno’s influence (Habermas, 1992, p. 438). Habermas had described the
eighteenth century bourgeois public sphere as too homogenous, as mentioned above. That public
sphere could, alternatively, have been understood as comprised of competing interest groups, and
thus, as being made up of coexisting and competing public spheres (Habermas, 1992, p. 425).
This would include the previously mentioned plebian public sphere, as well as a number of other
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See A. Allen (2012); Benhabib (1992); Fleming (1995); Fraser (1992, 1997a) Landes (1992,
1995).
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possible publics or counterpublics (Eley, 1992; Ikegami, 2000; Warner, 2002). Alternatively,
Fraser theorized that the larger public sphere was composed of weak publics that operated in
civil society to form opinion and identities, and strong publics, located within institutions where
the already formed opinion was implemented (Fraser, 1992, pp. 89-92; see Habermas, 1996 Ch.
8). This understanding provided an alternative to the decline of the public sphere; the differences
between the early and late public spheres could be seen as the result of a self-transformation
(Habermas, 1992, p. 430). Adopting this view, the decline of the bourgeois public sphere could
be seen as the inclusion of previously marginalized and excluded groups, and as such, the
expansion of political debate.
Habermas’s portrayal of the public sphere was also affected by the lack of attention paid
to social movements (Calhoun, 1992, p. 36). The social movement most familiar to Habermas
was the student movement, on which he coauthored 1961’s Student und Politik. He believed that
the movement contained authoritarian or fascist tendencies, and that it was motivated by action
for action’s sake. Habermas later walked back some of his criticism of the movement as fascist
(see Holub, 1991, Ch. 4). Habermas’s caution, if not opposition, to social movements led to his
being critiqued as conservative, as incorporating too much of capitalism and bourgeois society’s
ideology, and too critical of leftist tactics, and thus, as an obstacle to the very change he claimed
to favor (Holub, 1991, pp. 94-98). Habermas’s was the sort of failure to move beyond the liberal,
capitalist system that drew the ire of Slavoj Žižek, among others, who desired a move away from
that system:
[T]he left has a choice today: either it accepts the predominant liberal democratic horizon
(democracy, human rights and freedoms . . .), and engages in a hegemonic battle within
it, or it risks the opposite gesture of refusing its very terms, of flatly rejecting today’s
liberal blackmail that courting any prospect of radical change paves the way for
totalitarianism . . . it is the advocates of changes and resignifications within the liberaldemocratic horizon who are the true utopians in their belief that their efforts will amount
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to anything more than the cosmetic surgery that will give us capitalism with a human face
(2000, p. 326).
Habermas’s unfriendliness to social movements in general, the student movement in particular,
and hence his failure to include them in his consideration of the public sphere, contributed to his
pessimism. This unfriendliness paired with the inability, or unwillingness, to move beyond the
capitalist structure drew critique from the left.
Habermas had asserted that the importance of the public sphere arose from its ability to
allow individuals to “generalize their interests and to assert them so effectively that state power
is transformed into a fluid medium of society’s self-organization” (1992, p. 431). Thus, the
account of democracy in The Structural Transformation was influenced by Abendroth and
radical democracy. In Further Reflections, Habermas questioned the self-organization of society
on several grounds. First, Habermas expressed the view that contemporary institutions were too
powerful and complex to be controlled by public debate taking place in the lifeworld, aside from
the matter of whether public debate was rational or not. The best that public debate could achieve
was preventing the citizen from becoming even more consumer-like, preventing administration
and economics from becoming even more dominant in every day and political life (Habermas,
1992, p. 444). Second, with the admission that rational political debate could not control the
economy, it must be acknowledged that the role of economic conflicts in the declining public
sphere was overemphasized. Since the bourgeois public sphere was not a totality, much of the
debate within it may be seen to address “existential issues” (Habermas, 1992, p. 448) 448. These
issues concerned the formation of group self-identity and their accompanying conceptions of the
good life. Pluralistic democratic debate gave voice to these marginalized groups.
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3.4 Crises of Legitimacy
The next pertinent step in Habermas’s thought came with the publication of Legitimation
Crisis. This work was published in 1973, more than a decade after Structural Transformation,
and more than a decade prior to Further Reflections. Legitimation Crisis continued to analyze
late capitalism, and was greatly concerned with the capacity, or lack thereof, for change in
contemporary capitalism and society as a result of a misconstrued notion of politics. The work
addressed a world in which states were still of the social welfare variety described in The
Structural Transformation. Moreover, Habermas was expressly concerned with utilizing the
resources of Marxist theory to explain late capitalism. The ultimate problem of Legitimation
Crisis remained a familiar one: how could legitimate government, one responsive to the public,
be possible in a situation where a rational politics was absent? As Habermas wrote:
The political system fails as a guardian of social integration if its decisions even though
effective, can no longer be traced to legitimate law. The constitutionally regulated
circulation of power is nullified if the administrative system becomes independent of
communicatively generated power, if the social power of functional systems and large
organizations (including the mass media) is converted into illegitimate power, or if the
lifeworld resources for spontaneous public communications no longer suffice to
guarantee an uncoerced articulation of social interests. The independence of illegitimate
power, together with the weakness of civil society and the public sphere, can deteriorate
into a “legitimation dilemma,” which in certain circumstances can combine with the
steering trilemma and develop into a vicious circle. Then the political system is pulled
into the whirlpool of legitimation deficits and steering deficits that reinforce one another
(1996, p. 396).
Marxist Approaches
As previously described, the role of the state had changed from that of the liberal,
nightwatchman to the social welfare state. The state had become more active to offset the
negative externalities of capitalism, at least to an extent and at least for selectively chosen groups
(Habermas, 1979, p. 194). Additionally, capitalism had shifted from a competitive marketplace
to one where production was concentrated in the hands of a few large corporations (Habermas,
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1976a, pp. 33-34). Habermas approached the phenomenon of late capitalism from two
standpoints within the Marxist tradition. He considered an “orthodox” approach in which the
state, no matter how interventionist, did not interfere with the anarchic system of commodity
production (Habermas, 1979, p. 51). Alternatively, Habermas considered a “revisionist” Marxist
approach, wherein the anarchy of production has been replaced by planning on the part of an
interventionist state (Habermas, 1979, p. 59).
Habermas found fault with both approaches. The orthodox approach could not deal with a
contemporary capitalism in which surplus value and labor value could not be determined as they
previously had been. State intervention in capitalism through infrastructure, education, and
investment had made labor more productive. The state had made “reflexive” labor more
important and useful while orthodox Marxism considered it unproductive (Habermas, 1979, p.
56). Habermas viewed reflexive labor as crucial to the continual increase of the productivity of
direct labor (Habermas, 1979, pp. 55-57). In short, Habermas rejected the old labor theory of
value. Free market wages were replaced by a “quasi-political” wage system affected by unions
and governmental intervention in the wage negotiations of certain industries (Habermas, 1979,
pp. 38,57). Furthermore, the nature of use value changed as its content, education, housing, and
healthcare, became the subject of political struggles in the welfare state (Habermas, 1979, p. 58).
Democracy was not merely a manifestation of class conflict, as believed by the orthodox
approach. Citizens had some outlets for exerting pressure, and thus a degree of control over
government.
The revisionist approach within the Marxist tradition was capable of acknowledging the
“recoupling” of politics and economics (Habermas, 1979, p. 36). However, Habermas argued
that the belief that the state was capable of controlling and planning economic development
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could only be held if the state was given too much credit, combined with a healthy dose of
naivety. Planning was typically only applied to, and effective in, dealing with crises. Some
amount of anarchy would inevitably remain in commodity production, despite the best efforts of
the state (Habermas, 1979, p. 60). Both Marxist approaches viewed the relationship between
politics and economics too simplistically. They did not wholly separate as the orthodox model
held, nor did they wholly converge, as was the position of the revisionist model.
Having found Marxist approaches lacking, Habermas postulated a more complex,
elusive, and perhaps even deceptive relationship between the two. The state did intervene in
economics, however, it cultivated the appearance of distance from a free economy (Habermas,
1979, p. 195). Thus, a new and fundamental tension was revealed between the private use of
surplus value and the administration of economic and social interests for the sake of the
collective good (Habermas, 1976a, p. 36). It was a tension between the state’s need to secure the
support of its citizens, and with that support its legitimacy, and the conflicting interests of
capital.
Systems Theory
The weaknesses and over simplifications Habermas found in Marxist approaches led him
to a form of systems theory. 28 Specifically, he analyzed late capitalism in terms of three
subsystems: the economic, the political, and the sociocultural. The economic subsystem revolved
around securing surplus value. The sociocultural subsystem utilized the appropriate structures
and worldviews to create social integration. Between the economic and sociocultural subsystems
lay the complex concept of the political that Habermas divided between the administrative and
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See Habermas (1988, pp. 74-88) for his critique of systems theory.
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legitimation systems (Habermas, 1976a, p. 60). Here, Habermas’s approach shared some aspects
with Claus Offe’s (Offe, 1984, 1985, 1992).
The connections between the three primary subsystems were those of inputs and outputs.
The outputs of the sociocultural subsystem were norms, meanings, and worldviews, all of which
created social integration. The economic system’s outputs were consumable values. The political
systems outputs were administrative decisions. The outputs of both the economic and the
political subsystems were the inputs for the sociocultural. The economic depended upon the
political’s administrative decisions, the motivations and integration of the sociocultural system,
as well as capital, labor, land and the state’s improvement of labor as its inputs. The political
relied upon mass loyalty of the population and the consumable outputs of the economic as its
inputs. This complex and interdependent relationship meant that if one of the subsystems
faltered, the others would follow suit. A crisis of either inputs or outputs in one of the three
negatively affected the other two, creating a vicious cycle of crises.
Four types of crises occurred in late capitalism. Legitimation crises occurred in the
political system due to its inability to manage the economic system, and its inability to secure the
peoples’ loyalty. Rationality crises in the economic subsystem arose from an inability to navigate
the tension between private economic interests and the satisfaction of the collective good,
including resolving inequalities. The sociocultural subsystem could create motivation crises
when the expectations and needs of citizens, created by worldviews and norms, conflicted with
the prevailing distribution of economic goods or administrative decisions. A rationality crisis in
the economic system was manifested at the system level, while the legitimation and motivation
crises occurred at the level of the lifeworld. The fate of the capitalist system rested upon that
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system’s ability to solve such crises, in effect, on the system’s potential for change (Habermas,
1976a, pp. 31, 39-40).
Rationality Crises
Absent the potential for responsive change several types of crises were possible. Figure 2
summarizes the various subsystems originating the crises as well as how they were manifested at
the level of the system and identity.
Figure 2

Crises Points of Origin

Point of origin
(subsystem)

System Crisis

Economic

Economic Crisis

Political

Rationality Crisis

Socio-Cultural

-

Identity Crisis
Legitimation Crisis
Motivation Crisis

(Held, 1982, p. 183).
The political subsystem’s outputs were funded by taxation. The taxation system, and any
change in it, needed at a minimum to be justified by its efficiency, if not by appeals to more just
or beneficial distributions, it must be an effective means of achieving the specified ends. Put
another way, it was based upon instrumental rationality (Habermas, 1976a, p. 62). A crisis of
rationality occurred when decisions were enacted that were not rationally justifiable.
Alternatively, a crisis occurred if decisions about ends were simply incorrect and the economy
and society became unstable. Things were complicated by the tension between private economic
interests and the collective good of society.
Habermas provided two examples of rationality crises (1976a, p. 47). The first example
came from Joachim Hirsch, and was connected to the aforementioned orthodox Marxist view.
Habermas believed that the problem with this view was that it could not understand that failures
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of the state and failures of the economy were not distinct and separable. State failure was never
clear-cut; it depended upon the specific population’s expectations and tolerances. Economic
failure, on the other hand, was characterized by unemployment and bankruptcy (Habermas,
1976a, pp. 63-64). Failures in economic planning could even be beneficial for the state if it could
absolve itself of responsibility. A perceived inability to regulate the economy would limit the
degree to which economic victims could make demands upon the state (Habermas, 1976a, p. 65).
Furthermore, rationality crises could exist within norms and worldviews; this was
demonstrated by Habermas’s second example. This example came from Offe who maintained
that rationality crises arose when the state’s mechanisms to control the economy and society, e.g.
taxation, subsidies, interest rates, and redistribution, were ineffective (Habermas, 1976a, p. 67).
In essence, Offe argued that social behavior could not be controlled by the manipulation of
monetary policy. For example, some individuals were not motivated by economic concerns, but
rather the inherent goals of their chosen career. They were considered abstract labor and were
often found in public services like education, social work, and healthcare. Additionally, an
increasing number of individuals were being removed from the workforce by lengthening
education, earlier application of retirement and pensions, incarceration, and the recognition of
chronic afflictions. Lastly, as the economic system became increasingly complex, it became
more difficult, if not impossible, to gather sufficient data upon which to base changes in policy
intended to manipulate behavior.
Therefore, decisions about economic policy were transformed into political questions as
the goals and values motivating decisions became more important than the more easily
determined, instrumental means of realizing an end (Habermas, 1976a, pp. 66-67). Ultimately,
instrumental rationality gave way in an increasing number of instances to communicative
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rationality that would be capable of critically examining and justifying the outcomes sought. This
entailed crises of the system being sent to the lifeworld for resolution as a rationality crisis could
quickly became a legitimation crisis. If, however, the communicative potential of the lifeworld
could not be taped into then the crisis would fester. The processes of colonization circumvented
the communicative potential of the lifeworld and questions sent there were either blatantly left
unresolved or were merely given the appearance of resolution. Such crises were essentially
referred to the lifeworld that was dominated by aspects of the system that had proven insufficient
for their resolution.
Legitimation Crises
As previously mentioned, the scope of state administration increased to encompass areas
previously beyond its purview, like the economy and once private social life including the
family, education, and healthcare. As this expansion occurred, legitimation became more
important (Habermas, 1976a, p. 71). Habermas’s analysis provided two theories dealing with the
problems associated with the increasing importance of legitimation. His first theory rested upon
“structural dissimilarity” between state administration and sociocultural meanings and
worldviews that secured integration and legitimacy. As dissimilarity increased, state
administration became less able to secure the legitimacy it required. His second, complementary
theory, was that when the state’s need for legitimacy was met, it had problematic, unforeseen
consequences, the ability of citizens to critique the political process, for example (Habermas,
1976a, p. 50).
The dissimilarity between political administration and the sociocultural subsystem could
be understood as the dissimilarity between the types of rationality prevalent in each subsystem.
Specifically, it was the dissimilarity between instrumental rationality and communicative
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rationality, between efficiency and meaning as ends. The instrumental administrative system was
unconcerned with meanings. Administration increasingly intervened in areas of life that were
organized around traditional, taken as natural, belief systems that were not reliant upon
justification. This was previously seen in the belief that there was a natural order and justice to
the unrestrained capitalist free market. These traditional worldviews were taken as natural and
assumed to be beyond the scope of critical and rational reflection or debate (Habermas, 1976a, p.
70).
This opened the door for legitimation crises in two ways. First, the application of
administration in these areas drew their naturalness into question. Human action was
increasingly responsible for the organization of areas that had, in the past, been beyond such
responsibility. Second, there was “no administrative production of meaning” since instrumental
reason was unconcerned with meanings (Habermas, 1976a, p. 70). Administration was incapable
of creating novel justifications for relationships which were no longer viewed as natural, or had
deviated from their natural state.
If the administrative system was caught manipulating meanings to justify its creations,
then any legitimation it had acquired in doing so would be forfeit (Habermas, 1976a, p. 71). The
furthest the administrative system could push was the exploitation of existing expectations and
preferences. Those associated with privacy were especially ripe for this exploitation. The state
played upon “civic privatism”, the individual interest in acquiring material goods from both the
state and the economy, paired with the absence of interest in political participation. The state also
preyed upon existing “familial-vocational privatism”, characterized by an escape into private
family life combined with an interest in the consumption made possible by success in the labor
market (Habermas, 1976a, p. 75). These forms of privacy meant that the state could ease its need
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for legitimacy by ensuring the provision of material goods and thereby distracting a large number
of individuals from politics.
However, state administration went further than its reliance on privacy and distraction.
The administrative system attempted to classify problems as depending upon subjective
decisions, rather than rational public debate. Additionally, it could attempt to distract the public’s
attention away from the genuine problem (Habermas, 1976a, p. 70). The administrative system
could hum along smoothly so long as it met society’s expectations concerning consumable
goods. This solution was not sustainable due to the tension between private economic interests
and the collective public good (Habermas, 1976a, p. 73). Put simply, not all conflicting
preferences and expectations could be met indefinitely.
Habermas’s second theory dealt with the expansion of administration bringing taken for
granted values and meanings into doubt. Tradition, the existing way of dealing with and
understanding the world, ceased to function as it previously had. Administrative intervention
brought newly intensified reflection and discussion of these norms and meanings. Confusion,
fatalism, and existentialism were avoided by education and debate. Community activities became
key to debate and renewal and counteracted the growing pervasiveness of privatism. Again, the
state responded strategically, this time by coopting participation oriented citizens and groups into
the administrative decision making process, thus taking on an added air of legitimacy
(Habermas, 1976a, p. 72). This brought with it the unintended, and for the state, problematic,
effect of developing the citizenry’s ability to criticize state administration (Habermas, 1976a, p.
73). This, in turn, resulted in withholding or questioning legitimacy.
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Motivation Crises
The political subsystem’s inability to acquire legitimacy was due in part to its inability to
generate meanings; it was also partly due to the sociocultural system’s resistance to manipulation
and withholding of loyalty. Restated, a crisis could occur when the political subsystem received
insufficient inputs from the sociocultural subsystem’s outputs; this was a motivation crisis. The
sociocultural subsystem could produce too few outputs when it received too little input from its
fellow subsystems, which would feed into the lives of the individuals within the population
(Habermas, 1976a, p. 48). Crises within the system were social crises when they affected the
sociocultural subsystem. These crises demanded action from individuals who needed to engage
in interpretation, criticism, and alterations of everyday practices.
Habermas again proposed two theories that could account for motivation crises. His first
theory reasoned that such crises occurred when the privatism so crucial to legitimacy was
challenged. As privatism was threatened, there were no alternatives to fill its role. Habermas’s
second theory held that the sociocultural subsystem not only created crises, but also
“overloaded” the late capitalist system. This overload resulted from a novel and universal politics
and morality, which criticized existing structures, especially the class system (Habermas, 1976a,
p. 50).
In detailing his first theory, Habermas described privatism as a combination of prebourgeois tradition and bourgeois ideology now codified as law. Civic privatism was rooted in
bourgeois law that viewed the individual as a holder of state protected rights and personal
freedoms, rather than as an active political participant. This system contained a paradox: the state
needed citizen participation at some times, while wanting absolute authority at others, requiring
that certain areas be left to the sole control of the state (Habermas, 1976a, p. 76). Familial-
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vocational privatism was rooted in utilitarianism, individualism with an emphasis on possession,
and religious traditions like the Protestant work ethic, all of which combined to create a
dedication to capitalism (Habermas, 1976a, p. 77). The connecting theme was that capitalism
relied upon these already existing privatisms, among other things, to concoct its ideology and
was never able to generate a novel ideology of its own.
Late capitalism saw these traditions, and hence the ideology it relied upon, threatened.
Traditions began to be questioned and were found wanting in a number of areas, including the
scientization of politics (Habermas, 1976a, pp. 79-80). As administration expanded, so did the
scope of its instrumental reason and the technocratic approach. This expansion made the
lifeworld’s traditional communicative reason less effective. Simultaneously, society’s pluralism
increased, which called traditional belief systems into question as they encountered rival belief
systems. A worldview became a matter of subjective personal preference and commitment.29
Furthermore, the once pervasive commitment to capitalism was weakened by a number of
factors. First, the emergence of concrete labor (Habermas, 1976a, pp. 83-84). Second, rising
quality of life and affluence made individuals less dependent upon continued and uninterrupted
labor to meet their needs (Habermas, 1976a, p. 83). Finally, the link between work and reward
became less absolutist with the recognition that it depended upon a fairness that the market did
not necessarily possess (Habermas, 1976a, pp. 81-82).
The Critical Potential Inherent in Late Capitalism
The same tendencies that challenged tradition and capitalism had the potential to produce
a critically reflective, and thus politically functional society akin to that existing within the
idealized bourgeois public sphere. A number of disciplines, science for example, permitted
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Weber compared this situation to polytheism (Weber, 1948, p. 149).
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criticism (Habermas, 1976a, p. 84). The change from the nineteenth century that affirmed
fictitious bourgeois ideals, to the twentieth century “post-auratic” art was of greater importance.
Benjamin believed that the mechanical reproduction of art removed its aura and expanded its
appeal beyond the more affluent classes (Benjamin, 2008). Adorno argued that art’s avant-garde
expression called into question bourgeois art’s illusory naturalness. This encouraged critical
reflection on art as a process and convention, rather than a natural product (Adorno, 1997, Ch.
6). This sort of art demonstrated “the irretrievable sacrifice of bourgeois rationalism” (Habermas,
1976a, p. 85). Art’s weakness lay in its inability to take its reflective capacity to a broad
audience. It was always confined to elites, as Adorno believed, and not capable of the mass
appeal that Benjamin had foreseen (Habermas, 1976a, p. 86).30
The critical potential of law and morality were far less ambiguous than the potential of
science and art. Habermas provided an overview of the development of law and morality (1976a,
pp. 86-89). The most important development was that of natural law and natural rights, based
upon universal, abstract principles seeking a logical consistency that took the place of force in
ensuring adherence. Natural law’s universalism was undermined by the fact that formal legal
systems were specific to cultures and nations, thus any law was applied only to citizens and not
to l’homme.
Morality had greater potential for universal consistency. Utilitarianism was rejected for
leaving judgment to subjective, personal preference. The Kantian approach was more likely to
yield a universal result by applying the rational justification for action to all (Kant, 1983b, p. 15).
However, Kant’s approach did not account for the degree to which needs and motivation were
culturally rooted, thus, universalism and particularism came into conflict. Unsatisfied with
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Though not widely studied, several authors have provided accounts of Habermas’s somewhat
limited contribution to aesthetics, see (Duvenage, 2003; Roblin, 1990).
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previous attempts to create a universal ethics, Habermas struck out in a new direction that
resulted in his communicative or discourse ethics (Habermas, 1976a, p. 89). Under this notion,
all affected by an ethical system must engage in a discursive process to form a collective will and
freely agree to the ethical system. Habermas’s yet to be discussed communicative ethics was
capable of acknowledging individual and cultural particularism, yet simultaneously could result
in a just ethical system. It would also reconstruct the conditions of genuine political discourse
that had been most recently possible in the idealized bourgeois political sphere, albeit in a far
more inclusive manner.
The critical capacities of law, morality, art, and science were socialized into citizens who
accepted only principles that could be rationally justified, rejecting those that relied solely upon
dogmatism and tradition (Habermas, 1976a, p. 91). By implication, the fact that a belief or
worldview was accepted within a society did not constitute its legitimacy. According to
Habermas, the factual question of acceptance, and that acceptance being tantamount to
legitimacy, was the position that systems theory had taken (1979, p. 199). The adoption of this
view would mean that legitimacy would be nothing more than meeting the expectations of a
particular culture (Habermas, 1979, p. 202). Larger questions of justice would be subsumed by
empirical questions of acceptance, and thus, systems theory collapsed as a perspectivist
proposition. Universal validity required Habermas’s communicative ethics articulated as
universal pragmatics and communicative action. Habermas’s theories had the potential to recover
the mode of communication and action that could no longer be found in the political sphere.
3.5 Communicative Action
Outlining the conditions necessary for the existence of a functioning political realm and
democratizing it occupied Habermas’s more mature thought. Craig Calhoun noted that
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Habermas’s mature theories were efforts to recover the pre-structural transformation functions of
the bourgeois political sphere, while Dana Villa described that position as “uncontroversial”
(Calhoun, 1992; Villa, 2008, p. 174). Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action and the
accompanying concepts, like the ideal speech situation, and discourse ethics can be understood
as efforts at such a recovery. The ideal speech situation reformulated the conditions Habermas
theorized as being present in the functioning bourgeois political public. Within that situation,
individuals communicated and defended claims recognizing the force of the better argument and
relating to one another as subjects rather than opponents, aiming for consensus rather than
strategic victory (Habermas, 2001a, pp. 147-148). By recovering discourse and allowing
communicative action Habermas’s theory would counteract the corrupting influences that
entered into the public discourse with the structural transformation of the public sphere. For
example, communicative action would mitigate the manipulative or corruptive influences of
steering media like mass communications and money.
The alternative to communicative social action was strategic social action, which was
now “a normal component of the political system” (Habermas, 1984b, pp. 285-286). These
different types of possible communications are represented in Figure 3. Strategic action of this
type aims solely to achieve its ends; individuals employing it would view others as mere objects
and seek to manipulate them rather than truly engage with them. The purpose of strategic action
was victory over one’s opponent rather than freely agreed upon consensus (Habermas, 2001a, p.
148). The force of the better argument could not carry the day as the better argument would not
be acknowledged, but strategically manipulated or dismissed. Claims would not be properly
defended. The very form of speech used, at least its purpose, was altered to strategic rhetoric not
relying upon rational argument or evidence (Habermas, 1993c, pp. 266-267).
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Figure 3

Types of Action
Action
Orientation

Action Situation
Nonsocial
Social

Oriented to Success

Oriented to Understanding

Instrumental Action

-

Strategic Action

Communicative Action

(Habermas, 1984b, p. 285).
The prevalence of strategic relations created an environment in which communicative
competence could not even develop. This rendered individuals incapable of acting
communicatively even if they were presented with the opportunity to do so. There would be no
citizens capable of participating in a properly functioning political realm. This account
demonstrates that with the structural transformation, the activity of the political sphere became
strategic, and the very possibility of political action in the communicative sense was precluded.
Universal Pragmatics
Motivated by the concerns of Legitimation Crisis, Habermas constructed universal
pragmatics as a theory of mundane, everyday communication. The theory of communicative
action could be seen as a description of a situation where communication would be political,
where the relationships between individuals would resemble those in the truly political past ages
albeit more inclusive. Habermas’s theory of universal pragmatics was most fully developed in
The Theory of Communicative Action where the concept was viewed, not just as a theory of
communication, but also as a comprehensive social theory. Within the concept, Habermas drew a
distinction between non-social action, which was instrumental, and social action. The
terminology may seem odd, however, social action could be of the political sort, and non-social
of the administrative sort. Social action was then divided into communicative action and strategic
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action. Strategic action was strictly oriented toward achieving its ends; an individual employing
it would view others as mere objects and seek to manipulate them rather than truly engaging with
them. Communicative action more closely resembled an idealized political action focused on
achieving mutual understanding. An individual undertaking communicative action would view
others as subjects and attempt to construct intersubjective understanding with them (Habermas,
1979, p. 209; 1982, p. 263).
The goals of universal pragmatics were twofold. It sought to theorize conditions that
would make communicative action possible. Additionally, in the possibility of communicative
action, it sought the creation and maintenance of a meaningful, ordered, stable and just society.
Habermas argued that social life, amongst others, could be understood as being based upon the
ability to communicate, to perform “speech acts,” where action took place through words
(Habermas, 2001b, p. 85).31 Society and the ability to act within it were constituted by words;
universal pragmatics represented a novel effort to explain this constitution and ability.
Habermas’s project was, in part, inspired by what he viewed as the failure of previous
“constitutive theories” (Habermas, 2001b, pp. 18-22). Habermas grouped these theories together
on the basis of their following Kant in appealing to a transcendental subject. They broke from
Kant in emphasizing the mundane constitutive capacities of social agents rather than recognition
as being constitutive of society. These theories held that society was not constituted through
mere cognition, but instead through the taken for granted everyday practice of individuals.
Thinkers adopting such theories included Marx, Lukács, Dilthey, Gadamer, Husserl, and Schutz.
These theorists described the constitutive power differently. Dilthey and Gadamer employed the
terminology of hermeneutic interpretation, Marx labor, while Husserl and Schutz theorized their
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Habermas was indebted to Austin’s formulation; he had described the way in which actors “do
things with words” (1975).
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version of the lifeworld. Habermas critiqued these theorists on varying grounds. For example,
Husserl saw the constitutive power as residing only within discrete members of society while
Marx and Lukács assigned it to a holistic social subject. The common theme of the varied
critiques was that these theorists to a greater or lesser extent neglected interaction and hence
were unable to account for the constitution of society as arising solely from intersubjectivity
(Habermas, 2001b, pp. 18-25).
Habermas also found systems theory problematic in that it described a subject absent a
system of rules (2001b, p. 16). However, Habermas approved of the manner in which systems
theory emphasized the role that rules played in creating society. He went so far as to endorse
Noam Chomsky’s structural linguistics and synthesized it into his own universal pragmatics
(Habermas, 2001b, p. 68). Chomsky’s “deep grammar” referred to a set of rules, unconsciously
applied, on an everyday basis, that allowed individuals to communicate with one another. This
mundane ability allowed communication, and hence the creation of meaning, between
individuals and their actions. This led Habermas to adopt and analyze Ludwig Wittgenstein’s
concept of language games.
Habermas viewed Wittgenstein’s concept of language games as operating in a fashion
somewhat similar to his own theory (2001b, p. 52). The pertinent point was that players need not
be able to explain the rules, but need merely know how to follow them, and recognize
nonconformity, to keep the game functioning. Furthermore, players’ knowledge of how to follow
the rules allowed them to continue play in novel situations (Habermas, 2001b, p. 53). This was a
community based concept, in that other players were required to check a speaker, and private
language could not exist. Additionally, and a bit radically, knowing how or why something
existed as it did was more important than merely knowing that it existed. The context in which
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the series of ad hoc games was embedded was more critical than their correspondence to facts in
the nonlinguistic world. Knowing definitions and grammatical rules was meaningless if the
context of language was not grasped. “It is snowing” would be an appropriate response to the
question “what is the weather like?” However, that statement is nonsensical as a response to the
question “who wrote The Theory of Communicative Action?” Speakers created the context and
establish the conditions, or rules, for meaningful responses and interactions (Habermas, 2001b,
p. 73).
The bridge between previous linguistics and society lay in Habermas’s and
Wittgenstein’s concern with “speech acts” (Habermas, 1979, pp. 31-32). Speech acts constructed
the context of everyday social life. They established specific sets of relationships, both social and
moral, between those involved in the communication. Speech acts were contained within the
contexts of language games. However, Habermas noted that Wittgenstein had not constructed a
comprehensive social theory, providing more linguistic therapy than theory (2001b, p. 53).
Wittgenstein had not identified a core of language common to all users, independent of context
or culture, and this was precisely the task Habermas set for universal pragmatics. 32
Wittgenstein’s approach was problematic in that language users were so deeply embedded in the
context of the rules that they were incapable of critically reflecting upon those rules, questioning
their legitimacy, or rationally debating them. This was related to what Habermas called the
“double structure” hidden by the language game concept, which required language users to
simultaneously relate to one another and the subjects of their communications (2001b, p. 62).
When playing a game, the participants related as opponents within the game and not
necessarily as human subjects. Communication through language would be different, in that the
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A task Wittgenstein took up in his early work but had abandoned as illusionary by the time of
his Philosophical Investigations (1973).
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goal would a mutual understanding between subjects (Habermas, 2001b, pp. 101-102). A game
could proceed when the players did not understand one another’s intentions; in fact, the point of
many games was to conceal one’s intentions. Games, in this understanding, would be based upon
strategic reasoning. Such players would not be communicating despite following a common set
of rules. Habermas argued that language was the opposite: essentially the point of
communicative action was to attempt to understand one another’s positions and intentions, rather
than conceal them (2001b, p. 59). Although, non-social strategic action would more accurately
resemble a game played by opponents whose goals were nothing more than victory over one
another. This situation may be more akin to contemporary politics than Habermas’s truly
communicative interactions would be. In this context understanding political interaction as a
game makes sense.
When communicating, if individuals misunderstood one another’s intentions or positions,
then communication broke down; the same would not be true of games. If game players failed to
follow the rules, the game could be paused and the rules discussed or explained. If
communication failed, the only resort would be the further use of language; there could be
nothing to fall back upon. As Habermas observed, language was reflexive and contained its own
metalanguage. The same was not true of games (Habermas, 2001b, pp. 57-58, 73). Thus,
language must entail the capacity for users to relate to one another and to sustain communication,
in a metalinguistic fashion.
The game metaphor also inaccurately portrayed the way individuals related to language.
Both Wittgenstein and Habermas recognized this intimacy with language and the way it “meshes
with our life” (Habermas, 2001b, p. 57). Human development must be understood as the
development of language using creatures. For example, the acquisition of the word “no” marked
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an important stage in the development of a child. Nay saying entailed the recognition of the self
and the other as social agents; additionally, it entailed critical reflection upon the negated
statement. To say “no” required the recognition that whatever was rejected could be otherwise; it
was not a law of nature, but some challengeable artificial construction. This entailed the
recognition of intention and counter-intention formulation (Habermas, 2001a, p. 140). Habermas
went beyond his predecessors in believing that so long as social agents acknowledged one
another as competent subjects, they were capable of questioning the legitimacy of the rules they
encountered (Habermas, 2001b, p. 60).
Content and Force
The foregoing account addressed only one side of the double structure while neglecting
language’s cognitive aspect. One could hold the view that language games existed independent
of the nonlinguistic reality, and hence structured reality. Habermas took a different approach:
language provided the possibility of experiencing, rather than creating reality (Habermas, 2001b,
p. 58). Speech acts possessed illocutionary content that enabled individuals to do things with
words, and cognitive statements possessed propositional content that made statements about
reality (Habermas, 1976b, p. 157; 1979, pp. 36, 41). These two components were present in all
speech as was the potential for interaction between them. Performing a speech act could create a
dispute over the facts contained therein. Similarly, a cognitive statement could be followed by a
discussion regarding the relationship between the conversing individuals. Language acted
reflexively; communication breakdowns were prevented by using language to discuss the
conversation taking place through the medium of language (Habermas, 2001b, p. 74).
The importance of communication was mutual understanding, made more likely by the
reflexivity of language, and contained in the idea of illocutionary force. The illocutionary aspect
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of speech created relationships between subjects. More precisely, successful speech acts created
relationships between subjects, and those relationships were freely entered. They would generate
the contexts in which meaningful communication could occur through questions, agreements,
objections, denials, confessions, betrayals, apologies, and promises (Habermas, 2001b, pp. 8283). Stated differently, successful speech acts permitted participants to understand and accept the
intentions of other participants (Habermas, 1979, p. 35; 2001a, p. 144). Ultimately, Habermas
changed his emphasis from recognition of intention to mutual acceptance of the verifiability of
claims communicated through speech acts (Habermas, 1984b, pp. 295-305). Habermas
emphasized context generating speech acts, deemphasizing those based upon existing
institutions, like voting and marriage, for example (1979; 2001b, p. 84).
The goal was to provide a basis for critique. The illocutionary force inherent in speech
acts was based upon rationality. The concern was over how relationships should be established,
not how they were actually established. The rules of language, or any rules for that matter,
should not be blindly accepted. Instead, reasons must be given to legitimate rules; if rational
reasons could not be offered then rules could be abandoned. The rationality of illocutionary
force was communicative rationality. In constructing this rationality, Habermas presented an
alternative to other forms of reason like instrumental and dialectical rationality. Communicative
rationality offered the prospect of political communication and action resembling what had taken
place in the bourgeois public sphere.
Validity
Validity claims and challenges to them contained the rational basis of illocutionary force.
When a statement was made, the validity of its implicit or explicit claims could be freely
challenged. Challenges had to be addressed through a satisfactory defense of the validity of the
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claims before conversation could continue. In short, the answers to challenges had to be
characterized by the “unforced force of the better argument” (Habermas, 2001b, p. 95). This
could occur through the examination of the four types of claims contained within any statement:
truth, rightness, intelligibility, or sincerity of validity claims. These four types of validity claims
corresponded to Habermas’s four domains of reality: the world, external nature; our world,
society; language; and individual internal nature (Habermas, 1979, p. 68).
Truth claims concerned the relationship between a statement and the objective world;
challenges to them questioned their cognitive content. Rightness claims addressed the
relationship between the speaker and the moral, social, and cultural aspects of reality. Challenges
to a rightness claim questioned the speaker’s standing to create the type of relationship or context
their speech act purported to create. Intelligibility claims were related to the linguistic
appropriateness of the statement. Disputing an intelligibility claim challenged linguistic
coherence and required an interpretation or clarification. Finally, sincerity claims addressed the
relationship between the statement and the intention of the speaker. Challenging sincerity
questioned speakers’ representations of their own intentions.
According to Habermas, challenges to truth claims were resolved in two ways (1979, pp.
63-64). First, empirical evidence could persuade the challenger of the truth claim’s validity.
Secondly, evidence may be disruptive, rather than supportive, of a claim; empirical evidence
could run counter to a truth claim. This was related to Charles Pierce’s model of science as
disruptive of previously held presumptions and expectations which served as the foundations for
action (Habermas, 2001b, p. 88). When experience ran afoul of expectations, further appeal to
experience rarely resolved the conflict; instead, rational argumentation provided the resolution
sought.
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Habermas rejected correspondence theories of truth, the notion that truth occurred when a
statement corresponded to reality or to empirical evidence (2001b, pp. 86-88). Habermas was not
arguing that a statement’s truth was independent of whether it corresponded to reality (2001a, p.
148). He found fault with correspondence theories in that they did not recognize that statements
existed within speech acts (Habermas, 2001b, p. 86). His problem was not with correspondence
generally, but specifically with the manner in which truth was assigned. For the assignment of
truth, Habermas made a pragmatic turn to consensus theory, which held that a statement would
be true when its truth was freely accepted by everyone “who could have entered into discourse
with me” (2001b, p. 89). Habermas sought to avoid relativism by employing Pierce’s concept of
truth, which held as true what the community of scientists would agree upon over the long term.
Truth must be agreed upon not just by those who were present but also by anyone who could
have been present at any time, including individuals who did not yet exist. Truth was always
only provisional.
As crucial as the parties to the discussion were, the character of the discussion was of
equal import. It was discourse rather than everyday communication that could result in truth.
Discourse was the form of argument that took place after the assertive force of a statement’s
content had been set aside (Habermas, 1976b, p. 164; 2001b, p. 100). Discourse would deal with
theory or statements as hypotheticals. Discourse approached statements as expressing an
appearance and not making actual objective claims about reality (Habermas, 1976b, pp. 165166). The particular nature of discourse did not place it beyond the application of normative
standards. In the rare circumstances when normative standards were met truth could be redeemed
in a scenario of freely given consensus and mutual understanding.
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The first normative requirement was that discourse be non-exclusionary, that every
competent participant was free to enter the discussion. Habermas admitted that this requirement
was problematic as it was difficult to judge individuals’ competency to engage in discourse until
they actually engaged (2001b, p. 96). This problem could be mitigated. Since truth claims were
only provisionally made, discourse, like any communication, occurred within the context of
assumptions about what counted as evidence and about how the world worked (Habermas, 1982,
p. 273). Given these conditions, it was conceivable that competence, and problems with
evidence, may go temporarily unnoticed. Humility replaced certainty in judgment since new
evidence could alter the validity of a truth claim and require a reassessment of competence.
Secondly, equality of opportunity to participate in discourse must exist, since none may be
excluded. Drastic imbalances in power, or inequalities would distort the situation and prohibit
discourse. All participants deemed competent, must have equal opportunity to initiate, engage in,
and continue discourse (Habermas, 2001b, p. 98).
Claims to rightness were similarly defended. If the right to create a social relationship
was questioned, then the social conventions permitting that creation were appealed to. If
resorting to social conventions was not dispositive, then the parties could resort to practical
discourse, which was similar to the theoretical discourse applied to truth claims. The norm would
be considered as an existing condition; whether it should exist would be questioned (Habermas,
1976b, p. 166). Put another way, the legitimacy of the norm appealed to would be at stake and
treated as hypothetical during practical discourse (Habermas, 1979, p. 64).
Claims about intelligibility and truthfulness would be resolved differently. With respect
to intelligibility, if rephrasing or explanation was not dispositive, then the parties resorted to a
process of hermeneutic discourse (Habermas, 2001a, p. 148; 2001b, p. 94). Challenges to
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truthfulness claims could not be resolved through a form of discourse and instead required the
empirical comparison of actors’ stated intentions to their behaviors (Habermas, 1979, p. 64;
2001b, p. 90). These validity claims were, for Habermas, the truly universal properties of speech
(Habermas, 1976b, p. 161). This was a precursor to portraying competency in communication as
the foundation for social relationships and it emphasized the importance of communicative
rationality.
Communicative Competence
Habermas believed that communicative competence developed in stages. In creating a
three-stage developmental model, Habermas drew from the work of Lawrence Kohlberg
(Habermas, 1976b, pp. 162-166; 1979, p. 69; 1990, pp. 116-194; 1993a, pp. 113-132; 2001a, pp.
137-146).33 While Kohlberg focused on moral development, Habermas saw moral development
as one part within the broader concept of communicative competence. The development of
communicative competence allowed individuals to handle ever more complex social interactions.
This entailed understanding relationships, the ability to repair communication failures, and
crucially, the ability to understand the world from second and third person viewpoints rather than
being constrained to the personal, subjective worldview (Habermas, 1990, p. 138). This involved
decentering the self, understanding world perspectives, and the ability to differentiate between
different types of speech acts (Habermas, 1990, pp. 137-138).
In the first pre-conventional stage, language use began. However, the individual,
normally a child, retained a natural conception of himself. The view of authority would be one
associated with reward and punishment, and only obeyed due to force (Habermas, 1976b, p.
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Habermas’s reliance on Kohlberg has been critiqued for focusing on the general other at the
expense of the concrete other. For a feminist perspective, see Gilligan (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan
& Murphy, 1980). Similarly, Benhabib critiqued Habermas as being utopian in his failure to
incorporate both notions of the “other” (1986a, 1986b).
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162). The second conventional stage brought with it a transition from natural to social identity.
The individual gained the ability to recognize and employ different types of speech acts. The
roles of speaker, hearer, and bystander were differentiated. Norms were obeyed not for
punishment and reward, but rather due to the recognition of their universality. Progress through
the developmental stages brought reflective critical capacity. What was blindly accepted at a
previous stage may be called into question in a subsequent stage.
In the third and final post-conventional stage, the individual was capable of engaging in
discourse having acquired the ability to discern discrepancies between the way things were and
the way things should be (Habermas, 1982, p. 272). Upon completion of this stage of
development, the individual, by that point an adolescent, would be swayed by the force of the
better argument, rather than the recognition of an existing rule. Legitimacy would turn on
rationality rather than authority (Habermas, 1976a, p. 89) 89. Ego identity prevailed and reason
was expected to be generally applicable. Habermas summarized the development through these
stages as culminating in the ability to differentiate “between the lifeworld and the world” (1990,
p. 138).
3.6 Ideal and Distorted Communication
Ideal Speech
Habermas described a situation in which communication was not distorted by power
imbalances.34 The absence of such imbalances, equality of communicators, would permit the
possibility of political communication and action. All would be equally free to initiate or
continue discussion, and to challenge one another. Additionally, all would be equally able, and
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In earlier works Habermas used the phrase “ideal speech situation”; however, he later worried
that that term could incorrectly imply that the situation could be realized in actual life (1982, p.
261; 1993a, p. 163; 2001b, p. 102).
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equally willing, to defend the validity claims implicitly or explicitly presented in their
statements. To that end, they would be able to cite evidence or norms to support their claims, or
if that was insufficient, to engage in discourse. Claims that could not be properly defended would
be removed from the interaction. It was expected that all would be held accountable to these
standards (Habermas, 2001a, p. 147). Individuals engaged in ideal speech related to one another
as subjects rather than opponents in a strategic game. This communication aimed for mutual
understanding and freely agreed upon consensus, rather than victory over an opponent
(Habermas, 2001a, p. 148).
Habermas recognized the difficulty of attaining ideal status, but believed that
communicative competence entailed the assumption of the ideal’s existence (2001b, p. 102).
Furthermore, the ideal speech situation required that everyday communicative competence
contain a critical potential (Habermas, 2001b, p. 97). This critical potential allowed individuals
to recognize discrepancies between ideal and actual communications (Habermas, 2001b, p. 97).
Ideal conditions would be assumed until there was sufficient evidence to warrant their
abandonment.
The inevitable occurrence of non-ideal conditions would replace understanding with
coercion. Overtly distorted communications occurred when a party utilized its “privileged access
to weapons, wealth or standing, in order to wring agreement from the other party” (Habermas,
1982, p. 272). Resort to these means precluded the possibility of communicative action, and
instead strategic action occurred. Victory would take precedent over mutual understanding or
freely agreed upon consensus, and the other parties were not viewed as subjects but objects to
manipulate. The very form of speech used, at least its purpose, would change to strategic rhetoric
abandoning rational argument and evidence (Habermas, 1993c, pp. 266-267). Overtly distorted
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communications could occur in any sphere of life and their existence within the political sphere
precluded the possibility of the idealized politics of the bourgeois public sphere.

Overt

distortions were problematic, but their overtness made them less problematic than systematically
distorted communications that could go unnoticed. These forms of non-ideal communication are
represented as a form of social interaction in Figure 4.
Figure 4
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(Habermas, 1982, p. 264).
Systematically Distorted Communication
Overt distortions of speech situations would be obvious. Habermas distinguished those
obvious distortions from subtler systematic distortions. Systematic distortions were more
problematic because they involved the deception of one or more of the parties. Due to the covert
nature of systematic distortions, they could go unnoticed (Habermas, 1970a, p. 206). Habermas
initially drew upon the psychoanalytic method, which explained the way public articulations of
neurosis were prevented by individuals’ defenses. Those affected by neurosis engaged in selfdeception, unable to recognize the manifestations of their neuroses. For example, an individual
may believe himself to be coherently communicating, despite being incoherent to others. This
would represent systematically distorted communication if the incomprehensibility could not be
resolved because of the neurosis (Habermas, 2001a, p. 150). Habermas gave another example of
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a couple whose marriage was a shambles, yet deceived themselves about the health of their
relationship and their mutual affections (2001a, p. 152). Shifting from the psychoanalytic
perspective back to universal pragmatics, speech’s internal organization had been overburdened
just as speech’s external organization had (Habermas, 2001a, p. 147). Specifically, the
incoherent individual was unable to deal with validity claims to intelligibility, while the couple
embodied problems with truthfulness. In both examples, inability to deal with challenges to
validity claims and conflict resulted in the loss of communicative competence. Systematically
distorted communication and the loss of communicative competence was pathological and
evidence of an unhealthy society.
Habermas also used the family and its relationships as an example of a social system
(2001a, pp. 159-164). This example explicated the above-mentioned overburdening, and
demonstrated how system crises translated into lifeworld crises. A family’s ability to function as
a social system was inextricably related to the potential for internal conflict. Conflicts could arise
from power imbalances within a family. Hierarchical systems, like the family, could only
achieve consensus by prohibiting communicative action. Conflicts could, theoretically, be
resolved with communicative action in an ideal speech situation. However, in practice, discourse
would destroy any consensus that had been achieved, and so critically reflecting upon the family
structure was impossible. Therefore, the hierarchical nature of the family would never be
critically reflected upon, rationally debated, or even recognized as problematic. Since discourse
was impossible, familial relationships would be characterized by strategic, rather than
communicative action. Another negative result of systematically distorted communication was
the inability to develop communicative competence. Individuals accustomed to a strictly
strategic environment never developed the capacity for discourse.

	
  

158
The family’s problems mirrored the problems discussed in Legitimation Crisis. Society
had been thoroughly permeated by power imbalances, which were not critically reflected upon,
or even recognized, but as with the family, inhibited communicative action, discourse, and the
ideal speech situation. A crisis of meaning resulted from the overburdening of the legitimation,
economic, and political systems. A rational defense of the norms underlying society could not be
articulated. As a result, meaning became a “scarce resource” (Habermas, 1976a, p. 77).
Contemporary society, as late capitalism, could only be sustained by substituting value, e.g.
consumer goods, for meaning. Deemphasizing and distracting from the importance of meaning
avoided demands for a rationally articulated legitimacy claim.
Habermas presented an account of a world where political and economic organizations
suppressed the demands for legitimation. The state also suppressed these demands because it
proved unable to articulate a coherent, rational legitimizing argument. These were not merely
problems of practice and communication; more fundamentally, these were problems in the very
nature of thought within society. With the prevalence of systematically distorted communicated,
the opportunity for ideal speech, and the development of communicative competence necessary
for it, were precluded. The degree of subtlety and deception involved ensured that none could
recognize that strategic action had replaced communicative action, that an altered and
manipulative form of politics had become prevalent. The politics of the bourgeois public sphere
was not impossible and this remained hidden.
3.7 Discourse Ethics
Habermas constructed universal pragmatics as a basis for a system of communicative
ethics (Habermas, 1976a, pp. 102-110). This included individuals’ moral competence as a
component of their communicative competence (Habermas, 1993a, p. 34). The concept was
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retitled discourse ethics.35 Discourse ethics maintained Habermas’s concern with politics and
political theory, while displacing the Marxist influence by engaging liberal political theory’s
notions of justice. This involved the explicit articulation of the following “rules of discourse”:
1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a
discourse.
2a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
2b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.
2c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.
3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion from exercising his
rights as laid down in (1) and (2) (Habermas, 1990, p. 89).
By entering into communicative action individuals committed themselves to these rules. These
rules defined the force of the better argument, the logical character of discourse, and the moral
relationship between parties. Breaking these rules was a “performative contradiction”
(Habermas, 1990, p. 80).36
Habermas also believed that everyone sufficiently competent to engage in discourse
recognized the necessity of universality. This universality held that all legitimate norms must
satisfy this condition: “All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests and these
consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation” (Habermas,
1990, p. 65). All parties must accept the norm upon considering all available information.
Additionally, Habermas’s principles of discourse ethics were presented as “[o]nly those norms
can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity
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Karl-Otto Apel also dealt with this development (1980). Habermas wrote that discourse ethics
would be more accurately referred to as a “discourse theory of morality” (1993a, p. vii).
36

The concept of performative contradiction was an effective device in prior philosophy.
Habermas cited Rene Descartes’s cogito argument as an example (1990, p. 80).
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as participants in a practical discourse” (Habermas, 1990, p. 66).37 Norms could only valid if
they were so judged through open, intersubjective rational argument.
Discourse ethics was differentiated from alternative systems by virtue of its being
cognitive, universal, and formal (Habermas, 1990, pp. 120-121). It was cognitive in that moral
judgments were justified through argument, making communicative reason an alternative to
instrumental reason (Habermas, 1976a, pp. 105-106). It was universal because the justification of
norms depended upon the force of the better argument, rather than contextual or cultural
preferences.38 Discourse ethics was formal in its focus on the way in which norms were justified,
or created to begin with, while being unconcerned with the content of norms. This allowed
Habermas to avoid an elitist system whereby norms and their justifications were handed down to
a people.
Habermas’s theory utilized “ideal role taking”, as articulated by George Herbert Mead,
and understood as the ability to recognize and take on the positions of others (Habermas, 1990,
pp. 121, 154).39 Habermas distinguished his theory from that of John Rawls.40 Rawls utilized the
veil of ignorance and the original position to blind social system designers to their eventual place
within that system (Rawls, 1972). Rawls, in veiling the parties, reduced plurality into singularity.
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Habermas did not believe that morality completely excluded compromise, which he viewed as
just if and only if it represented “an arrangement that (a) is more advantageous to all than no
arrangement whatever, (b) excludes free riders who withdraw from cooperation, and (c) excludes
exploited parties who contribute more to the cooperative effort than they gain from it”
(Habermas, 1996, p. 166).
38

However, Habermas acknowledged that the realization of universal ethics was dependent upon
the historical conditions of post-traditional societies (Habermas, 1976a, p. 90; 1990, p. 107).
39
40

See Habermas (1984a, pp. 3-43; 1993b, pp. 149-204) for his thoughts on Meade.

As Habermas acknowledged, his system was similar to that articulated by Rawls in a number
of respects (Habermas, 1990, p. 198; Rawls, 1972, 2001). Hedrick has provided a thorough
account of the relationship between the thought of Habermas and Rawls (2010). Also, see
McCarthy (1994).
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The result was an ersatz consensus agreed upon by identical individuals engaged in a shallow
form of debate. Habermas avoided this by insisting that the parties to his discourse would be real
individuals addressing real issues. Furthermore, the formalistic nature of discourse ethics was
concerned with seeing procedures followed rather than dictating what outcomes were reached. In
an exchange with Rawls, Habermas stated that his theory was concerned with the manner in
which political constitutions were formed rather than their contents (Habermas, 1998a, pp. 4973).
Discourse ethics connected, albeit subtly, discourse and the lifeworld (Habermas, 1990,
pp. 177-178). The lifeworld created solidarity to stave off crises of legitimacy, and its cultural
values were not questioned in their entirety. These values made the members of the lifeworld
social agents capable of action. Despite this, a lifeworld could oppress its members by not
allowing appeal to anything beyond its own values. For example, if the values of the lifeworld
marginalized or oppressed a group, then that group needed to appeal to values beyond the
lifeworld to remedy their situation. Discourse ethics provided recourse to those marginalized or
oppressed by the values of their lifeworld. Though a lifeworld’s values could not be questioned
as a totality, an individual norm could be questioned. An individual possessing communicative
competence could challenge a norm, thereby demanding its rational defense; this was the very
moment of justice. Norms could be rejected requiring that they be defended through rational
discourse or be abandoned and restructured (Habermas, 1990, p. 200).
Discourse ethics did not provide content, and relied upon substance that was rooted in a
lifeworld; it was, in Adorno’s sense, a minimalist ethics (Adorno, 1974; Habermas, 1990, pp.
86,121). It recreated a consensus sufficient to allow life to continue where crises had weakened
social norms. Discourse ethics addressed how the norms and values of the lifeworld should be
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defended. Alternatively, a maximal ethics would emphasize the role played by cultural values in
articulations of the good life and seek to bring about that life without providing adequate defense
against systematically distorted communication.
Habermas’s theory was located within a particular historical context and so could be seen
to be reliant upon that context. However, he argued that his was not a maximal ethical theory
because it was unresponsive to conceptions of the good life, but acknowledged differences
between the actual state of affairs and any conception of the good life. Such differences revealed
themselves through human suffering, or in Adorno’s terminology, “damaged life” (Adorno,
1974; Habermas, 1990, p. 205). Habermas avoided endorsing any particular set of cultural
values, or a particular ordering of society. Discourse ethics constantly questioned any set of
values by challenging the existing system and forcing it to defend itself on rational terms.
Habermas oscillated on the possibility of the existence of the conditions necessary for
discourse ethics. At times he implied that they could be approximated (Habermas, 1984b, p. 42).
At other times he presented them as a theoretical construction that must be simultaneously
“claimed and denied” (Habermas, 1987, p. 325; 1996, p. 322; 1998b, p. 22). At still other times,
Habermas took the position that rational consensus, arising from discourse ethics, was possible
in neither theory nor practice. Habermas wrote, “this entropic state of a definitive consensus,
which could make all further communication superfluous, cannot be represented as a meaningful
goal because it would engender paradoxes (an ultimate language, a final interpretation, a
nonreviseable knowledge, etc.)” (1998c, p. 418). If issues were resolved through discourse there
would be no need for future discourse. Habermas quoted Albrecht Wellmer on the subject:
“Even if the ideal reference points are understood as aims that are not attainable in principle, or
attainable only approximately, it remains ‘paradoxical that we should be obliged to strive for the
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realization of an ideal whose realization would be the end of human history’” (Habermas, 1998b,
p. 365). Reaching an ultimate agreement prohibits all future efforts. Habermas’s theory may,
then, be a performative contradiction.
Habermas avoided this problem by distinguishing justification from application. That
distinction also resolved the criticisms Habermas applied to Kant’s moral philosophy, that
abstract moral judgments required that parties possess an impossible to achieve level of
information, and that such judgments would be too abstract to be meaningfully applied to real
situations (Habermas, 1990, pp. 190-215). Klaus Günther acknowledged a critique along these
lines; his argument was particularly interesting since Habermas engaged with it in revising his
discourse ethics (Günther, 1993, pp. 217-220; Habermas, 1993a, pp. 35-39; 1996).
It was Günther’s distinction between justification and application discourse that
Habermas adopted. Initial justification discourse revolved around what was just and created
norms. Application discourse then determined whether that just norm applied to specific
circumstances. Discourse would be never ending since novel situations would always arise, and
an unrealistic amount of knowledge was not required. Furthermore, this allowed Habermas to
avoid juridification, a yet to be discussed problem of modernity. Habermas quoted Gunther:
In justification only the norm itself, independently of its application in a particular
situation, is relevant. The issue is whether it is in the interest of all that everyone should
follow the rule . . . In application, by contrast, the particular situation is relevant,
regardless of whether general observance is also in the interest of all (as determined by
the prior discursive examination). The issue here is whether and how the rule should be
followed in a given situation in light of all of the particular circumstances . . . What must
be decided is not the validity of the norm for each individual and his interests but its
appropriateness in relation to all of the features of a particular situation (Habermas,
1993a, p. 37).
Just general norms could remain just when applied to specific situations. Discourse outcomes
would not be binding everywhere and always. This avoided the critique contained within Kant’s
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moral philosophy and irresolvable conflict when multiple norms seemed to apply. Genuine
political debate could occur when creating norms and also when determining their application.
The lasting outcomes of justification discourse were always open to reinterpretation
through application discourse (Habermas, 1996, pp. 219-220). However, this raised another
issue. What exactly was the purpose of the initial justification discourse since it could always be
modified or ignored? All discourse could be application discourse; the effect of the theory would
lose nothing in the absence of its justification component. J. M. Bernstein leveled a critique
along this line (1995, pp. 222-228). Since each novel situation had to be made to mesh into the
larger pattern of society, why not consider novel situations afresh, without a previous standard?
Bernstein admitted that this theory was workable in a political system with the legislative
deliberation akin to justification discourse and judicial consideration similar to application
discourse (1995, p. 228). However, he remained opposed to the application of this type of system
to everyday life since it “yields a politicization of the ethical that reduces the complex
achievements of our coherent normative order to mere consensus . . .” (J. M. Bernstein, 1995, p.
228). In short, Bernstein pointed out the danger of relativism, or contextualism.
Habermas’s poststructuralist critics brought another critique to bear. They believed
discourse ethics and rational consensus were impossibilities, which meant that difference and
disagreement must persist, and this was the core of human plurality and democracy (Mouffe,
2000, p. 48).41 Jean-François Lyotard articulated the fear that Habermas’s approach would
impose consensus upon a diversity of positions, that conformity would be forced upon
nonconformists. He argued that even a charitable reading of Habermas revealed that his scheme
did nothing more than ignore dissent in favor of a merely imagined consensus (Lyotard, 1984).
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For more on the poststructuralist critique of Habermas on this point see Thomassen (2007, Ch.
1).
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Maurizio d’Entreves framed the entirety of the debate between Habermas and the postmodernists
as hinging upon the responsibility to action versus the responsibility to otherness, openness to
dissonance, ambiguity and difference (1997).
3.8 Lifeworld and System
Habermas’s earlier theories were drawn together in three themes of The Theory of
Communicative Action. In his introduction to that work, Thomas McCarthy wrote that these
themes were the explication of communicative rationality, an understanding of a society based
upon two levels, the system and the lifeworld, and a theory of modernity (Habermas, 1984b, p.
xl). That work’s method was not straightforward but instead proceeded through historical
reconstructions, engaging the history of sociological thought from the founders to contemporary
thinkers, and interspersed with more explicit articulations of the theory of communicative action.
The first theme, communicative rationality, was already covered by Habermas’s previous
writings on universal pragmatics; however, The Theory of Communicative Action was not merely
a restatement, but provided an expanded critique of philosophy and sociology’s failure to
appropriately value natural language and intersubjectivity. The Theory of Communicative
Action’s analysis of communicative rationality advanced two aims. First, it contained
Habermas’s articulation of the intersubjectivity and language that constituted existence. Second,
it corrected what Habermas saw as a flaw in his earlier work on universal pragmatics.
Specifically, the work refocused his thought on sociological issues which he felt had been
abandoned to address philosophical ones.
The second theme, a concept of a society understood through the dual levels of the
system and the lifeworld, was concerned with properly working out the connection between
those two levels. The level of the lifeworld had not been fully developed, and had not progressed
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much beyond the earlier phenomenology or thinkers like Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz.
Habermas now further developed the lifeworld, properly accounting for its intersubjective and
linguistic nature. This account opened the door to address the third and final theme, an account
of modernity.
Lifeworld
The social theory of communicative action was concerned with the creation and
maintenance of society. Society, as a shared social world, arose as a product of human
interaction characterized as either mutual understanding through communicative action,
modeling the political action of the bourgeois public sphere, or manipulation through strategic
action. The novel issue addressed was the difference between general communicative
competence and the competence to act in specific social contexts. The lifeworld generated the
context for specific competence, a necessary complement to general communicative competence
(Habermas, 1984a, p. 130; 1984b, pp. 70-71). Stated differently, it was the movement from
universal knowledge of language to the ability to differentiate the subjective, social world and
the objective world (Habermas, 1998b, p. 238).
Habermas used the example of a construction crew to illustrate the move from universal
competence to context specific competence (1984a, p. 121). An experienced worker instructed a
new worker to fetch beer for the crew’s break. The instruction could be analyzed as a validity
claim whose truthfulness, intelligibility, sincerity, or rightness could be challenged. However, the
new worker could go beyond challenging the validity of the instruction. The fundamental
understanding of the situation could be challenged. The new worker could apply context specific
competence not provided by general communicative competence. In questioning whether or not
a break was imminent, he would challenge the pace of work presumed by his more experienced
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colleague. By questioning the right of the more experienced to issue instructions the young
worker would challenge the jobsite’s hierarchy.
Such challenges resulted from breakdowns in mutual understanding surrounding the
cultural and social context of the lifeworld. The parties made conflicting presumptions about the
prevailing norms of their lifeworld context. Assumptions about the lifeworld went unexamined
until some crisis forced their examination (Habermas, 1998b, p. 243). Under normal conditions,
the lifeworld could be understood as a “naïve familiarity with an unproblematically given
background” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 130). A challenge to this given background questioned the
relationships between parties. Resolving crises required appeal to the context specific
competence of the lifeworld, rather than general communicative competence.
Challenges to the assumptions of the lifeworld did not challenge its totality, but specific
portions of it (Habermas, 1984a, p. 132). The specific assumptions or norms questioned
depended upon the context and content of the challenge. Habermas described this as “topicdependent contextual knowledge” (1998b, p. 241). For the construction crew only the plan to get
beer was challenged, not the lifeworld as a whole. Resolving the challenge required parties to
build upon mutually accepted aspects of the context. The construction workers may have agreed
that the crew did get a break while holding differing expectations about timing. Usually there
would be more agreement than disagreement surrounding understandings of the lifeworld; only
understandings of the specific situation would be different. Habermas understood a situation to
be “a segment of lifeworld contexts of relevance” (1984a, p. 122). Disagreement would be over
specific contexts and activities in which the parties found themselves. The dispute over getting
beer questioned the informal hierarchy and practices of that particular worksite, but it would not
challenge the legal norms of society. Habermas wrote that a lifeworld was simultaneously
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determinate, in imparting interpretation and understanding, and porous, in that it was constantly
shifting as novel experiences arose (1984a, p. 130).
Habermas’s conception of lifeworld differed from those of his predecessors. While
alternative articulations were based upon perception as the key manner of experiencing the
world, Habermas focused on the role of language. Language was the medium through which the
lifeworld, and disagreements about it, were articulated, challenged, and defended. Language did
not shape experience, but did affect a situation’s meaning. When crises arose meaning and
understanding were challenged, requiring mutual efforts to redefine the world to realign
experience and meaning. This permitted Habermas to move away from the formality of universal
pragmatics and give new substance to the idea of mutual understanding.
The ability to redeem the lifeworld applied when specific and limited situations were
challenged (Habermas, 1984a, p. 137). Questioning the totality of the lifeworld would negate the
ability to act or form relationships within it. Habermas noted that this view was problematic
because it gave the impression of individuals being directed by the lifeworld, rather than
interacting with it. This would entail a return to the sort of philosophy Habermas sought to avoid
(Habermas, 1987, p. 342). This philosophy of consciousness was avoided by adding the
perspective of the observer to that of the already present participant. The ability to construct
narrative from within a given context was key as it required knowledge of traditions, social
groups, the perspective of the observer, and the nature of individuals involved (Habermas,
1984a, p. 137). This led to Habermas’s next step, the shift from a formal notion of the lifeworld
to a sociological one (Habermas, 1982, p. 247). The intention was to describe the general
structure of lifeworlds moving from the context specific particularism back to generality. The
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intuitive knowledge required for the production and maintenance of the lifeworld was
formalized.
Habermas’s conception of the lifeworld was comprised of three components: culture,
society, and personality (1984a, p. 138). Habermas incorporated these three already existing
sociological concepts, and linked them with the three aspects of statements. Culture was
connected to the objective world and understood as a “store of knowledge from which those
engaged in communicative action draw interpretations susceptible of consensus as they come to
an understanding about something in the world” (Habermas, 1987, p. 343). Society was linked to
the intersubjective world and described as “the legitimate order from which those engaged in
communicative action gather solidarity, based on belonging to groups, as they enter into
interpersonal relationships with one another” (Habermas, 1987, p. 343). Finally, personality was
mapped onto the subjective world and made up of “acquired competences that render a subject
capable of speech and action and hence able to participate in processes of mutual understanding
in a given context and to maintain his own identity in the shifting contexts of interaction”
(Habermas, 1987, p. 343). The three structural components of the lifeworld were thus connected
to the necessary ability to make and sustain distinctions between the objective, intersubjective,
and subjective worlds (Habermas, 1984a, p. 137). Furthermore, as represented in Figure 5, the
components of the lifeworld each contained the potential for action oriented toward the mutual
understanding that communicative action aimed for and had been possible in the idealized
bourgeois public sphere.
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Figure 5

Functions of Action Oriented Toward Mutual Understanding
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(Habermas, 1984a, p. 144).
This mapping of lifeworld structures onto these three realms was problematic. Since
culture was associated with the objective world it was associated with truth claims. This entailed
a particular understanding of culture that did not include art, for example, as a component.42 This
understanding of culture acknowledged that the lifeworld provided the basis for science, and thus
viewed science as a component of culture (Habermas, 1998b, pp. 239-240). Individuals acting
within a culture discovered knowledge. Culture was, however, not constitutive of knowledge.
Reality was ever present to refute, and force re-articulations of knowledge. Individuals required
culture to come to mutual understandings on the state of knowledge and the objective world.
Culture was a rational standard necessary for creating continuity between a specific situation and
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Habermas later acknowledged that he had given too little credit to the “world-disclosing”
ability art possessed (1998b, pp. 245-246).
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the rest of the lifeworld (Habermas, 1987, p. 344). Specific interpretations, understandings, and
items of knowledge were always exposed to a standard of rationality and already acquired
knowledge. This was crucial for coherent everyday practice to continue (Habermas, 1984a, p.
137). Ultimately, Habermas understood culture as the basis for a meaningful world, and meaning
would become scarce if there were difficulties in sustaining the lifeworld (Habermas, 1984a, p.
140).
Society was judged by its solidarity, as culture was by its rationality. Society was
concerned with norms applicable to relationships and awareness of membership in a common
community. A loss of normative motivation resulted from society’s inability to create solidarity
and sustain the lifeworld (Habermas, 1982, p. 280). When society successfully sustained
solidarity and the lifeworld, novel situations could be incorporated into existing social identity
and everyday practice continued uninterrupted. A successful society would construct a social
space wherein life could be lived with the applicable meaning and norms.
Personality was more closely associated with a particular historical context, depending
upon the appropriate socialization of individuals. Specifically, individuals needed to acquire the
necessary competence and values to act appropriately in the lifeworld. Habermas’s notion of
socialization relied upon Mead’s, where individuals first acquired the ability to fill roles within
the family and later as members of the larger society (Habermas, 1993b, pp. 149-204). Issues
arose with the continuity between the particular situation and the broader, general context.
Successful socialization resulted in individual personalities existing harmoniously within the
historical traditions of society (Habermas, 1984a, pp. 140-141). However, society did not exist
independent of individuals, society did not create individuals, and society should not be viewed
as a mere compilation of individuals. Habermas’s symbolic construction of the lifeworld shifted
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between the competence ingrained in individuals and the lifeworld. Thus, individuals were only
metaphorical “members” of society (Habermas, 1987, p. 343).
Habermas described a lifeworld sustained by continually reproduction through the
interaction of the lifeworld’s structural components: culture, society, and personality.
Socialization helped create personality by embedding the values and motivations consistent with
the norms of the particular society. Once socialized, individuals were competent to relate to the
objective world. A successful society not only ordered relationships between individuals, but
also instilled the sense of solidarity necessary for mutual understanding and discourse. Culture
was the source of legitimacy and knowledge, while it simultaneously defined and ensured the
continuation of knowledge, checked by rationality (Habermas, 1984a, pp. 141-144).
Rationalization
There were several problems in this account of the lifeworld. First, the lifeworld was a
historical development and did not always exist. Second, by emphasizing the congruence of the
particular and the general, the view could become conservative with limited possibility for social
change. However, the lifeworld must be capable of change to become increasingly rational.
Habermas located several potential solutions to these problems within the foundations of his
social theory. He proposed a thought experiment borrowing Emile Durkheim’s concept of
mechanical solidarity (Habermas, 1984a, p. 87).43 This experiment posited a totally integrated
society held together by religious ritual where there was total uniformity of culture, society, and
personality. Conflicts did not arise because their resolutions were predetermined by religious
authority, borrowing from Wittgenstein, Habermas wrote that language had gone on holiday
(Habermas, 1984a, p. 87). Stated differently, this society was “sociocentric”, and individuals
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For the extensive treatment of Durkheim’s phylogenetic account of the transition from sacred
to secular society, see Habermas (1996, pp. 43-111).
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were not capable of “decentering”(Habermas, 1984b, p. 69). Individuals were incapable of
differentiating their views from the views of others, because no difference existed. Since all
understanding and meaning was identical and in accordance with religious dictate, there was no
possibility or resources for challenges or debate. Only in the presence of differing viewpoints did
challenge occur, and debate over the accuracy of views became necessary to achieve agreement.
Language was on holiday because it had no role to play.
Habermas theorized a process called the “linguistification of the sacred”, which was the
ability to subject beliefs to critical reflection and rational scrutiny (1984a, p. 77). This could lead
to the emergence of the previously imagined total solidarity. Language’s holiday ended and as a
result solidarity became less assured and only achieved through rationality (Habermas, 1987, p.
345). Conservative societies valued tradition more highly and so they went farther in assigning
meaning to novel experiences. In such societies, novel experiences were less likely to disrupt the
reproduction of the lifeworld. More liberal societies faced greater challenges in giving meaning
to novel experience and binding them to tradition.
Achieving coherence between the novel and the traditional required abstraction as form
and content parted ways (Habermas, 1984a, p. 146). Socialization needed to incorporate the
ability to employ abstraction and the ability to deal with novelty. More abstractly, universal, and
general approaches were required to legitimate society and culture. As a corollary, justice and
truth parted ways as society and culture became increasingly distinct. Governmental legitimacy
was no longer a given simply because that government held power. Personality and society also
became less congruent with the expansion of societal roles. Culture and personality grew apart,
as the former could no longer be dogmatically imposed upon the later. Thus, a continual need for
new cultural works arose (Habermas, 1984a, p. 148). The trend was one of replacing dogmatic
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belief with rational critique. Continuity could not be sustained by continuing traditions and came
only from critical engagement with tradition.
The rationalized lifeworld, which critically reflected upon tradition, existed at the
opposite end of the spectrum from Durkheim’s fictional society of mechanical solidarity. The
rationalized lifeworld was the “vanishing point” for the lifeworld of total integration (Habermas,
1984a, p. 146). The three structures of the lifeworld were continually subjected to processes
resembling communicative action. Legitimacy, and hence continued acceptance, was dependent
upon possessing the force of the better argument, rather than age.
System
Habermas adopted a systems theory approach to address the shortcomings and idealism
of the lifeworld. Taken on its own the lifeworld was overly idealistic in grounding all
interactions in an already idealized notion of discourse. Furthermore, a lifeworld only analysis
overlooked material concerns that must be addressed if the cultural necessities of the lifeworld
were to be met. Left unaddressed, this would have led Habermas to the “hermeneutic claim to
universality”, the notion that sociological inquiry ended by recreating the understanding that
individuals possessed of their own culture (Habermas, 1984a, p. 148). Habermas, partially
through debate with Gadamer, opposed a purely hermeneutic approach generally, and the
hermeneutic claim to universality specifically (Habermas, 1971, 1980; 1988, pp. 143-185). That
approach was unable to recognize the potential of systematically distorted communication to
disrupt the system because it assumed that the lifeworld provided sufficient resources to
understand and provide meaning to society (Habermas, 1984a, pp. 149-150).
Reconsider the society characterized by mechanical solidarity, which possessed a
hermeneutically transparent lifeworld where individuals easily understood all possible
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interactions. Additionally, the culture of that society would have no trouble supplying shared
meaning for all interactions (Habermas, 1984a, pp. 156-157). This society had a vanishing point
other than rationalization. It could vanish when growing complexity was met with meaningless
forms of organization that originated and were sustained completely outside of the lifeworld
rather than through mutual understanding. The result was similar to mechanical solidarity, in that
challenges to validity claims could not be raised. This society was beyond the scope of rational
debate or critical reflection as order was imposed upon the lifeworld from an external point. As a
result, the lifeworld would weaken and lose any force it once possessed. Habermas noted the
similarity to Adorno’s account of a totally administered society, as well as Luhman’s view of
contemporary society (Habermas, 1987, p. 353). Habermas explained this negative aspect of the
evolution of society using systems theory. He simultaneously believed that his persistent
acknowledgment of the lifeworld allowed him to avoid the pitfalls of an approach rooted entirely
in systems theory.
Habermas’s understanding of systems revolved around their ability to produce and
maintain a border between themselves and the more complex external system (Habermas, 1984a,
p. 151). Analyses of social phenomena could proceed through examining the lifeworld or the
system. These alternative approaches rested upon an analytic distinction between their “depth of
field” (Habermas, 1993c, pp. 252-253). Culture, for example, could be analyzed as one of the
structural components of the lifeworld, or alternatively, as a subsystem within a system. Systems
theory considered society from an observer’s viewpoint and supplied counterintuitive
explanations (Habermas, 1993c, p. 252). It did not provide much of interest to actual members of
society, and portrayed them as possessing little in the way of agency. By contrast, the lifeworld
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approach provided an explanation that could be understood by members of society. It made
tacitly recognized components of society more explicit.
The two approaches also differed in what they were unable to explain. The lifeworld
approach stressed the importance of human agency and was unable to explain unintended
consequences arising from that agency. Unintended consequences were viewed as meaningless.
Alternatively, systems theory provided an account of unintended consequences. Social
integration was the ability of individuals to coordinate their actions around mutual
understanding. Meanwhile, systems integration resulted from the coordination arising from the
consequences of actions (Habermas, 1984a, p. 202). From a systems view, individuals were
concerned with the consequences of actions, rather than the meaning of those actions. The
system approach could not account for the understanding of individuals within society. Thus, it
could not account for the effect that a lack of understanding of administration and economics
could have on systems integration. This lack of understanding could lead to alienation, for
example, and this would go unacknowledged by systems theory (Habermas, 1984a, p. 151;
1993c, p. 253).
System as Colonizer
Once uncoupled only as methodological approaches the lifeworld and the system became
truly distinct from one another under modern capitalism (Habermas, 1993c, p. 255). States still
required legitimacy and so were grounded in the social structure of the lifeworld; for example,
law was but a shell containing social interaction (Habermas, 1984a, p. 178). States purported to
organize interactions while in reality they merely created a space in which already existing
interactions took place. Interactions were more reliant upon existing norms within society than
the letter of the law. However, state sanctioned organization penetrated and affected the
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lifeworld. For example, as capitalism placed greater emphasis on the role of money, it became
the prominent steering medium of life. This threatened the viability of the lifeworld.
Money had acted as a steering medium in simple markets without endangering the
lifeworld. In simple markets, money provided a way for strangers to enter into instrumental
relationships with one another. Strangers would meet as buyer and seller without needing to
share much in the way of meaning. There would be no moral connection between the two. For
example, sellers were not responsible for how buyers intended to use a product. All they cared
about was the monetary amount and use value of the exchange. If more sellers entered the
marketplace, it would have the unintended but predictable consequence of driving the price of a
good down. Conversely, yet equally predictably, if more buyers entered the marketplace, the
price of a good would be driven up. Thus, money coordinated action without supplying meaning.
These actions would be coordinated but lack the understanding and possibilities provided by
language.
Money provided a manner for sending simple and schematic messages. It compelled
specific actions on behalf of both holders and recipients, creating an instrumental relationship
between them. Money had much in common with power as an effective steering medium.
Money, however, surpassed power in several ways. Money could be more readily circulated
within a system, it could be accumulated and stored, it could be easily quantified, the recipient
was not put at a disadvantage as with power, and most importantly, money did not require
legitimation as power did (Habermas, 1984a, pp. 265-266). Money once required some form of
backing, like the gold standard, but so long as it was recognized as currency, it could operate as a
steering medium. It was unlikely to encounter normative questions of whether what passed for
currency ought to be accepted as such. Exchange and hence currency could take any form; the
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exchange of gold, Euros, or dollar bills, would all operate in the same manner and have the same
effect.
Contemporarily, money as a steering medium has transcended any physical form. It can
take the form of credit, the corresponding debt, or more abstract financial mechanisms like
derivatives. The global economy, as well as smaller scale incarnations, is dominated by abstract
and instantaneous electronic exchanges. Fortunes can be made and lost unconnected to any
physical medium. The dominance of money, or perhaps more accurately today, finance, has been
obscured by such development. It determines the fate of nations, the influence of corporations,
and the daily life of individuals all while remaining primarily beyond observation. Its ever
evolving speed and increasing level of abstraction has resulted in a state where most do not
understand its influence and even those professionally responsible for its regulation struggle to
match its frenetic pace.
Simple incarnations of markets and exchanges existed in many stages of civilization and
did not in themselves represent a threat to the lifeworld. The threat arose when the principles of
exchange relationships infiltrated all areas of life, and in so doing colonized the lifeworld. Within
capitalist societies, exchange became the primary social institution. In earlier capitalism,
bourgeois legal systems provided a framework for resolving conflicts between competitors and
dealing with market failures (Habermas, 1984a, p. 178). However, money and the principles of
exchange were so effective as steering mediums that they moved beyond the borders of the
economic subsystem and began to steer in all subsystems. In addition to affecting all aspects of
life within all subsystems, money came to affect the relationships between the subsystems
themselves. For example, the state relied heavily on taxation and power, and became reliant on
money as a primary steering medium. Tax incentives and financial penalties became a primary
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means of compelling behavior desired by the state. Another example was the diffusion of wage
labor within society; this overtook more traditional modes of work, and deemphasized the use
value of products. Laborers became almost singularly concerned with the monetary
compensation they received for their labor, rather than the resulting product. Everyday life was
altered, and this alteration could be seen in the ever increasing urbanization and industrialization
that characterized modern capitalist societies (Habermas, 1987, p. 351).
The colonization of the lifeworld could be summarized as the intrusion of money and
power as steering mediums into all the institutions and relationships of the lifeworld. The state
began to reorganize itself along economic lines. The economy cast off the relationships that had
once embedded it in the lifeworld. It became supreme and subjected all other institutions to its
principles and modes of thought as mere subsystems. The lifeworld, in its entirety, was
threatened with relegation to the status of a subsystem within the economy. This organized all
action around strategic lines; coordination was solely motivated by instrumental and purposive
rationality concerned with consequences, specifically, the consequences of economic style
exchanges. Action, based upon mutual understanding resulting from discourse and
communicative rationality, would no longer be possible. Critical discourse was prohibited by the
central role of money and the principles of economic exchange. In effect, money filled the
unquestioned role that dogmatic acceptance of belief had filled in earlier societies, in that it
prevented both critical reflection and rational discourse. Habermas wrote, “the more the welfare
state goes beyond pacifying the class conflict lodged in the sphere of production and spreads a
net of client relationships over private spheres of life, the stronger are the anticipated
pathological side effects . . . that entails both a bureaucratization and a monetarization of core
areas of the lifeworld” (1984a, p. 364). Since money required no legitimation, it was unaffected
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by rational debate. The actions of the state did little more than codify the existing dominance of
this mentality (Habermas, 1987, p. 355).
The modern state had expanded its citizenry, as more were able to participate in the
political realm. However, that realm took on a new and less meaningful role. As Habermas put it:
“The establishment of basic political rights in the framework of mass democracy means, on the
one hand, a universalization of the role of citizen and, on the other hand, a segmenting of this
role from the decision-making process, a cleansing of political participation from any
participatory content” (1984a, p. 350). The political sphere no longer spoke to the state in terms
of governing decisions, representing genuine participation. Instead citizens became clients. They
make demands upon the state as a supplier of goods. All the state need do is meet the demands of
its clients, regardless of its direction. This is a form of politics that “has shrunk to
administration” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 354). The result has been an absence of non-clientalistic
demands in the political sphere. Quoting Weber, Habermas noted that one result has been “the
complete elimination of ethics from political reasoning” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 324).
A number of subsequent authors have seized on the notion of the individual as consumer
and the state as supplier, a result of Habermas’s colonization of the lifeworld, some seemingly
independent of Habermas’s account. John Clarke et al. noted the general trend to recast the
government-citizen relationship as a supplier-customer relationship (Clarke, Newman, Smith,
Vidler, & Westmarland, 2007). More specifically, Lizabeth Cohen quoted a Clinton
Administration report that stated:
Effective, entrepreneurial governments insist on customer satisfaction. They listen
carefully to their customers—using surveys, focus groups, and the like. They restructure
their basic operations to meet customers’ needs. And they use market dynamics such as
competition and customer choice to create incentives that drive their employees to put
customers first (2003, p. 396).
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This report demonstrated that the economic, customer/supplier relationship had permeated
government. Catherine Needham noted that the U.K.’s Blair government, along with other recent
labor and conservative governments, sought to move the relationship between the government
and citizens toward an economic, consumer-supplier relationship by utilizing tactics similar to
those outlined in the Clinton Administration’s report (2003). David Bollier contributed an
exhaustive list of the ways local governments had followed this trend from selling naming rights,
to branding cities, to outright municipal endorsements of everything from ice cream to rental cars
to underwear (2003, p. 158).
One effect of colonization was what Habermas called juridification, Verrechtlichung,
which was the increase of formal law in contemporary states (1984a, p. 357). Habermas wrote,
“it is the medium of law itself that violates the communicative structures of the sphere that has
been juridified” (1984a, p. 370). Additionally, “From the start, the ambivalence of guaranteeing
freedom and taking it away has attached to the policies of the welfare state” (Habermas, 1984a,
p. 361). In this vein Habermas continued, “[i]t is now the very means of guaranteeing freedom
that endangers the freedom of the beneficiaries” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 362).
Individuals were, essentially, reduced to clients, or customers, rather than being citizens
capable of interacting with the state or their fellows. Individuals were only capable of seeking
victory as communicative understanding and action had no place in concretely defined legal
relationships. “As legal subjects they encounter one another in an objectivizing success-oriented
attitude” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 369). This system could not account for every context that would
arise, and so situations and individuals were forced into the formalized set of rules, regardless of
the specific context. Habermas wrote, “the situation to be regulated is embedded in the context of
a life history and of a concrete form of life; it has to be subjected to violent abstraction, not
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merely because it has to be subsumed under the law, but so that it can be dealt with
administratively” (1984a, p. 363). All life occurrences would be forced to fit into the
predetermined set of general rules.44
Another aspect of the colonization of the lifeworld could be seen in the world of culture.
The degree of cultural differentiation increased as experts in various areas, like art, law, morality,
and science, grew apart (Habermas, 1984b, p. 159). Not only did these areas move away from
one another, but they also became more distant from all other aspects of the lifeworld. The
resultant condition was one in which elites in various areas would not communicate with one
another, and lay members of society were far removed from decision making in all areas.
Cultural areas were increasingly technocratic and bureaucratic, and the experts in each area were
specialized to the extent that they were excluded from nearly all other areas. Thus, the public was
even further removed from realms where ideal communicative action could occur.
The colonization of the lifeworld by the system caused meaning to become rare, and was
the source of a new form of conflict in society. As Habermas put it:
In the past decade or two, conflicts have developed in advanced Western societies that
deviate in various ways from the welfare-state pattern of institutionalized conflict over
distribution. They no longer flare up in domains of material reproduction; they are no
longer channeled through parties and associations; and they can no longer be allayed by
compensations. Rather, these new conflicts arise in domains of cultural reproduction,
social integration, and socialization . . . The issue is not primarily one of compensations
that the welfare state can provide, but of defending and restoring endangered ways of life.
In short, the new conflicts are not ignited by distribution problems but by questions
having to do with the grammar of forms of life (1984a, p. 392).
Being concerned with this, rather than economic issues, was a departure from the Marxist
perspective that had influenced Habermas’s early work (Habermas, 1984a, pp. 348-349). Rather
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Habermas was not simply opposed to law, but later distinguished between colonizing law and
law with communicative foundations, in the deliberation of those subjected to it (Habermas,
1984a).
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than being primarily concerned with economic redistribution, the concern was over the now
colonized and no longer properly functioning lifeworld. Social movements took the place of
class based conflicts in expressing societal discontent (Habermas, 1984a, pp. 393-396). 45
Critiques like Žižek’s, leveled above, took on new clarity. Habermas was concerned with where
the lines between the system and the lifeworld should be drawn, and how the distinctions could
be maintained, rather than how to do away with the system and its corrupting imperatives
altogether. Habermas was then seen to be implicitly defending capitalism, and hence, taking a
conservative position (McCarthy, 1991; Shabani, 2003). The defense of capitalism would not be
a critical fault in and of itself. Capitalism as a concept contains a wide variety of possibilities
from the Anglo neo-liberal strand to the more managed incarnations of the European continent. It
could be argued that Habermas, in concurrence with Marx, viewed the ailments of modern
society “as treatable through transforming capitalist relations of production” (McCarthy, 1991, p.
119). This critique then is only damning for those who view capitalism in all its forms as
unsalvageable, e.g. Žižek.
Colonization and the accompanying process of juridification were detrimental to many
aspects of life in modern society, politics included. The system lacked the linguistic meaning
only found in the lifeworld. Individuals may sense the lack of meaning to participation in the
political sphere. As a result, individuals seek recourse via the only readily available avenue and
“privatized hopes for self-actualization and self determination are primarily located, namely, in
the roles of consumer and client” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 356). Additionally, these developments
inhibited the development of communicative competence. Communicative action, discourse and
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Also, see Habermas’s comments on social movements in Horster and van Reijen (1992).
Cohen and Arato (1992) also considered social movements from a Habermasian perspective.
Holub (1991) explored Habermas’s relationship with the student movement in particular.
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mutual understanding were not possible in a lifeworld colonized by a system. The possibility of
communicative action was precluded; all that remained was instrumental and strategic action
either openly or in some unperceived manner. Due to these impossibilities, colonization led to a
malfunctioning lifeworld characterized by crises of reproduction, anomie, loss of meaning, and
outright psychological pathologies (Habermas, 1984a, p. 145). These malfunctions in the
lifeworld, in Habermas’s account, became characteristic of modernity.
The differentiation between the private sphere, the sphere of public authority, and the
public sphere that Habermas presented in Structural Transformation, as represented in Figure 1,
has disappeared. None of the three spheres remain distinct from one another. All have coalesced
into one contemporary sphere colonized by the economic subsystem and functioning in
accordance with its principles of exchange. This unitary sphere of life has no place for
communicative action and the force of the better argument caries little weight. Issues are
approached subjectively, rather than objectively, and the promotion of private interests takes
precedent. Under the best circumstances others are potential partners in market exchanges, under
less optimal circumstances they are objects to be manipulated and taken advantage of in those
exchanges.
Further complicating already complex matters, the absence of a properly functioning
lifeworld goes unnoticed. Habermas wrote that rather than communicative relations “we find the
shamming of communicative relations in bureaucratically desiccated, forcibly ‘humanized’
domains of pseudopolitical intercourse in an overextended and administered public sphere”
(Habermas, 1984a, p. 386). Habermas argued that the “systematically independent organizations
of the state are fictively transposed back into the horizon of the lifeworld . . .” (Habermas, 1982,
p. 283). In short, that “[w]hile the system is draped out as the lifeworld, the lifeworld is absorbed
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by the system” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 386). Echoing Arendt, the substitution of politics went
unnoticed, we are unaware that colonization has occurred, or by way of Benhabib, we are
unaware that the blob has consumed us.
3.9 Conclusion
Habermas provided an account that offers both an alternative and complement to
Arendt’s rise of the social. His early work detailed the development and decline of a properly
functioning notion of politics, akin to the Greek system that developed within the bourgeois
public sphere. That notion of the political declined, leading to the pathologies of modernity. The
contemporary age saw an altered notion of the political with the inclusion of private interests, the
absence of critical reflection and rational debate, and the inability of individuals to even develop
the capacity for discourse. There were corresponding legitimation crises, and the lifeworld was
colonized by the system. Furthermore, all aspects of life became mere subsystems of the
dominant mode of thought and behavior that was modeled on economic exchange.
The public sphere, including the political sphere, no longer stands between the private
and the public realm. These realms have collapsed into one another and become integrated into
one another. As a result, the state intervenes in aspects of life that it previously left alone.
Simultaneously, and perhaps more problematically, once private, non-political, modes of
interaction have become prevalent in the public realm. As colonization took place strategic and
instrumental modes of action were reinforced as the dominant forms of relationships.
Habermas’s theory of communicative action may be viewed as an articulation of the conditions
that would allow a revival of a healthy politics; however, the very pathologies that led to the
decline of the political sphere may prevent its reemergence.
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CHAPTER 4 MICHEL FOUCAULT
4.1 Introduction
Michel Foucault’s approach to power, and those who continue to utilize his approach,
address politics in a very different manner than pre-Foucauldian scholars, non-Foucauldian
scholars, or mainstream political scientists. This is due to the fact that in Foucault’s analysis the
relationship between the state and what it governs have changed. As a result new forms of
governance have emerged. They exist in different locales, have become more pervasive, and act
on their subjects in different ways and in fact the subjects have come to act upon themselves in a
self-disciplining manner. In my analysis of Foucault I describe a conception of politics that has
been altered over time, becoming both more topically inclusive and whose power has become
more diffuse. It is a politics that has moved beyond the borders of any structure or institution that
was previously conceived of as political. There is a new form of governance that effectively
accomplishes the tasks of traditional powerbearing political structures, or at the very least
compliments those structures.
In this section I examine some of Foucault’s key concepts with respect to power as a
framework for understanding how the nature of the political has necessarily changed as the
exercise of power has changed. Correspondingly, at times it was a change in the political that
resulted in alterations to forms of power. It is difficult to consider Foucault’s work without
simultaneously considering the work of those commentating on, expanding upon, and modifying
his work. Perhaps this is due to his early death in 1984 at the age of fifty-seven, perhaps it due to
the nature of his work, which introduced novel concepts only to abandon them and move on, as
was the case with biopolitics and governmentality as explained below.46 Regardless, Foucault’s
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For an account of Foucault’s life and death, see James Miller (1993).
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thought is but one component of the Foucauldian line of thinking examined here. Foucault’s
work was but a part, the foundational part, of a coherent and influential research program that
has developed beyond the work of a single individual.
Specifically, I investigate three key concepts. First, I address panopticism and the
creation of self-disciplining individuals within the political realm as a result of the rise of
panoptic, or surveying power. This was modeled on Jeremy Bentham’s institution of the
panopticon, or inspection house. Foucault expanded Bentham’s notion of a singular institution to
the organization of society as a whole. Second, I examine biopolitics and the way the nature of
the political changed to encompass life processes and operate at the level of biological function.
To borrow the Arendtian language, the biological functions of animal laborans were
incorporated into politics. Third, and finally, I consider Foucault’s overarching concept of
governmentality, which has connections to and has come to encompass many of the other, and
prior, aspects of Foucault’s thought. Governmentality, perhaps more explicitly than the other
concepts deals with the arrangement of the state, though it certainly goes beyond this to include
non-state structures. Particular attention is paid to neoliberal governmentality, which is not only
a key strand of governmentality research, but also a unique constellation of power, of particular
importance to democratic states.
Foucault provides us with a spectrum along which the practices of government may fall.
This spectrum ranges from traditional forms of governmental sovereignty, as practiced by state
institutions, to forms of self-regulation, where the individual performs the work of government
on its behalf. This way of thinking permits a more complex look at the levels at which
governance can occur and the means by which governance can operate. Thinking of government
in this way takes a further step by questioning the normally perceived antinomies between

	
  

188
freedom and subjectivity. Our understanding of such concepts is shaped by the ways in which
governmental apparatuses operate and the spaces provided as seemingly free from them. What
exists is a complex relationship between such concepts rather than a sharp distinction between
them.
The result is a politics that is more inclusive than it once was. This is a politics that has
come to incorporate nearly every aspect of life, including those that were once private and
beyond the scope of the state or any other public entity. Simultaneously, a framework emerged in
which power that was monopolistically controlled by the state was extended and enmeshed into
non-state entities, thereby, allowing the state to govern from afar. The result is an unprecedented
state of affairs in which all things have been subjected to political control, while state
apparatuses have, to a degree, shifted enforcement of behavior to non-state institutions. This
diffusion of power, which was once exercised solely by state institutions, has gone so far as to
coopt the individual who now self regulates on behalf of the state. A key path to this selfregulation was the development of the concept of panopticism.
4.2 Panopticism
It would be impossible to address Foucault’s conception of panopticism without at least
briefly mentioning Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon. Bentham’s panopticon was, in brief, a prison
in which the inmates could be observed at any time without their knowledge. The desired effect
was that the inmates would behave as if they were under observation at all times (Bentham,
1995b). The standard design was a central tower occupied by observers with a surrounding ring,
which housed those potentially under observation. The purported purpose of the inspection house
was the utilitarian administration of the penal system, although its actual purpose along with the
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entirety of Bentham’s project has been questioned. 47 While rooted in Bentham’s singular
institution, the inspection house, Foucault’s panopticism permitted a wider application of the
concept to society at large (Foucault, 1977, pp. 195-230). Some have seen Foucault’s
interpretation of and expansion upon Bentham as containing problematic distortions of the latters
work (Dinwiddy, 2003; Engelmann, 2003; Schofield, 2009). Others have examined the
connections running between the two authors without becoming preoccupied with rescuing
Bentham’s image (Brunon-Ernst, 2012b).48
Foucault believed his concept of panopticism embodied the transformations that took
place at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Thus, he opened his Truth and Juridical Forms
by observing that “[p]eople at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century . . . did not fail to notice
the appearance of what I’ve been calling – somewhat arbitrarily but, at any rate, in homage to
Bentham – ‘panopticism’” (Foucault, 1994, p. 70). Foucault believed the societal transformation
and move toward panopticism was important, however, its description required a modification of
Bentham’s original concept. Michel de Certeau described Foucault’s transformation of the
panopticon into panopticism as follows: “The first step is a découpé: it isolates a design of some
practice from a seamless web, in order to constitute these practices as a distinct and separate
corpus, a coherent whole, which is nonetheless alien to the place in which theory is
produced . . . . In the second step, the unity, thus isolated, is reversed” (1995, p. 334). As
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Some claim that Bentham was primarily concerned with the protection of rights and
maintaining the rule of law (Hart, 2001; Rosen, 1983). For example, Schofield noted that
Bentham intended the panopticon as a vast improvement over the conditions of prisoners at the
time (2009), Foucault himself acknowledged the noble intentions of the reforms. Others maintain
that Bentham produced authoritarian measures aimed at total social control (Hume, 2004; Long,
1977; Rosenblum, 1978). By way of example, Himmelfarb charged that Bentham did not
consider potential inmates fully human and hence undeserving of the rights that went along with
that status (1985; 1995, pp. 32-81).
48

The panoptical connection between Foucault and Bentham is the most obvious and widely
investigated; however, there are others, for example, see Brunon-Ernst (2012a).

	
  

190
described elsewhere Foucault routinely selected facts on the basis of their helpfulness toward the
ultimate explanatory goal (Bevis, Cohen, & Kendall, p. 172).
The purpose here, however, is to investigate Foucault’s concept so I will set aside
Bentham’s influential work and focus upon the Foucauldian application. Bentham’s project was
to architecturally construct singular institutions, be they factories or prisons, which embodied the
continuous prospect of potential observation. The ultimate end of the project was to teach and
instill the mode of behavior the institution desired. Foucault applied this notion to the modern
state, which possessed panopticism as one of its traits. Thus, panopticism was defined as “a type
of power that is applied to individuals in the form of continuous individual supervision, in the
form of control, punishment, and compensation, and in the form of correction, that is the
molding and transformation of individuals in terms of certain norms” (Foucault, 1994, p. 70).
The effect the panoptical prison had on prisoners was universalized within a territory by the
society-wide application of panopticism. Desired and expected behaviors became the norm and
took the place of actions that were novel, unexpected, or undesirable.
Foucault’s most famous treatment of panopticism came in Discipline and Punish
published in 1975. However, in earlier lectures Foucault can be seen wrestling with the creation
of the concept. For example, in the aforementioned Truth and Juridical Forms there is a fairly
straightforward description of the panopticon:
The Panopticon is a ring-shaped building in the middle of which there is a yard with a
tower at the centre. The ring is divided into little cells that face the interior and exterior
alike. In each of these little cells there is, depending on the purpose of the institution, a
child learning to write, a worker at work, a prisoner correcting himself, a madman living
in madness. In the central tower, there is an observer . . . able to see everything without
anyone seeing him (Foucault, 1994, p. 58).
Similar descriptions can be found in other pre-Discipline and Punish works, such as Foucault’s
1973-74 lecture Psychiatric Power (2006b, pp. 74-75), as well as works written several years
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later, e.g. The Eye of Power (1980a). In Discipline and Punish itself Foucault provided his most
in-depth articulation of the panopticon:
At the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower: this tower is pierced with
wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided
into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two
windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the
outside allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed,
then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a
patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of the backlighting,
one can observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light the small captive
shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small
theaters, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible
(Foucault, 1977, p. 200).
The original notion of the panopticon remained pervasive throughout Foucault’s development of
panopticism.49
Foucault described the panopticon as “a diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its
ideal form” the result was “a marvelous machine which, whatever use one may wish to put it to,
produces homogenous effects of power” (1977, pp. 202, 205). This homogenous effect was the
self-regulation of behavior brought about by the constant potentiality of surveillance. As William
Bogard put it, “this should not be confused with an ideological formation or a representation
which masks the truth of social relations . . . . It is an unstable historical formation neither
universal nor the totality of social relations, but rather the form of a changing amalgam of
localized events and processes” (1991, pp. 327-328). The panopticon could only be applied in
“rigorously closed” systems, e.g. schools, hospitals, and of course prisons (Foucault, 1977, p.
207). The self-regulating behavior produced by the panopticon resulted in a system of control
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In addition to the works already mentioned, see Foucault’s About the Concept of the
“Dangerous” Individual in Nineteenth-century Legal Psychiatry (1984a, p. 186); What is Called
Punishing? (1984b, p. 385); Questions of Method (1991b, pp. 81-82); The Punitive Society
(1997c, pp. 32-35); Security, Territory, Population (2009, pp. 66, 117).
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and helplessness in the face of all-powerful institutions. It could be possible for these institutions
to possess the inescapable power to completely order life within their confines.
This has led some, like Duccio Trombadori, to critique Foucault for offering too
pessimistic an account of a totally paralyzing disciplinary society (Foucault, 1991c). Trombadori
wrote “Foucault, far from providing a new stimulus for demands of liberation, limits himself to
describing a mechanism of pure imprisonment” (Foucault, 1991c, p. 20). Others charged
Foucault with falling into “monolithic relativism” (Taylor, 1984, p. 179). This was the claim that
Foucault’s concept of power was normatively one-dimensional and could not explain why
resistance was preferable to the acceptance of domination or why some exercises of power
should be resisted while others were accepted (Fraser, 1981, p. 286).50
However, in his treatment of power Foucault did not go so far as the elimination of
freedom and the emergence of domination. He wrote that “[p]ower is exercised only over free
subjects, and only insofar as they are ‘free’” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 342). In power relations there
must be some other capable of action. Furthermore, relations of power permit a choice of action
“faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible
inventions may open up” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 340). Power, for Foucault, was not as simple as A
forcing B to do something, or A preventing B from doing something (Foucault, 2000d, pp. 340341). Rather, power existed within a complex array of relationships and entailed altering the
possibilities of another party’s action.
The strategic nature of a relationship, with respect to influencing the possibilities of
action, did not necessarily imply that the relationship was acceptable or unacceptable. Nor did
such relationships necessarily violate the interests of the party being strategically influenced. For
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Also, see Habermas and Benhabib’s Modernity versus Postmodernity (1981) and Habermas’s
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987).
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example, offering advice or rational argument may influence the possibilities of action just as
manipulation and violence may. Some of these influences would be acceptable exercises of
power and others unacceptable. Influence over possibilities that arise out of institutionalized
inequality or persistent asymmetric relationships would be objectionable and proper foci of
resistance (Patton, 1998, p. 69).51 Instead of considering power relationships good or bad it may
be more useful to think of them as more or less “dangerous” on the basis of their likelihood to
develop into circumstances resembling domination (Foucault, 1997b, p. 256). This necessitates
the exercise of examining particular relationships of power to differentiate between those that
offer the possibility of “practices freedom” and those that threaten to turn into states of
domination (Foucault, 1997a, p. 283). Foucault wrote the following addressing Habermas’s
work:
The idea that there could exist a state of communication that would allow games of truth
to circulate freely, without any constraints or coercive effects, seems utopian to me. This
is precisely a failure to see that power relations are not something that is bad in itself, that
we have to break free of. I do not think that a society can exist without power relations, if
by that one means the strategies by which individuals try to direct and control the conduct
of others. the problem, then, is not to try to dissolve them in the utopia of completely
transparent communication but to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques,
and also the morality, the ethos, the practice of self, that will allow us to play these games
of power with as little domination as possible (1997a, p. 298).
Hence, Foucault did not see the need to combat all relationships of power or remove all strategic
of influence from social interaction.
Foucault did allow for the possibility of resistance to dangerous power relationships and
even endorsed some contemporary resistances, like the gay rights movement and the women’s
movement (1997d). These movements challenged asymmetric power structures and
institutionally created inequalities that came close to solidifying states of domination. Both
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Along these lines also see Michael Kelly (1994), and Samantha Ashenden and David Owen
(1999).
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movements changed political, social and cultural power relationships and even challenged
scientific dialogue. Such resistance can create the possibility of practices of freedom through
altering relationships of power and even resisting definitions. Foucault wrote “[m]aybe the target
nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 336).
Foucault appeared to believe that more acceptable social practices could arise in the wake of
resistance (Foucault, 1991c, pp. 159-163). Whether such resistances could be instigated prior to
the solidification of domination may be an open question, adopted on a case-by-case basis. There
was also the problem of whether individuals or collectives could recognize that they are on the
impaired side of dangerous power relationships. Put another way, can we even recognize that we
are in a panopticon, or that it is a potentially dangerous power relationship?
Visibility of power was an important aspect of the panoptical relationship. Foucault wrote
that:
Bentham laid down the principle that power should be visible and unverifiable. Visible:
the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from
which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being
looked at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so . . . the
Panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric ring,
one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without
ever being seen (1977, pp. 201-202).
Importantly, then, the panoptic relationship was an unequal one, as there existed a rigid
dichotomy between the observed and the observer, the warden and the inmate, the doctor and the
patient, the instructor and the pupil. This structure not only hides the physical form of the
observer but other aspects of the operation. The observed is not privy to the observer’s motives,
ethics, or practices. This must be a source of uneasiness. Not only is the observed subjected to
the self-regulating control of the observer but he also may lack any knowledge of his captor’s
intentions.
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The importance of the observed parties lack of knowledge and seeing, paired with the
observer’s potential to constantly survey have led some authors to focus on sight as key
component of social control. Some, such as Martin Jay (1986) and Majid Yar (2003), have
adopted sight as the primary point of commentary and critique. Indeed, sight was important, as
Foucault put it “visibility is a trap” (1977, p. 200). Sight entailed silent observation and modern
technology has permitted the replacement of the human seer with a mechanical seer in the form
of video cameras, as extensively used in London, or unmanned drones as controversially
employed by America. Taken to extremes panoptic sight creates an Orwellian society. Bogard
argued that Foucault’s position on the relationship between the observed and the observer should
be read as a result, rather than as a cause, of the panoptic principle:
If Foucault emphasized the importance of the gaze . . . it was always with a view to other
problems: first, of the standardization of multiple techniques – the concrete operations –
for partitioning space and ordering temporal relations (i.e. imposing form on the
multiplicity of human conduct), and second, of linking these operations to the forms of
discursive knowledge which direct the gaze and give it its object (1991, pp. 336-337).
The purpose of panopticism, then, revolves around ordering as much as around seeing. It allows
the creation of social categories and the appropriate filing of individuals into them. Population
management during plagues was one early application that led to the prospect of domination
(Green, 1999).
Opposed to the closed nature of the panopticon, panopticism “is the general principle of a
new ‘political anatomy’ whose object and end are not the relations of sovereignty but the
relations of discipline” (Foucault, 1977, p. 208). The primary purpose of panopticism was
identical to that of the panopticon:
to induce in the inmate a state of consciousness and permanent visibility that assures the
automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that surveillance is permanent in its
effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action: that the perfection of power should tend to
render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a
machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who
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exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which
they are themselves the bearers (Foucault, 1977, p. 201).
Uncertain of whether he is being watched but certain of the possibility of being watched the
inmate regulates his own behavior. He behaves as if he is being watched at all times so as not to
incur disciplinary action from the observer who may or may not be watching. Thus, the rules of
the institution or the society are enforced by the internal self-regulation of individuals. As
Foucault put it, “[h]e who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes
responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he
inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes
the principle of his own subjection” (1977, pp. 202-203). This sort of control represented a
transition from traditional power to self-regulating individuals. In other words it was a shift from
externally applied “heavy” power to a “lighter” power, from resource consuming physical
punishment to seemingly less resource intensive non-physical control (Foucault, 1977, p. 203).
This was the power of “mind over mind” (Foucault, 1977, p. 206).52 Correspondingly, the
theatrical “great spectacle” of torture and execution gave way to an “age of sobriety” in
punishment (Foucault, 1977, p. 14). In line with Foucault’s analysis of the pastoralization of
power, discussed with governmentality, the goal was no longer simply to exert control over the
body, but rather, to discipline the entire life of the individual.53
Foucault used the metaphor of a historical royal menagerie to describe panopticism.
However, “the animal is replaced by man, individual distribution by specific grouping and the
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Foucault’s language here was borrowed from Bentham’s 1787 letter from Russia in which he
described his Panopticon as “[a] new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity
hitherto without example: and that, to a degree equally without example, secured by whoever
chooses to have it so, against abuse” (1995a, p. 29).
53

Sigmund Freud articulated this has the internalization of the of the power of control, as the
victory super-ego which made civilization a possibility (Freud, 1961). Similarities between
Foucault and Freud should not be surprising given their shared Nietzschean influence.
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king by the machinery of a furtive power” (Foucault, 1977, p. 203). Individuals within a
panopticon, or a panoptic society, no longer live natural lives. They can be isolated, sorted,
compared, and always observed. “[T]he panopticon does the work of a naturalist” (Foucault,
1977, p. 203). Simultaneously, “the Panopticon is also a laboratory” (Foucault, 1977, pp. 203204). The level of observation, the ability to sort and compare individuals whether they are
inmates, patients, students, workers, or merely individuals, permits experimentation.
The social world could be structured and manipulated to bring about the desired
behaviors. Foucault wrote of panoptic observation:
This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are
inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all
events are recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and the
periphery, in which power is exercised without division, according to continuous
hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located, examined and
distributed . . . (1977, p. 197).
Thus, Foucault was not only writing about the control over the body and mind through various
techniques, but also, as Bogard observed, the “mechanics of administration” (1991, p. 334).
Foucault was concerned with the “generalized mechanism of panopticism” (Foucault, 1977, p.
216). This mechanism was “indefinitely generalizable” resulting in a “disciplinary society”
(Foucault, 1977, p. 216). Ever advancing techniques and technologies made panoptic observation
possible at the societal level while simultaneously alleviating the need for a human observer to
be constantly on duty. Far from requiring a human observer “[w]hat are required are mechanisms
that analyze distributions, gaps, series, combinations, and which use instruments that render
visible, record, differentiate and compare: a physics of a relational and multiple power”
(Foucault, 1977, p. 199). Such mechanisms can be entirely automated as commentators,
surveillance scholars, and even casual news consumers have noticed.
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Examples of new formulations of panopticism abound and I have limited discussion to a
few relevant and important accounts. Descriptions of various new takes on panopticism that have
cropped up post-Foucault and could have continued endlessly with discussion of the panspectron
detailing the manner in which open information creates a system of constant surveillance
(DeLanda, 1991; Palmås, 2011), the fractal panoptic (De Angelis, 2001), the myopic panopticon
which explains distortions in monitoring (Leman-Langlois, 2003), the industrial panopticon
(Butchart, 1996), the neo-panopticon (Mann, Nolan, & Wellman, 2003), the panopticon-at-large
(Lyon, 1994, pp. 57-80), the social panopticon (Wacquant, 2001), the polyopticon (M. Allen,
1994), the urban panopticon (Koskela, 2003), the educational pedagopticon (Sweeny, 2005), or
the synopticon as the many observing and admiring the few (Mathiesen, 1997). Panopticism has
been expanded to include and applied to a vast variety of settings. For example, Vicente
Berdayes (2002) developed the concept of panoptic discourse to demonstrate how management
theories applied panopticism within organizations.
Some have used Foucault’s panopticism not only as a way to understand society-wide
surveillance structures but also as a point of entry into his thought generally as well as the farreaching works on governmentality. Foucault did much to bring panopticism and the panopticon
under scholarly scrutiny. As David Lyon, in describing the modern electronic panopticon, wrote
“[t]hough many historians of ideas or systems of punishment have recognized the importance of
the panopticon, it is really only since Foucault that interest in it has become widespread” (1994,
p. 62). Many have equated panopticism with pervasive surveillance though, at times, the
emphasis on the techniques or the nature of surveillance overlooks its universalizing effects on
behavior. In addition to those already mentioned there is no shortage of freshly coined terms
used to describe various surveillance paradigms.
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Some attempts to update panopticism leave the core of the concept intact. Some have
expanded the notion of panopticism with little alteration. For example, Stephen Gill presented
the idea that the panopticon now operated on a global scale and individuals, as well as nations,
fall under panoptic surveillance (1995). Alternatively, Nic Groombridge described a more
democratic system, “an ‘omnicon’ where all watch, or might potentially, watch all” (2003, p.
43). The democratic omnicon would at least allow the potential to observe all; the guardians
would themselves be guarded, to answer the question posed by everyone from Juvenal (2004) to
the blockbuster film Watchmen (2009). By contrast, Didier Bigo has argued that society operates
as a “ban-opticon” which employees profiling technologies to place members of suspect
categories under panoptic surveillance and influence (2002; Bigo & Guild, 2005). “This global
ban-opticon has contributed to the securitization not only of terrorism but . . . of citizenship and
migration, which highlights the relationship between protection and the political” (Fierke, 2007,
p. 183).
It is no surprise that panopticism and its derivations have been criticized. Some have
argued that attempts to move the panoptical principle from singular institutional sites of
confinement and surveillance have limited its usefulness and stretched its accuracy. Such claims
charge that when theorists make the move from Bentham’s inspection house to Foucault’s
disciplining society they go to far. The panoptical principle cannot be applied to a wide public
arena because the necessary surveillance and normalizing corrective action would simply not be
possible in non-carceral settings (McCahill, 2002; Norris & Armstrong, 1999). Such authors
were, however, addressing the effect of CCTV as the primary mechanism of surveillance. While
this technology is lacking, it has advanced much since these pieces were authored and has been
combined with other methods of surveillance and data accumulation. Even when only
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considering the use of CCTV more than a decade ago, the concept of the panopticon could not be
outright dismissed, but only qualified as Norris and Armstrong put it, “[w]hile we do not
disagree that introduction of CCTV to public space represents a move toward panopticism, we
need to recognize that the totalizing vision of the panoptic prison is not simply reproduced on the
streets with the introduction of cameras” (Norris & Armstrong, 1999, p. 92). The concept
remains useful but must be subjected to the limits that differentiate society from a more
contained system in which total control would be far more practically achieved.
Others have challenged the wholesale applicability of the panoptical concept in modern
society, as opposed to those who challenge its empirical accuracy in specific contexts. These
critics believed that the conditions that would permit the possibility of a panopticon vanished.
Foucault’s disciplinary society was short lived and by the middle of the twentieth century was
fading. The perceived breakdown was the result of vanishing institutional boundaries and with
them the sites wherein panoptic discipline had functioned. The interiors where panopticism had
been at least a possibility were fading. Deleuze wrote:
We’re in the midst of a general breakdown of all sites of confinement – prisons,
hospitals, factories, schools, the family. The family is an “interior” that’s breaking down
like all other interiors – educational, professional, and so on. The appropriate ministers
have constantly been announcing supposedly appropriate reforms; but everyone knows
these institutions are in more or less terminal decline. It’s simply a matter of keeping
people busy until the new forces knocking at the door take over (1995, p. 178).
Panoptical, disciplinary societies gave way to “societies of control” as their institutions were
replaced by “ultrarapid forms of apparently free-floating control” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 178).
Control was fluid and modulating and so not dependent upon fixedness as discipline had been.
As Deleuze put it “[c]onfinements are moulds, differing mouldings, while controls are a
modulation, like a self-transmuting moulding continually changing from one moment to the next,
or like a sieve whose mesh varies from one point to another” (1995, pp. 178-179). Deleuze also
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recognized a role for advanced technology to monitor and control “dividuals” and saw the entire
shift as “rooted in a mutation of capitalism,” which he terms “metaproduction” (1995, pp. 180182).
Similarly, Zygmunt Bauman (2000) wrote of the rise of fluid societies, at the expense of
collapsing institutions. A critical component of Bauman’s analysis was his contention that
powers once held by institutions or the state were now held by individuals resulting in his titular
concept liquid modernity:
an individualized, privatized version of modernity, with the burden of
and the responsibility for failure falling primarily on the individual’s
Solids are cast once and for all. Keeping fluids in shape requires a
constant vigilance and perpetual effort – and even then the success
anything but a foregone conclusion (Bauman, 2000, pp. 7-8).

pattern-weaving
shoulders . . . .
lot of attention,
of the effort is

Bauman also described post-disciplinary power brought about by individualization. He
emphasized the use of technology, with the database as an example (1998, p. 51).
However, for Bauman cultural change took precedence over technological development.
He asked “Is there life after Panopticon” (Bauman, 1998, p. 48). The fixedness required by the
panopticon had been replaced by “extraterritoriality” and a marked end to “the era of mutual
engagement: between the supervisors and supervised, capital and labour, leaders and their
followers, armies at war” (Bauman, 2000, p. 11). Ultimately, Bauman expanded on Mathiesen’s
(1997) notion of synopticon. The synopticon’s functions could be contrasted with the
confinement and coercion of the panopticon. In the former:
Locals watch the globals. The authority of the latter is secured by their very remoteness;
the globals are literally “out of this world”, but their hovering above the worlds of the
local is much more, daily and obtrusively, visible than that of the angels who once
hovered over the Christian world: simultaneously inaccessible and within sight, lofty and
mundane, infinitely superior yet setting a shining example for all the inferiors to follow
or to dream of following; admired and coveted at the same time – a royalty that guides
instead of ruling (Bauman, 1998, pp. 53-54).
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Bauman’s version of the synopticon altered the operation of the panopticon. While the
panopticon prohibited unsurveyable space, the synopticon brought all personal and private life
into view (Bauman, 2000, pp. 26-30). Bearing a resemblance to a society organized around
televisual spectacle the many observed a few.
Bauman argued that his notion of individualization was a part of the pervasive logic of
neoliberal mode of governance, one understanding of governmentality. Structures contributed to
their own decline by adopting this logic by increasingly promoting the rule of “unbound ‘market
forces’ and free trade” (Bauman, 1999, p. 28). This tendency led to the rise of what Bauman
termed “consumerism,” which entailed the consumerization and economization of the state,
politics, and relationships within their frameworks (Bauman, 2002, 2010). Consumerism was
detrimental, for Bauman, in that despite its claims of granting individuals greater freedom it
removed them from politics by closing them off from the public sphere, rendering them
consumers rather than citizens. He wrote:
Once the state recognizes the priority and superiority of the laws of the market over the
laws of the polis, the citizen is transmuted into the consumer, and a consumer “demands
more and more protection while accepting less and less the need to participate” in the
running of the state. The overall result is the present “fluid conditions of generalized
anomie and rejection of the rules” in all their versions. (Bauman, 1999, p. 156).
Bauman’s solution was to emphasize the republican notion of freedom, focusing on a collective
common good, over the neo-liberal notion of laissez-fare freedom, which markets routinely
promised and failed to deliver (Bauman, 1999, 2004).
A number of authors have taken the above sort of critique as a point of departure.
Agamben’s “zones of indistinction” represents a new mode of power, one which uses data to
monitor and direct individuals as they move across the no longer existent boundaries between
public and private life, ultimately rendering behavior malleable and predictable (1998). Bauman
(1998), Rose (1999), Diken and Laustsen (2002), and Hardt and Negri (2000) found similar
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apparatuses at work. The visual surveillance permitted by the panoptical design of the inspection
house was ultimately replaced by more sophisticated methods of “dataveillance.” This new
technology makes possible the automatic inclusion or exclusion of individuals from citizenship,
spaces, or services (Bogard, 1996; Rose, 2000, pp. 324-327). The historical configurations of the
discipline society were replaced by the configuration of a society of power/control.
Some have remained committed to an extended form of panopticism as a method of
analyzing surveillance while focusing on the role of ever advancing technology. For example,
Boyne argued that “the Panoptical principle is not fading away, and that developments in
screening and surveillance require the retention of the Panopticon as an analytical ideal type”
(2000, p. 285). Such authors retain the basic triad underlying panopticism: observe-classifynormalize. In this line of thought the social contexts and locations of surveillance will, of course,
not always be in-line with the ideal type. According to Boyne, the most productive way forward
is to adopt a Derridean approach: placing panopticism under erasure thereby retaining it as a tool
while “simultaneously denying its validity as description” (Boyne, 2000, p. 303). Gandy
described the “panoptic sort” of entire populations into categories such as “normality” and
“abnormality” based upon the data from information systems (1993). This sorting by pervasive
information systems is then used to deny or provide opportunities to workers, consumers, and
citizens.
Similarly,

Mark

Poster

seized

on

the

monitoring

of

personal

information,

communications, and large data to construct his notion of the superpanopticon. Like Foucault,
Poster recognized that surveillance had been spread throughout society and was no longer
concentrated in a single institution. “Today’s ‘circuits of communication’ and the databases they
generate constitute a Superpanopticon, a system of surveillance without walls, windows, towers
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or guards” (Poster, 1990, p. 93). Poster argued that the superpanopticon “reconfigures the
constitution of the subject” in a new way (1996, p. 182). Subjects are recreated in a form of
hyperreality “the subject has been multiplied and decentered, capable of being acted upon by
computers at many social locations without the least awareness by the individual concerned yet
just as surely as if the individual were present somehow inside the computer” (Poster, 1996, p.
186). As a subject, each individual exists outside of themselves within some, probably multiple,
databases where they are acted upon and monitored at times with and at times without their
knowledge.
From Panopticism to Governmentality
Ever-developing technology results in advances in panopticism, or your preferred –
opticism, and continually creates new forms of “political machines” (Barry & Wissenburg, 2001;
Thrift, 2006). The political machine, to which Thrift refers, ties arts of surveillance into
governmentality:
Political knowledge has become systematized in networks of devices which require
technological capacity to operate and discriminate. Most particularly, we can point to the
use of computer software to encapsulate scientific methods that have recast the old arts of
patrol, diagnose, cross-reference, and survey, thereby beginning to produce something
like continuous government which will act as a kind of politics by default. Two main
methods of working toward this continuous government are currently in operation. The
first of these is profiling, simulations of the likes and dislikes of citizens that present a
recurring problematic for and solution to government (Elmer, 2004). The second is track
and trace, the attempt continuously to track citizens’ spatial routines, producing what
might be called a real-time census in which the state of citizens can be continually
updated . . . (Thrift, 2006, p. 553).
This approach to emerging technologies of surveillance connect panoptical concepts, like control
societies (Deleuze, 1995), coded bodies (Aas, 2006), social sorting (Lyon, 2009), banopticism
(Bigo, 2008) as apparatuses of continuous government, to governmentality. Processes of egovernment (Henman, 2010) and emergent internet orders of governance (Flyverbom, 2011) can
similarly be read as specific constellations of disciplinary power related to governmentality.
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To conclude this treatment of panopticism, its connection with governmentality and the
intrusion of government into new areas of life more generally must be noted. While delivering a
lecture on biopolitics in 1979, from which the governmentality concept was born, Foucault noted
that “[e]conomic freedom, liberalism in the sense I have just been talking about, and disciplinary
techniques are completely bound up with each other” (Foucault, 2008, p. 67).54 Foucault argued
that liberalism as a governmental form did not “leave more white spaces of freedom” and instead
constantly worked to produce freedom, which was then consumed by that same government
(Foucault, 2008, p. 67). By way of example, liberalism portended to permit free market laissezfaire economics, while in fact that economic system existed only because government had
extended its reach into the market. It had observed the market and stepped in to correct what it
viewed as undesired behavior, applying “control, constraint, and coercion” to construct its
freedom (Foucault, 2008, p. 67). This intervention occurred through two modes of action. First,
as with Roosevelt’s welfare policies, the government could directly influence “the function of
producing, breathing life into, and increasing freedom, of introducing additional freedom through
additional control and intervention” (Foucault, 2008, p. 67). Second, less directly, previously
panoptical “[g]overnment, initially limited to the function of supervision is only to intervene
when it sees that something is not happening according to the general mechanics of behavior,
exchange, and economic life” (Foucault, 2008, p. 67).
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Foucault, somewhat problematically, viewed Bentham as the prime representative of liberal
thought. This led to his contention that the Panopticon was “the very formula of liberal
government” (Foucault, 2008, p. 67). Foucault’s view of liberalism may have been different, or
perhaps his case strengthened, had he adopted some other thinker as representative of liberalism.
To complicate matters further it has been argued that Foucault misread Bentham in Discipline
and Punish, for example, see Garland (1993).
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4.3 Biopolitics
Biopolitics became an important topic in Foucault’s work during a 1976 lecture
(Foucault, 2008) and in The History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1978), though the term had
previously appeared in a prior 1974 lecture on the Birth of Social Medicine (Foucault, 2000a, p.
137). As with many of Foucault’s important conceptual developments, biopolitics was used to
denote different ideas at different times and there are several aspects of biopolitics that will be
addressed here. First, it should be noted that Foucault, at times, supplemented the term
“biopower” for biopolitics without clearly distinguishing between the two. The two concepts are
certainly related though not always equivalent. Second, biopolitics represented a novel
formulation of political power and a radical transformation in political thought and modes of
conduct. Third, biopolitics was integrally tied to the rise of racism in the modern age. Fourth,
biopolitics at times denoted the liberal art of government and is tied to Foucault’s work on
governmentality in this way. Foucault eventually moved away from the examination of
biopolitics, and as was his tendency left much in the way of unexplored territory. For example,
he desired to move away from the naturalization of power and find a way to understand the “art
of living” that could exist outside of the universal normative claims of biological science
(Foucault, 1978). This field of study has been taken up by a variety of subsequent scholars
impacted by Foucault’s work.
Foucault analyzed the mechanisms of power with an eye toward their historical limits and
applications. This led to a distinction between traditional sovereign power and the more newly
emergent biopower. Sovereign power was exercised by deduction; essentially, the deprivation of
goods and services, and in extreme cases the deduction of the subject’s life. Deduction was being
used in a mathematical sense of removal with the case of a life this meant annihilation, rather
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than deduction in the sense associated with logic, e.g. as opposed to induction. Foucault believed
that the sovereign “right of life and death” dramatically changed in the period after the 17th
century. Sovereign power had become integrated with biopower, a power that operated by means
other than mere deduction: “‘Deduction’ has tended to be no longer the major form of power but
merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and
organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering
them rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit or destroying them”
(Foucault, 1978, p. 136). This novel manifestation of power could foster and secure life through
administration. The change occurred not only within the political realm, but was related to
changes in other areas of life as well. For example, the growth of scientific and medical
knowledge, as well as the increased productive capacity of industry and agriculture were
required for the “entry of life into history” (Foucault, 1978, p. 141). Advances in science,
medicine, technology, and social administration permitted “relative control over life” as
“methods of power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life processes and undertook to
control and modify them” (Foucault, 1978, p. 142). By contrast, prior to the integration of
biopower, occurrences of disease and famine could be viewed as “pressure exerted by the
biological on the historical” (Foucault, 1978, p. 141).
The negating deductive power over legal subjects gave way to a power concerned with
and applied to living beings. While sovereign power either deducted a subject’s life or permitted
the subject to live, biopower was capable of fostering life or preventing its existence (Foucault,
2003, p. 241). Foucault recognized two forms of biopower over living beings: control over the
population, or security, and control over individuals, or discipline. Before describing these two
forms of power an important qualification is necessary, namely, that these two were not entirely
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separable and in fact define one another. Foucault wrote that they form “two poles of
development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations” (1978, p. 139).
Foucault also noted that “mass” and “individual” are not dichotomous, but rather, exist together
within a pandemic technological framework whose purpose is the simultaneous control over the
human species and the individual human body (see Foucault, 2003, pp. 242-243). Discipline, for
example, is applied to the individual, but presumes a multitude of such individuals existing
within a population who are subject to the technology of security. Meanwhile, population creates
an aggregation of individuals existing within some political framework.
This distinction must also be approached cautiously as it cannot be maintained while
engaging in historical investigations. Foucault’s theoretical distinction is problematized when
empirically examined. Thus, there existed apparatuses, or alliances between the two forms of
biopower. For example, during the 19th century the state’s regulation of a population relied upon
a number of institutions like philanthropic organization and insurance schemes. Similarly in the
18th century the state relied upon police technology, which existed both as a disciplinary
institution and as the state’s means for monitoring and regulating the population. The powers
were, at times, exercised simultaneously. Another example is the “apparatus of sexuality,” which
was important for the maintenance of a population and simultaneously for the regulation of
individual bodily behavior. Thus, the apparatus of sexuality stood “at the pivot of the two axes,”
the individual and the population (Foucault, 1978, p. 145). Sexuality had been “the theme of
political operations, economic interventions . . . and ideological campaigns for raising standards
of morality and responsibility: it was put forward as the index of a society’s strength, revealing
of both its political energy its biological vigor” (Foucault, 1978, p. 146). Simultaneously, it
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operated as a “stamp of individuality” always at work “behind” and “underneath” outward
behavior (Foucault, 1978, p. 146).
Foucault described “two transcriptions” that occurred during the 19th century. The first
was the “openly biological transcription” of race war (2003, p. 60). This transcription drew upon
perceived knowledge of biology while framing conflicts as evolutionary “struggles for
existence.” In the second transcription race war was examined dialectically as a class conflict. As
a result the revolutionary discourses substituted social class for politically constructed
understandings of race (Foucault, 2003, pp. 61, 78-80). Foucault argued that the resulting version
of racism was of “vital importance” because it generated the validity of killing in the presence of
the newly emergent biopower (2003, p. 256).
First, with respect to security as biopolitics, control over the population, emerged in the
later part of the 18th century (Foucault, 1978, p. 139). This biopolitical technology was directed
at that the social body and the life processes that affected it. The accumulation and distribution of
wealth, birth and death rates, incidences of disease and the promotion of health came under the
control of “technology of security” (Foucault, 2003, p. 249). This entailed instruments that
sought “to establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals but by achieving an overall
equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers” (Foucault, 2003, p.
249). The purpose was to offset the inherent and unpreventable risks associated with a
population necessarily comprised of biological beings.
The technology associated with population was differentiated from the other, and prior,
disciplinary power over the individual as a living body (Foucault, 1978, p. 139). This “anatomopolitics” regarding the human body had already begun in the 17th century and viewed the body as
a biological machine (Foucault, 1978, p. 139). Disciplinary power in this context aimed for the
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optimization of economic outputs and simultaneous acquiescence of the political subject.
Discipline, then, was the combination of the economic and the political. Foucault described the
historical moment in which discipline was created as “the moment when an art of the human
body was born, which directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its
subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient
as it becomes more useful, and conversely” (1977, pp. 137-138). Once developed as a
technology, discipline could fill the role left vacant by the decline of pre-modern means of
control, serfdom, for example.
For Foucault, biopolitics was characteristic of modernity. It was only when life entered
into political strategy with the emergence of biopolitics and the “incorporation” of power that
society reached the “threshold of modernity” (Foucault, 1978, p. 143; 1980b, p. 125). Foucault
analyzed the processes by which life emerged as a central and organizing principle of politics.
This development was a radical break from the politics that preceded it. However, biopolitics
was not merely added to existing political modes of power and content. Instead, it altered the
very heart of politics by permitting new forms of sovereignty and knowledge. The change was
fundamental:
For the first time in history . . . biological existence was reflected in political existence . .
. . But what might be called society’s “threshold of modernity” has been reached when
the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man
remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a
political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a
living being in question (Foucault, 1980b, pp. 142-143).
Thus, biopolitics represented a characteristically modern mode of exercising political power.
Foucault differentiated between the two forms of biopower on the basis of their dates of
emergence, instrumentalities, and purposes. They were also differentiated by their positions with
respect to institutions. Security could be seen at the state level and was applied across the
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entirety of the population, as it existed independent of any individual institution. This biopower
was concentrated as the state centralized and took on the power to regulate the entirety of its
population. This centralization and regulation were dependent upon the ability to measure and
account for resources and the ability to collect and make sense of demographic data describing
the population. On the other hand, the development of discipline occurred within individual
institutions. For example, discipline could be found within schools, hospitals, asylums,
militaries, and prisons. Discipline could come in a variety of forms, Foucault’s most noted
example being the panopticon. Thus, within biopower Foucault identified two series: “the
population-biological process-regulatory mechanisms-State” related to population and security,
and “the body-organism-discipline-institution series” of disciplinary control (Foucault, 2003, p.
250).
As biopolitics, and biopower, replaced traditional forms of power the formation of norms
became important. Normalizing society emerged, replacing natural law as the ordering principle
of society:
It is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of
distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Such a power has to qualify,
measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendor; it
does not have to draw the line that separates the enemy of the sovereign from his loyal
subjects. It effects distributions around the norm (Foucault, 1978, p. 144).
Rights were replaced by norms. In this instance, the absolute right of the sovereign was replaced
by the new methods for comparing, measuring, and calculating life.
Foucault was not arguing that the sovereign “power over death” vanished entirely, rather
that it was subjected to a new power aimed at regulating and managing life. The issue was now
the survival of a living population and not the existence of a sovereign. In this way the power
over death was unconstrained in that it was intended to protect and serve life all along. However,
as biopolitics brought efforts to manage, preserve, and secure life it also brought frighteningly
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efficient means of destroying life, as there emerged a “death-function in the economy of
biopower” (Foucault, 2003, p. 258). Foucault wrote:
Wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and . . . never
before did the regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations . . . . Entire
populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life
necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies
and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so
many men to be killed (Foucault, 1978, pp. 136-137).
Foucault ascribed the rise of modern racism to this development.
Racism
Foucault undertook a genealogy of modern racism. His account is undoubtedly lacking in
some respects. For example, he does not address the role colonialism played in racist
discourses.55 His analysis began in his 1976 lectures when the emphasis of biopolitics shifted.
The “break between what must live and what must die” was now a central component of
biopolitics (Foucault, 2003, p. 254). Sovereign power had been organized and exercised through
a political-military discourse. This discourse had emerged to “challenge royal power” by the 17th
century (Foucault, 2003, p. 58). This powerful discourse was present in England’s Puritan revolts
and in the French aristocrats’ antagonism toward Louis XIV. Race was present in these
resistances but represented political, historically based divisions within society and was not yet
linked to biological traits. At this time groups were distinguished from one another on the basis
of non-biological characteristics, such as religion, language, or geographical origin. These
challenges to power generated questions surrounding the purported universality of laws and the
legitimacy of the sovereign. In Foucault’s account discourse on race emerged in efforts to resist
the pressures of existing societal power transformed into the imperative to protect society from
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Both Stoler (1995) and Forti (2006) provided critical accounts of Foucault’s work on racism.
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living dangers. In this way “[r]acism is, quite literally, revolutionary discourse in an inverted
form” (Foucault, 2003, p. 80).
Foucault’s conception of biopower up to this point had been oriented toward the
management and preservation of life and racism moved the concept in a new direction. “How
can a power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its
duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings” (Foucault,
2003, p. 254)? The answer was that “at this point racism intervenes” (Foucault, 2003, p. 254).
Racism served two primary ends in Foucault’s account. First, it divided society along newly
defined biological lines. The purpose was “to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological
continuum” (Foucault, 2003, p. 255). Previous conceptions of race had viewed society as
consisting of two distinct races, but during the 19th century this gave way to a society viewed as
“biologically monist” (Foucault, 2003, p. 80). Racism’s new divisions overturned this monistic
conception.
However, rather than perceiving an external threat, racism created an internal threat. The
outcome was a “racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements, and its
own products. This is the internal racism of permanent purification, and it will become one of the
basic dimensions of social normalization” (Foucault, 2003, p. 62). Once dividing lines were
placed within society they could be viewed as the lines “between what must live and what must
die” (Foucault, 2003, p. 254). This meant that one side of the line was more valuable than the
other. It also meant that some races were superior to others and should be accorded superior
positions. Foucault employed an unusual notion of death, which included “indirect murder.” This
included killing politically and socially, rather than strictly biologically. For example, killing
politically and socially could mean “exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for
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some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on” (Foucault, 2003,
p. 256).
In addition, racism served a second purpose that went beyond merely drawing a line
between life and death. Racism created a dynamic relationship between those on either side of
the line by “the establishment of a positive relation of this type: ‘The more you kill, the more
deaths you will cause’ or ‘The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more”
(Foucault, 2003, p. 255). This system meant that the continued life of one demanded the death of
another. The already established line determined which were worth of living and which must pay
for that life by forfeiting their own. Murder, disappearances, and exclusions secured the lives of
another group. This went beyond mere life, but ensured the health of life as well. Foucault wrote
that “the fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death
guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the
degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier” (2003, p. 255).
The protection and achievement of racial purity required massive endeavors of
identification, exclusion, and when necessary physical violence. It required a centralized state
with the resources to execute this racist vision. The state at the end of the 19th century was
willing and able to do so. Foucault argued that at this point “state racism” was the guiding
rationality for action (2003, p. 261). Once the state adopted this rationality it “is no longer an
instrument that one race uses against another: the state is and must be, the protector of the
integrity, the superiority of the purity of the race. The idea of racial purity, with all its monistic,
Statist, and biological implications: that is born at the point when the theme of racial purity
replaces that of race struggle” (Foucault, 2003, p. 81). The state had become a weapon that could
only be wielded by one group and which had constructed for itself pressing and legitimate needs
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for its use. Thus, racism was “inscribed as the basic mechanism of power, as it is exercised in
modern states” (Foucault, 2003, p. 254).
Foucault provided examples of two concrete developments in this vein. One was the
Soviet Union which carried out policing along medical lines, identifying as sick, any who
opposed the ruling ideology. This allowed Soviet society to achieve purity by cleansing itself of
impure, unhealthy ideology (Foucault, 2003, pp. 82-83). The second example was Nazi
Germany, which had employed the logic of race war both internally and externally. Germany
simultaneously engaged in combat with enemies from outside its ever expanding borders as well
as those lurking within. This “implied both the systematic genocide of others and the risk of
exposing oneself to a total sacrifice” It was driven by the desire for the privileges justly deserved
by “superior blood” (Foucault, 1978, p. 150).
With respect to the deadly side of biopolitics the work of Roberto Esposito has been both
interesting and important (2008). He provided an account of political thought since Hobbes,
arguing that important concepts, such as security, freedom, and property, can be viewed as
falling within a “paradigm of immunization” (Esposito, 2008, p. 45). Immunity initially
preserved life, but eventually shifted into a self-destructive mode. The life processes are reduced
to simple biology, and this “immunitary logic” eventually leads to the destruction of life
(Esposito, 2008, p. 56). Esposito’s paradigm included the life preserving and life destroying
aspects of biopolitics as two components of the same concept. Extermination policies were
extreme forms of immunization efforts. This was a politics of life, but also a horrific politics of
death, or thanatopolitics (Esposito, 2008, Ch. 4). Achille Mbembe, similarly, argued that
“necropolitics” the power over death, the power to decide who lives and who dies, represented a
crucial aspect of the modern age (Mbembe, 2003).

	
  

216
Biopolitics of Liberalism and Resistance
As biopower was expanded, resistance to it naturally grew as an inevitable expression of
freedom. Biopolitical control over life created counterclaims upon the power structure. Foucault
wrote:
Against this power . . . the forces that resisted relied for support on the very thing it
invested, that is, on life and man as a living being . . . . What was demanded and what
served as an objective was life, understood as the basic needs, man’s concrete essence,
the realization of his potential, a plentitude of the possible. Whether it was Utopia that
was wanted is of little importance; what we have seen has been a very real process of
struggle; life as apolitical struggle was in a sense taken at face value and turned back
against the system that was bent on controlling it (1978, pp. 144-145).
As control over life increased, it became an impetus for and the subject of new social and
political skirmishes. Biopower was exercised through disciplining individual bodies as biological
entities and managing the population in various ways. This new power gave rise to the demand
for new rights within the newly controlled areas. Right to life, to health, and to bodily
sovereignty and integrity were now claimed.
Foucault argued that biopolitical struggles had certainly been important since the 1960s
and perhaps as early as post-World War II. Biopolitical struggles arose as opposition to
subjectivation, joining longer standing struggles against older forms of domination (Foucault,
2000d, pp. 331-332). Struggles of this sort represented a “developing crisis in government”
(Foucault, 2000b, p. 295). They were unique in the fact that they represented an opposition to
“government of individualization” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 330). They disputed the legitimacy of
normalizing rules governing the body, ways of life, and sexual relationships. These now
questioned normalizing influences began losing their power. These struggles can be seen in
conflicts over the valid definitions of mental and physical health and disease, sexual relations,
personal relationships, basic needs, as well as various movements from women’s rights to
environmentalism.
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Roberto Esposito is again useful as he offered a biopolitical countermeasure to his
thanatopolitics. Consistent with Foucault and Agamben, who is discussed below, Esposito
considered totalitarian governments and democratic governments as existing on the same
continuum. However, Esposito offered an “affirmative biopolitics” of individual and collective
bodies capable of defending themselves by opposing immunitary rationality. Thus, this
biopolitics was “capable of overturning the Nazi politics of death in a politics that is no longer
over life but of life” (Esposito, 2008, p. 11). Perhaps the biopolitical struggles that Foucault
pointed to are examples of just such a defensive reflex.
Biopolitics in Contrast and Development
Foucault’s conception of biopolitics shares certain features with the thought of Hannah
Arendt. Although the two thinkers did not reference one another, general connections between
their thought have been noted (A. Allen, 2002; N. Gordon, 2002), and connections between their
thought on biopolitics, though Arendt did not emphasis that term, have been found (Blencowe,
2010; Braun, 2007). Braun argued that their projects were similar in that they both sought to
“unearth the roots,” of totalitarianism and atrocities, which both located within modernity (2007,
p. 8). Braun connected the thought of Arendt and Foucault at several points with respect to the
biopolitical, each of which were themselves connected to totalitarianism.
First, was the “zoefication of humans,” the control over and concern for bare existence
(Braun, 2007, p. 8). Foucault expressed this as biopolitical control over life and the preservation
of life, while Arendt expressed it as the priority of labor and the transformation of politics into
housekeeping. As Braun wrote:
Thus, while Foucault stresses that life is a resource which gets mobilized, Arendt points
out that life is constantly (re)produced. Both, however, state that individual life functions
as a force that feeds into the dynamic of a larger process, be it as a resource or as a
product, and that the newly emerging sphere of the social is not least characterized by the

	
  

218
constant consumption of life in order to maintain the dynamic of this process. They both,
I argue, make the diagnosis . . . that the rise of the social implies a certain degradation of
individual lives to mere means of sustaining and feeding the economy (2007, p. 9).
In both, the continuation of society and its economic processes had become the most important
good.
Second, Braun connected Foucault and Arendt at the point of politics, through
biopolitics, being reduced to administration and the administration of life (2007, p. 10).
Biopolitics, for Foucault, entailed the monitoring, development, and application of the
population as a resource. This was “a specifically technocratic understanding of politics in
modernity: politics is mainly the set of technologies required to achieve certain ends such as the
increase of the welfare and productivity of the population” (Braun, 2007, p. 10). Arendt also saw
modern politics as managing life and administering its necessities and government as a
housekeeper. Arendt lamented the loss of politics as an end in itself that this entailed, while
Foucault lacked this normative lament.
With respect to biopolitics, as with many aspects of Foucault’s thought, the post-Foucault
developments are as important as the work actually conducted during his lifetime. I will address
several strands of thought conceptually building upon Foucault’s biopolitics. Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri’s incorporation of capitalism represents the first strand. The second strand can be
found in Giorgio Agamben’s concept and expansion of the bare life. Third, I provide a brief
overview of the position of Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller who take a different position, arguing
that biopolitics represents a retreat, rather than an expansion of politics.
For Hardt and Negri biopolitics meant more than physical control over life and death, and
was characterized by the vanishing of previously existing borders between production and
reproduction or economics and politics. In one of their coauthored works, Empire (Hardt &
Negri, 2000), they described a newly emergent world order characterized by the intermeshing of
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the legal-political realm and economic structures. Empire represents both a form of world
domination and “a new form of sovereignty” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xi). As a part of this
change, the authority of the individual nation-state has declined in importance, overshadowed by
supranational organizations, like the European Union, and nongovernmental organizations.
Simultaneously, Hardt and Negri noted a shift away from constitutionally guaranteed freedom
toward policies conforming to Foucault’s logic of police. The new sovereignty that they identify
did not have an outside or a center and operated as interlocking politically decisive units that
construct a systematically and logically different form of rule (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 186190). Economically, Empire means an integrated global capitalist system the impacts of which
can be seen in bodies and minds, as well as markets.
Hardt and Negri saw an important change take place in the 1970s, as industrial capitalism
was replace by “cognitive capitalism” (Negri, 2008, p. 64). Capitalism was socialized into life
and thought like never before. Cognitive capitalism was identified by the transformation it
created in the working individuals through its informatized, automated, networked, and
globalized production. These transformations of the productive process blurred the distinctions
between physical and intellectual labor as well as between individual and collective labor leading
to the emergence of “immaterial labor.” Immaterial labor could be identified by three features:
The first is involved in an industrial production that has been informationalized and has
incorporated communication technologies in way that transforms the production process
itself . . . Second is the immaterial labor of analytical and symbolic tasks. Finally, a third
type of immaterial labor involves the production and manipulation of affect and requires
(virtual or actual) human contact (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 293).
Capitalist exploitation now operated differently, by incorporating the intellectual, affective, and
cooperative aspects of work. All the powers of groups and individuals and all spheres of life
could now be harnessed to create surplus value. “There is nothing, no ‘naked life,’ no external
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standpoint, that can be posed outside this field permeated by money; nothing escapes money”
(Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 32).
Building upon Foucault, Hardt and Negri described biopower as “the real subsumption of
society under capital” (2000, p. 255). They claimed that the process of wealth generation “tends
ever more toward what we will call biopolitical production, the production of social life itself, in
which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another”
(Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xiii). They attributed to Foucault a “structural epistemology” which led
to his holding too static a conception of biopolitics (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 28). Foucault’s
work was too concerned with the top-down processes of biopolitics, while Hardt and Negri
desired a dynamic account of empire. As a corrective, Hardt and Negri combined their notion of
universally present biopower with Deleuze’s (1995) work on control societies. Hardt and Negri
followed Deleuze’s position of dispersed and omnipresent control. Biopolitics was applied to life
within society while also being applied to the private details of individuals’ lives. They described
biopolitics as “control that extends throughout the depths of the consciousness and bodies of the
population – and at the same time across the entirety of social relations” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p.
24).
Further differentiating their work from Foucault, Hardt and Negri drew a finer distinction
between biopolitics and biopower. “Biopower stands above society, transcendent, as a sovereign
authority and imposes its order. Biopolitical production, in contrast, is immanent to society and
creates social relations and forms through collaborative forms of labor” (Hardt & Negri, 2004,
pp. 94-95). Biopolitical production contained two components of capitalist socialization. They
described the disappearance of two boundaries. For Hardt and Negri, these dual disappearances
signaled the move from the modern to the postmodern era. First, they described both the
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disappearance of the boundaries between economics and politics, and how the absence of that
boundary was characteristic of the new capitalism. Life was now determinative of production,
rather than the creation of life being limited to the sphere of reproduction, and as such
subordinated to labor processes. As a result, the line between production and reproduction
vanished, similar to the line between economics and politics. Biopower came to represent a
crucial part of production, while it had previously represented the reproduction and assurance of
the continuation of the relationships necessary for production. Empire, then, was a “regime of
biopower” wherein the political constitution ordering and regulating the political body merged
with economic production (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 41). As a result, the previously distinct
economic and political realms came to share practices and modes of thought. As Hardt and Negri
put it, “[p]roduction becomes indistinguishable from reproduction; productive forces merge with
relations of production; constant capital tends to be constituted and represented within variable
capital, in the brains, bodies, and cooperation of productive subjects. Social subjects are at the
same time producers and products of this unitary machine” (2000, p. 385; see Hardt & Negri,
2004, pp. 334-335).
Second, biopolitical production entailed a “civilization of nature” (Hardt & Negri, 2000,
p. 187). This meant there was a new type of relationship between nature, as anything previously
outside of the production process and culture. Nature “has become capital, or at least has become
subject to capital,” and meanwhile, life became an object ripe for the intervention of capitalist
technology (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 32). Natural process were now subjected to commercial
interests and used as productive inputs, and biology became an object of political and legal
regulation. “Previous stages of the industrial revolution introduced machine-made consumer
goods and then machine-made machines, but now we find ourselves confronted with machine-
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made raw materials and foodstuffs – in short, machine-made nature and machine-made culture”
(Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 272). Nature was incorporated into economic discourse and action
oriented toward it aimed to translate it into a source of profit.
In Hardt and Negri’s work, the postmodern age, an age with no line of demarcation
between culture and nature or politics and economics, offered no external point of reference that
would allow truth or life to oppose their conception of empire. Empire created a world that it
could come to dominate: “Biopower is a form of power that regulates social life from its interior,
following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it. Power can achieve an effective
command over the entire life of the population only when it becomes an integral, vital function
that every individual embraces and reactivates of his or her own accord” (Hardt & Negri, 2000,
pp. 23-24). Empire then was an “autopoietic machine” capable of creating and using nature, of
generating subjects and ruling their lives, and of creating its own justifications and rationalities.
Within this reality it was no longer possible to demarcate what empire had meshed together.
The other influential strand of post-Foucault biopolitics was represented, and heavily
influenced, by Giorgio Agamben, who, for example, claimed the existence of an “inner solidarity
between democracy and totalitarianism” and viewed the concentration camp as the key
“biopolitical paradigm of the west” (Agamben, 1998, pp. 10, 181). An important difference
between the thought of Foucault and that of Agamben was their view of the interruptive nature of
biopolitics. Foucault, as previously mentioned, saw the emergence of biopolitics in the 17th and
18th centuries as a radical break with the preceding traditions. By contrast, Agamben viewed
history as a coherent tradition from the Greeks, to Nazi concentration camps, to contemporary
politics. In essence, for Agamben, sovereign power presumed biopower, and its exercise may
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represent a radicalization of power, but a radicalization that had been inherent throughout
Western history.
Agamben considered not just Foucault but a number of others, including Arendt and was
particularly influenced by her The Origins of Totalitarianism (Arendt, 1966). Agamben argued
that the distinction between bios (political life) and zoe (bare life) had been present since ancient
Greece. This distinction was between political life and bare life was demarcated by the
protection of the laws of the polis: “[t]he original juridico-political relationship is the ban”
(Agamben, 1998, p. 181). The distinction was between being a person exposed to whatever
dangers may come and a person protected with the full legal weight of the political entity.
Agamben illustrated his thesis by using homo sacer, a conceptual individual he locates in Roman
law. Homo sacer could be killed without punishment by virtue of his existence outside of the
political realm. The bare life could be negated, with or without cause, as a function of sovereign
power. The existence and designation of a class of such people was coherent with the tradition
exemplified by Roman exiles and Nazi concentration camp victims. Agamben provided modern
examples: asylum seekers, refugees, or the brain dead, perhaps a case could be made for
undocumented immigrants. The defining feature of modern homo sacer was their exclusion from
politics: they existed in a bare sense, as a biological mass, yet not as political individuals
(Agamben, 1998).
Agamben argued that the concentration camp was “the hidden matrix of the politics in
which we still live” (Agamben, 2000, p. 44). This indicated the aforementioned “inner solidarity
between democracy and totalitarianism” and the connection between the development of human
rights and the denial of those rights (Agamben, 1998, p. 10). He went on to describe the
concentration camp as the “hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity” (Agamben,
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1998, p. 123). Agamben did not intend to ignore the drastic differences between the
concentration camp and all other contemporary life, nor did he intend to downplay the horror
associated with such distinct places. Rather, Agamben had in mind the commonalities between
those places where the bare life was produced and institutionalized. He wrote that “the camp is
the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule” (Agamben, 1998,
pp. 168-169). This could be the concentration camp, the refugee camp, stateless asylum seekers,
or the undocumented immigrant detention or deportation center.
The important biopolitical shift occurs when the previously peripheral bare life becomes
central to political existence. The exceptions at the edges of politics become incorporated into
political strategies as they become rules creating a “zone of irreducible indistinction” (Agamben,
1998, p. 9). Following this, Agamben wrote of two biopolitical faces, “[t]he spaces, the liberties,
and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central powers always simultaneously
prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order, thus
offering a new and more dreadful foundation for the very sovereign power from which they
wanted to liberate themselves” (Agamben, 1998, p. 121). Though the bare life was present, even
foundational, to various forms of government, those forms, democracy and totalitarianism or
dictatorship, are distinguishable from one another. The point was that they shared foundations
and notions of biopolitical sovereignty that were already historically present and manifested
differently in different periods, though these notions were radicalized and contextualized
differently. While the Nazi camp is an exception, Agamben sought to identify regularity and
normalization of its tendencies to demonstrate that the bare life had become inextricably tied to
political rationality because the existence and prolongation of life were increasingly tied to
politics (Agamben, 2000, pp. 37-45).
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Agamben argued that biopolitics had become even more radicalized and integrated into
political normality since the decline of Nazism and Stalinism. It had “passed beyond a new
threshold” (Agamben, 1998, p. 165). Nazi biopolitics targeted finite identifiable populations, but
“in our age all citizens can be said, in a specific but extremely real sense, to appear virtually as
homines sacri” (Agamben, 1998, p. 111). Thus, “in modern democracies it is possible to state in
public what Nazi biopoliticians did not dare to say” (Agamben, 1998, p. 165). The bare life was
no longer applicable to externally identifiable individuals, but rather has become internalized and
universalized,
Every society sets this limit; every society — even the most modern — decides who its
“sacred men” will be. It is even possible that this limit, on which the politicization and
the exception of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing
but extend itself in the history of the West and has now -in the new biopolitical horizon
of states with national sovereignty – moved inside every human life and every citizen.
Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells
in the biological body of every living being (Agamben, 1998, pp. 139-140).
Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller (1994) interpreted biopolitics as the retreat of political
science. They drew upon Foucault’s concepts and definitions related to biopower. There was,
however, an important difference between them. They viewed the ever-increasing social
importance of the body and life as political regression. They drew a sharp line between this
biopolitical situation and “traditional modern politics” (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 38; see Heller,
1996). Biopolitics, for them, was an antipolitical form. While Foucault viewed biopolitics as a
characteristic of modernity, Fehér and Heller, by contrast, saw it as a break from modernity.
They located biopolitics in their theory of modernity and postmodernity by examining the
American discourse surrounding race, gender, and the environment during the 1990s. Biopolitics
was a “politics of the body,” and was of growing significance (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 17;
Heller, 1996, p. 3).
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For example, within the contexts they investigated, Fehér and Heller considered the
discourse, politics, and changes concerning everything from race to health. Similar to authors
previously discussed, Fehér and Heller linked contemporary biopolitics, which is integrated into
democratic processes, to Nazism, which they called “an early experiment with biopolitics”
(Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 21). Thus, what they found concerned them. They feared the
“totalitarian venom” that permeated biopolitical issues (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 27). They
argued that the biopolitical tradition found an “intellectual mentor” in the French thought of the
postwar period, which emphasized “difference,” was skeptical toward universals, and prioritized
the aesthetic over the ethical (Fehér & Heller, 1994, pp. 51-57). The new biopolitics emerged
during the 1980s, as in the face of potential nuclear annihilation life and security was valued
above freedom (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 22). This valuation represented the fundamental
characteristic of the biopolitical, the prioritization of life, and its security, over the form of life or
freedom. The biopolitical was the moment at which “in the name of the integrity of The Body –
freedom is sacrificed” (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 104). The American security state post-9/11
could be offered as an example as fear of Soviet nukes has been replaced by fear of terrorist
attacks that could occur anywhere at any time.
From Biopolitics to Governmentality
Biopolitics was an important component of Foucault’s thought and it has remained useful
as an analytical framework. Foucault addressed the notions of biopower and biopolitics in works
like History of Sexuality (1978) and Society Must be Defended (2003). Foucault’s lectures on
neoliberalism began with biopolitics as an indispensible frame of reference. However, once the
topic of governmentality arose it moved to the forefront, displacing biopolitics (Bröckling,
Krasmann, & Lemke, 2011, p. 7; Elden, 2006, p. 32; Golder, 2007, p. 160). Foucault was
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cognizant of this shift and believed that the ability to adequately address biopolitics depended
upon an understanding of the regimes in which biopolitics occurred (Foucault, 2008, p. 317). If
Foucault’s plan was to address the background of liberal and neoliberal regimes and then return
to biopolitics, he never completed the project, as his lectures remained focused on the subject of
governmentality.
One approach has employed biopolitical concepts to make sense of governmentality
studies. This approach examined the politics of life as capable of existing in multiple forms,
constellations, and apparatuses (Fassin, 2011; Rainblow & Rose, 2006; Rose, 2007). Another
approach has treated biopolitics as a constant component of governmentality. Biopolitics in this
sense serves as a broad category into which virtually all exercises of power can be placed
(Agamben, 1998). The first approach may be seen as responsible for a rebirth of biopolitics as a
semi-independent topic of study. The second approach has kept biopolitics relevant all along,
although it has done so by generalizing it and connecting it to the broad concept of
governmentality.
4.4 Genealogy of Governmentality
Governmentality dealt with the “conduct of conducts” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 341; 2008, p.
186). This entailed the idea that the state was not the sole source of power. Rather than merely
emanating from a single monolithic, centralized source, power was exerted from a wide variety
of sources. Individuals attempted to regulate their own conduct and the conduct of others.
Governance could come from the family or the workplace, for example. The concern was with
specific contexts and how conduct was governed within them. Governmentality, however, did
not address all contexts in which power could occur (Foucault, 2009, p. 116). Its aim was to
understand the space located between the extreme ends of a spectrum represented by “strategic
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relations” and “states of domination.” The concept was not intended to address those common
“strategic games between liberties” that occur in all types of communities (Foucault, 1997a, p.
299; Barry Hindess, 1996, pp. 98-113). Governmentality was also not intended to address
extremely rare cases involving absolute domination. The space between those extremes was the
space where the “techniques,” “rationalities,” and “arts” of government occurred. Since
governmentality as a concept did not address states of domination employing it as an analytical
tool presumes that some degree of freedom, some space of resistance was possible for those
being examined (Foucault, 1997a, p. 300). For governmentality to be appropriately applied the
possibility of not acting in accordance with the will of power must be present.
Foucault’s clearest and most direct exposition of the concept of governmentality
contained the following three concepts:
1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form
of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political
economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.
2. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West has steadily led
towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type
of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation
of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the
development of a whole complex of savoirs.
3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the
Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, gradually becomes ‘governmentalized’ (Foucault, 1991a, pp. 102-103).
The concept of governmentality was initially born during a series of lectures at the
Collège de France in 1977 and 1978. The lectures were to address the “genealogy of the modern
state” (Foucault, 2009, p. 354). Foucault delivered several lectures consistent with the
preplanned topic only to change course upon commencing the fourth lecture. Valverde wrote
that:
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frustratingly for governmentality scholars, he does not explain why he changed terms. He
simply walks in one day (February 1, 1978) and declares that if he were able to go back
and correct the theme and title of that year’s lectures, he would no longer use the
advertised title, ‘Sécurité, territoire, population,’ but rather ‘Lectures on
Governmentality.’ Then he goes on to talk about techniques of governmentality, with
security quietly receding into the background (2008, p. 29).
The change in topic recast the triangular relationship between security-population-government.
Senellart attributed the shift to Foucault’s interest in power techniques beyond traditional
conceptions of sovereignty, which he had linked to the “art of exercising power in the form of
the economy” or “economic government” (2007, p. 379). Valverde suggested that Foucault
reoriented his lectures on governmentality and biopolitics to move away from a research
program overly directed at authoritarianism toward a broader approach to governmental systems
(Valverde, 2008). Whatever motivated Foucault’s change in direction, that change itself led to a
novel way of viewing government.
Additionally, Foucault’s concept of governmentality provided a fruitful base for
subsequent research. According to Senellart, “[m]aybe more than any other moment in
Foucault’s teaching, this illustrates his taste for the labyrinth into which I can venture, in which I
can move my own dis- course, opening up underground passages, forcing it to go far from itself,
finding overhangs that reduce and deform its itinerary” (2007, p. 380). The ability of subsequent
authors to venture into the labyrinth of governmentality has resulted in a large and continually
growing body of governmentality literature. This should not be surprising given Foucault
tendency to approach topics “as a researcher: explorations for a future book as well as the
opening up of fields of problemization were formulated as an invitation to possible future
researchers” (Ewald & Fontana, 2007, p. xiv).
Foucault’s Governmentality, as the notion of governing one’s self and others, has been
utilized in a variety of ways. Governmentality, generally speaking, has been traced across
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various times, regions, and contexts (Bröckling et al., 2011; Dean, 2010; Donzelot & Gordon,
2008; Münch, 2010; Rose, 1999; Rose, O'Mally, & Valverde, 2006). For example, it has been
employed for the study of the rationales and techniques of criminal justice (O'Malley, 1996b;
Rose & Miller, 1992; Stenson, 1993). One of the most compelling appropriations of
governmentality, and one that is examined in some detail below, is the governmentality of
neoliberalism.
Moving Beyond the Previous Conceptions of Power
In well-known works during 1970’s Foucault was critical of the juridical conception of
power (see Foucault, 1978; Foucault, 1979). The traditional, juridical conception of power
treated power as concentrated and centralized at some hub, a government or sovereign for
example. Foucault had been using “Nietzsche’s hypothesis” against the juridical concept, he had
been viewing power from above (Foucault, 2003, pp. 14-19). Power had been approached as a
struggle, a confrontation, or a war (Foucault, 1977, p. 26). Hence, Foucault wrote that the
political theory of power had not yet cut off the king’s head (Foucault, 1978, p. 89; 1980b, p.
121). To only conceive of power in terms of the sovereign was the mistake of understanding
power only in terms of a specific historical, and now outdated, manifestation. The means of
exercising power is always transitory and adherence to a sovereign centered concept was
“[u]tterly incongruous with the new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right
but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods
that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus”
(Foucault, 1978, p. 89). The state must now be viewed as “[s]uperstructural in relation to a whole
series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge,
technology, and so forth . . . . [T]his meta-power with its prohibitions can only take hold and
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secure its footing where it is rooted in a whole series of multiple and indefinite power relations
that supply the necessary basis for the great negative forms of power” (Foucault, 1980b, p. 122).
According to Foucault, analyses of modern forms of power required “a political
philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the
problems of law and prohibition” (Foucault, 1980b, p. 121). In essence, the king, or the
theoretical focus on the king, must be removed. This theoretical beheading was only a first step
and once it has been completed we must answer the following: “How is it possible that his
headless body often behaves as if it indeed had a head” or more mundanely “how are a macrosocial order, and macro forms of domination, constructed out of the diversity of micropowers”
(Dean, 1994, p. 156)? This beheading and providing an answer to how the headless body could
continue to operate was an important component of Foucault’s project.
Responding to that critique Foucault developed an alternative: the “microphysics of
power” (Foucault, 1977, pp. 26-27). Adopting that approach power would be viewed singularly
or generally, but always as “dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings”
(Foucault, 1977, p. 26). Given this understanding of power, Foucault viewed the investigator’s
role as one of mapping, differentiating, and understanding the different arrangements of power
(Jessop, 2006). Though microphysics was oriented toward powers in specific settings and
relationships, families, workplaces, prisons, it did not claim that large-scale patterns did not
exist. Rather the microphysics of power indicated that larger patterns were provisional
constellations of overlapping micro powers. “Major dominations are the hegemonic effects that
are sustained by all these confrontations” (Foucault, 1978, p. 94). Major power systems at the
international or national levels were potentially in a constant state of flux or could vary by
context.
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There were several weaknesses in the microphysics of power that led Foucault to the
notion of governmentality (Bröckling et al., 2011). First, the Nietzschean influence of describing
all power relations in terms of war metaphors, as Foucault did in Discipline and Punish and his
lectures on sovereignty, biopolitics, and race was limiting (Foucault, 1977, 2003). The move to
governmentality was intended to address these limitations (Bröckling et al., 2011, pp. 1-2).
Walters speculated that the prior approach had left too little room for subjects possessing at least
some degree of freedom (Walters, 2012, p. 15). Foucault’s new approach remedied this by
finding “recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom” within power relationships
(Foucault, 2000d, p. 342). With a new way to account for the freedom of subjects Foucault could
examine the way the strategies of government interacted with individual strategies, the concept
he called the “conduct of conducts” (Foucault, 1997g, p. 225). The “technologies of the self”
could be considered and linked to the techniques of government (Foucault, 1997f). This was
crucial since governments had recourse to “processes by which the individual acts upon himself”
(Foucault, 1993, p. 203). The new approach allowed Foucault to leave behind inadequate
metaphors and formulate a “necessary critique of the common conceptions of ‘power’”
(Foucault, 1997e, p. 88).
Marxist critics seized upon the second problem with the microphysics of power. In
essence the critique was that Foucault had been overly concerned with the diffusive nature of
power and as a result was unable to provide an adequate account of the state as an institution of
power (Golder, 2007; Poulantzas, 1978, p. 44). Generally stated, Foucault’s framework could not
deal with large-scale manifestations of power. Several commentators noted that Foucault had
already attempted to address this criticism (C. Gordon, 1991, pp. 4-5; Walters, 2012, pp. 15-16).
For example, Foucault’s treatment of biopolitics in Society Must be Defended took the topic of
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discipline, as had been addressed in previous works, and applied it on a massive scale (Foucault,
1977, 2003). Discipline was now applied to population, “a global mass that is affected by overall
processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on” (Foucault, 2003, pp. 242243). The state applied power on this scale by using new techniques. Governmentality took
considerations of the state farther than microphysics alone could have.
Some commentators maintain that governmentality described the power structures
characteristic of liberalism (Donzelot, 2008, p. 116; Rainbow, 2003, p. 55). These commentators
seized upon the instances where Foucault used governmentality in contexts related to one
particular “family” of governance, namely, the liberal mode of governance (Rose et al., 2006, p.
97). In those instances Foucault used governmentality to reference the liberal modes that were
first employed in the eighteenth century (Bröckling et al., 2011, p. 7; Foucault, 2009, pp. 108110). While understanding that liberal governance was an important component of
governmentality, especially for contemporary scholars of liberalism, it was not the entirety of the
concept. Foucault assigned the term governmentality a “very broad meaning” (Foucault, 2000d,
p. 341). Recognizing this, others have argued that Foucault used governmentality in a number of
contexts some general and some specifically applied to liberalism, among other things
(Bröckling et al., 2011; Dean, 2010; C. Gordon, 1991; Barry Hindess, 1996; Walters, 2012).
While some of Foucault’s successors have applied governmentality to a vast array of
power structures, Foucault himself limited the concept and used it only when examining the
governance affiliated with the state. In the lectures where Foucault most explicitly addressed
governmentality he made clear his intention to employ it as a new approach to the study of the
state (Foucault, 2008, pp. 2-3, 76-78; 2009, p. 120). Foucault conceived the concept as a
historian, his “data” consisting of the “archive” of texts comprised of historical and philosophical
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pieces addressing how conduct could best be governed (Scheurich & Mckenzie, 2005, p. 841).
Governmentality could be understood as the “genealogy of the modern state” rather than a theory
of the state (Foucault, 2009, p. 354). It was the way the modern state developed, tested, and
refined the arts and techniques it employed to govern conduct. It was the conditions and contexts
that made the modern state as a mode of governance possible. It was a window into the state as a
source of governance over individuals.
Foucault had previously described his method as the archaeology on knowledge, which
excavates the rules that exist beneath the logic and language and operate at a subconscious level,
thereby influencing systems of thought (Foucault, 1972). The critical contribution of archaeology
was that it allowed the investigator to proceed without relying on conscious individual subjects.
Foucault explicitly employed this method in several works, such as The Order of Things: An
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (1970) and The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of
Medical Perception (1973). Archaeology was limited to understanding the practices of an era or
context or comparing eras or contexts, but lacked the ability to explain changes in systems of
knowledge or ways of thinking. For example, in Foucault’s History of Madness (2006a)
archaeology allowed him to explain the different systems of knowledge related to madness
during from the 17th to 19th century, but archaeology alone could not excavate the causes of
changes in those systems.
Eventually, Foucault added the genealogical method, which appeared for the first time in
Discipline and Punish (1977), to his analyses. This was intended to supplement archaeology and
offset that method’s shortfall. In utilizing genealogy Foucault had borrowed an analytical tool
from Nietzsche (Foucault, 1998). Genealogy as a method could explain the changes from one
system of thought to another. As with Nietzsche’s genealogical investigation into the
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development of morals, Foucault would explain the transitions between systems of thought as
mundane and historically contingent, rather than as part of any rational historical progression.
Thus, with morality for Nietzsche or Madness, or more pertinent here Governmentality, for
Foucault, systems of thought and perceptions of knowledge changed in an aimless manner. Put
another way, there was not progress, of the scientific type, in these areas. Morality merely
changed without necessarily more closely approximating absolute moral truth, the same could be
said with the definition of madness or society’s understanding of it.
Several scholars have noted the importance of conducting studies of governmentality as
genealogy (Bevir, 2010; Bröckling et al., 2011; Dean, 2010; Valverde, 2007; Walters, 2012 Ch.
4). This approach rejected the notion of constancy in power relationships or human society more
generally. Brass wrote that Foucault’s genealogy addressed “moving objects, not the fixed
objects to which we are accustomed in our social science disciplines, defined clearly, related to a
model, a system, an order” (2000, p. 313). Genealogy went beyond merely understanding the
evolution or historical forms of the state. Donzelot described it as a “remarkable method for
challenging the way we think about supposedly universal objects like madness, delinquency,
sexuality and government” (2008, p. 115). Political concepts were given the same treatment
Foucault had previously given individual experiences, like madness.
Donzelot further explicated Foucault’s unique approach, writing that Foucault:
did not set out to show the historical relativity of these objects, or even to deny their
validity, as has often been said, but postulated a priori their non-existence, thus
dismantling all of our certainties concerning them, including that of their pure historicity.
This enabled him to reveal how something which did not exist could come about, how a
set of practices were able to come together to produce a regime of truth with regard to
these objects, a combination of power and knowledge which makes it possible to say, at
least insofar as this regime of truth succeeded in being effective, what was true and false
in matters concerning madness, delinquency, sexuality and government (2008, p. 115).
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Foucault did not abandon the existing conceptual content political science had used to investigate
the state as a theoretical entity (Foucault, 2008, p. 2). Consistent with Donzelot’s description
Foucault’s method did, however, abandon the notion of political concepts as pre-made, universal
constants (Foucault, 2009, p. 118). In the genealogical approach nothing is taken as constant or
given, political concepts are not a stable foundation upon which to build a theory of the state,
instead it recognized that they could change across contexts. Foucault approached each concept
as a “transactional reality” that was not always present and was “born precisely from the
interplay of relations of power and everything which constantly eludes them” (Foucault, 2008, p.
297).
As Paul Veyne wrote, “[o]bjects seem to determine our behavior, but our practice
determines its own objects in the first place. Let us start, then, with that practice itself, so that the
object to which it applies is what it is only in relation to that practice . . . . The relation
determines the object, and only what is determined exists” (1997, p. 155). The key to Foucault’s
genealogy was to examine the processes and contexts that brought objects into being, rather than
simply examining the objects themselves. All things should be understood and studied as effects
rather than as mere objects. In practice, this led to Foucault’s seeing processes as empirical
events, hence the repeated use of emergent events, birth as a titular metaphor for example.56
Foucault emphasized the multi-casual nature of such events as effects. The researcher was
required to analyze “an event according to the multiple processes which constitute it” (Foucault,
1991b, p. 76). Furthermore, the researcher should understand the “full weight of causality” by
not being satisfied with merely necessary conditions and “constructing around the singular event
analyzed a ‘polygon’ or rather a ‘polyhedron’ of intelligibility, the number of whose faces is not
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This emphasis on the empirical is what led Veyne, somewhat oddly, to bestow upon Foucault
the title of “the first completely positivist historian” (1997, p. 147).
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given in advance and can never properly be taken as finite” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 77). Thus, in
theory, genealogy became the empirical process of explaining the historical emergence of
techniques and arts of government explained using “causal multiplication” and “eventalization”
(Foucault, 2009, p. 116).
Foucault aimed to “retrace the history of what could be called the art of government”
(Foucault, 2008, p. 1). The vastness of such a project cannot be overstated. This art was practiced
within all ages and at all times at many different levels. This was why Foucault wrote that the
term government referred to a “thousand and one different modalities and possible ways that
exist for guiding men, directing their conduct, constraining their actions and reactions”
(Foucault, 2008, pp. 1-2). Foucault restricted this impossibly massive project in several ways
rendering it somewhat more realistically achievable. First, Foucault examined only situations
wherein governance was connected with “the exercise of political sovereignty” (Foucault, 2008,
p. 2). This project was concerned with the history of the arts out of which the state had emerged.
As Bröckling noted, “Foucault considers the ‘genesis of political knowledge’ of governing
humans from Ancient Greek and Roman ideas on the subject to early modern reasons of state
and ‘political science’, and onward to relevant liberal and neo-liberal theories” (2011, p. 3).
Second, by virtue of emphasizing the art of government, Foucault approached the state in
a limited way. This approach was distinct from that which might be taken by a traditional
political scientist, historian, or sociologist. Foucault focused on “the level of reflection in the
practice of government and on the practice of government” (Foucault, 2008, p. 2). Stated
differently, Foucault was concerned with “government’s consciousness of itself” (Foucault,
2008, p. 2).57 At times Foucault referenced seemingly superficial structural changes, but it was
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Foucault was not satisfied with this formulation (Foucault, 2008, p. 2).
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always within the context of understanding specific emerging developments in the art of
government. For example, Foucault analyzed some locales as “veritable small, micro-state
laboratories” for the art of government. He described seventeenth century Germany as a group of
small states “situated between feudal structures” with the “imperial idea…hovering over its
territory” to explain why the science of police was particularly well developed in that state
(Foucault, 2009, p. 317).
There was another reason for the expansive nature of governmentality as a concept.
Foucault also paired his genealogy of governmentality with an analysis of the development of
subjectivity. As the state changed the constellation of techniques it used to govern, the life
experiences of its subjects underwent corresponding changes. Foucault’s lectures were,
simultaneously, accounts of these two inexorably related phenomena. The “governmentalization
of the state” was necessarily paired with the “history of the subject” (Foucault, 2009, pp. 109,
184). Thus, the modern art of government concerned itself with:
a sort of complex of men and things. The things government must be concerned about . . .
are men in their relationships, bonds, and complex involvements with things like wealth,
resources, means of subsistence, and, of course, the territory with its borders, borders,
qualities, dryness, fertility, and so on. “Things” are men in their relationships with things
like customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking. Finally, they are men in their
relationships with things like accidents, misfortunes, famine, epidemics, and death
(Foucault, 2009, p. 96).
Every potential human activity, interaction with the world or one another was brought within the
scope of governmental concern. No aspect of life existed outside of the realm of government.
This expansion was, however, not Foucault’s primary concern. He was more interested in the
rationalities and techniques of government. Therefore, Foucault did not focus governmentality
on centralized state structures but rather explored the “tricky combination in the same structures
of individualization techniques and of totalization procedures” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 332).
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Governmentality and Liberalism
While governmentality served purposes beyond providing an understanding of liberalism,
it has proven useful in that endeavor. At times Foucault used governmentality to describe the
liberal mode of governance:
by “governmentality” I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures,
analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow exercise of this very specific,
albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its
major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security for its essential technical
instrument (Foucault, 2009, p. 108).
This liberal approach to the art of government took an economical perspective on governance. In
other words, liberal governance was guided by principles of economic efficiency. The goal of
liberalism was “the art of the least possible government” (Foucault, 2008, p. 28). The aim was to
avoid “governing too much” (Foucault, 2008, p. 17). This “self-limited” nature was a departure
from the prior “unlimited presumption of the police state” as “frugal” governance became the
order of the day (Foucault, 2008, p. 17).
Foucault identified liberalism as growing out of the works of British political economists
as well as French physiocrats and economists in the eighteenth century. It privileged certain
forms of knowledge, those conducive to the new approach to governance. Liberalism elevated
political economy as a field placing high value on its expertise in understanding markets. With
liberalism the market was held in high regard and occupied a privileged position as an
independent and “natural” sphere (Foucault, 2008, p. 31). The market was beyond the reach of
other realms of life, however, it was the standard by which governmental conduct and policy
formulations were judged (Foucault, 2008, pp. 31-32). For example, John Stuart Mill (2002)
formulated a view of individual liberty in terms of economic competition in using the metaphor
of a “marketplace of ideas.”
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Despite liberalism’s preoccupation with frugality, its onset did not necessarily entail an
expansion of freedom. The art of the least possible government did not leave more room for
unsupervised individual action. As Foucault wrote, liberalism is “not a form of governmentality
which would leave more white spaces for freedom” (2008, p. 63). Instead, liberalism adopted a
novel approach, understood as “the management of freedom” (Foucault, 2008, p. 63).
Simultaneously, in liberalism “[f]reedom is something which is constantly produced” (Foucault,
2008, p. 65). Freedom was produced in certain areas, work and market exchange, for example,
while managing to serve state purposes. This mixture was made possible by the “interplay of
freedom and security” (Foucault, 2008, p. 65). The freedom invoked here is something similar to
Jean-Jacques Rouseau’s formulation of citizens “forced to be free.”58 Freedom was constructed
and perceived in a certain, and historically contingent way, this was the only acceptable way of
understanding freedom, any other way of life must by definition lack freedom. This went against
the prevailing view of the American Enlightenment, which sought to carve out some space of
freedom beyond the grasp of governance.
Foucault conceived of security as a specific mode of governance. Security was not used
in the colloquial sense, as an arena of national policy. Nor was security used in the traditional
sense, as a basic need of all men. The meaning of security was conveyed by the example of how
three types of historical governmental regimes dealt with the crime of theft (Foucault, 2009, pp.
4-9). The first approach to theft was simple, theft was forbidden and transgressors were punished
in some physically damaging manner. During the eighteenth century the situation surrounding
theft changed with the second approach. New methods of surveillance were employed to monitor
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For examples of alternative conceptions of freedom see Isaiah Berlin’s classic Two Concepts
of Liberty (1969) and Benjamin Constant’s lesser known The Liberty of Ancients Compared with
That of Moderns (1988).

	
  

241
the occurrence of crime while the punishment was altered by the emergence of the penitentiary.
In addition to the gruesome physical punishments, the state could confine offenders, force them
to work, morally reeducate them, and attempt to redeem them. The third approach emerged most
recently and is the one Foucault associated with security. Larger picture questions were posed to
the system, as crime became a statistical object. This allowed more expansive management of
crime as it was related to a host of other problems and policies. Is it more cost-effective to
tolerate more crime or punish crime more severely? At what rate do offences occur? How are
other demographical statistics related to the crime rate: age, sex, race, employment status? How
does the incident of crime vary by region and penal system? Answering such question was the
form of security that liberal governmentality set as its goal.59
Pastoralization of Power
Foucault began with the intention of exploring the change in political power that occurred
in the eighteenth century. This was the change “from a form of power targeted on a territory to a
form of power bearing on a population” (Donzelot, 2008, p. 117). Foucault delivered three
lectures moving beyond biopower and biopolitics to explain how population is governed by
security, which entailed a different logic. Foucault would eventually return to those points, but
only after a foray into attempting to discover the origins of the ideas and practices associated
with the “government of men” (Donzelot, 2008, p. 120). This led Foucault to formulate the
concept of pastoral power as a prelude to governmentality (Golder, 2007, p. 167).60 Pastoral
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
59
In Emile Durkheim’s (1983) thought it was a movement from organic to mechanical social
solidarity and from repressive to restitutive law.
60

As with several other areas, Foucault did not fully develop his concept of pastoral power. This
may be partially attributed to his untimely death, which left his work on Christianity unfinished.
For example, his fourth volume of The History of Sexuality that was to focus on Christianity was
left incomplete and never published per Foucault’s request.
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power was examined in a genealogical fashion rather than as a standard history. Pastoral power
should not be thought of as emerging, playing its role, and disappearing, allowing new forms of
power to take its place. Walters utilized Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of a rhizome to explain
the analysis of pastoral power (Deleuze, 1995, pp. 3-25; Walters, 2012, p. 24). Rhizomes grow
underground setting up various roots and shoots that emerge in the future, as was the case of the
influence of pastoral power on future power structures.
The new subject took Foucault in a new direction as he looked back toward “the
historical rise of the Christian pastorate as a technology of power” (Golder, 2007, p. 162).
Political theory had been largely concerned with the relationship between the citizen and the
political community, formulated as the city-citizen relationship. Foucault went backwards by
juxtaposing this game with, and tracing its development from, the shepherd-flock relationship
(Foucault, 2000c). Here Foucault adopted a method similar to that used in his Discipline and
Punish. Namely, he explored power that had previously been ignored. In formulating his theory
of governmentality he found the notion of a shepherd controlling his flock more useful than the
traditional notion of a political entity ruling its citizens. Foucault wrote, “[w]hat is it . . . that
characterizes this power of the shepherd, which we can see is foreign to Greek thought, but
present and intense in the Mediterranean East, especially in the Hebrews? . . . The shepherds
power is not exercised over a territory but, by definition, over a flock, and more exactly, over a
multiplicity in movement” (2009, p. 125).
In short, Foucault presented a conception of power that “took its model from the fold”
rather than the “town” (Foucault, 2009, p. 130). He continued, writing that pastoral power:
is a power that guides towards an end and functions as an intermediary towards this end.
It is therefore a power with a purpose for those on whom it is exercised, and not a
purpose for some kind of superior unit like the city, territory, state or sovereign . . .
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Finally, it is a power directed at all and each in their paradoxical equivalence, and not at
the higher unity formed by the whole (Foucault, 2009, p. 129).
The end mentioned was salvation in the Christian model from which Foucault drew his
inspiration. Consider the seemingly odd example of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s “Grand Inquisitor,”
which demonstrates the extent to which pastoral power could be politicized when sufficiently
supported by a dominant administrative hierarchy (2003). Pastoral power, like other forms of
power, was a general category that occurred in differing contexts in the Ancient world. The
Christian model was the most important specific context, the one that became most influential in
terms of replication and influence on future contexts. The early Church integrated notions of
permanent pastoral care and instilled a compulsion for self-examination in its flock. Selfexamination was a unique addition to governance. As Hindess put it, Christianity found a way
“to turn the guidance of conscience into an integral part of a continuous relationship between the
shepherd (or his local representative) and each member of the flock” (1996, pp. 121-122). This
wove together government, even self-government of the individual through reflection and
confession, with the government of the whole. Personally intimate aspects of life, even
completely internalized thoughts or emotions, were now linked to external political rule.
In Foucault’s narrative pastoral power had changed in several important ways by the
sixteenth century. First, the Christian Church splintered under the pressure of the Protestant
Reformation and other “insurrections of conduct” (Foucault, 2009, p. 228). Despite the
seemingly radical nature of such insurrections, they did not seek to do away with pastoral power.
Instead, they were directed toward the specific organizations holding power as new communities
and social movements sprang up. They created splinter sects and new shepherds. The real effect
was the spread of pastoral power which strengthened its control over the “material, temporal,
everyday life of individuals” (Foucault, 2009, p. 229). Second, pastoral power trickled into new
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areas of life and moved beyond its religious constraints. Foucault wrote that pastoral power was
now applied to governing children, families, and the self (Foucault, 2009, p. 230).
Pastoral power eventually exerted pressure upon the secular state, placing the sovereign
in a difficult position. The sovereign was “required to do more than purely and simply exercise
his sovereignty” (Foucault, 2009, p. 236). The expectation arose that sovereigns would not
simply rule but govern individuals.61 Governing individuals and exercising sovereignty made
modern state power unique. Foucault distinguished between “the political form of government”
and the “problematic of government in general” (Foucault, 2009, p. 89). The new concept of
government encompassed nearly all areas of life: raising children, the family, the self, controlling
a private business entity, a community, and also governing the conscience and the soul
(Foucault, 2000d, p. 341). Despite examining a broad field, governmentality was still focused on
explaining a narrower problematic, how the population was controlled by the state and how
individuals came to control themselves on behalf of the state. An investigation into
governmentality could examine how control may be exerted in a specific temporal or geographic
context.
The influence of pastoral power could be seen in various aspects of modernity. It was
located both within and outside of state structures (Barry Hindess, 1996, pp. 122-123). Pastoral
power can be seen in the modern “welfare state problem” which required “the tricky adjustment
between political power wielded over legal subjects and pastoral power wielded over live
individuals” (Foucault, 2000c, p. 307). Pastoralism could also be seen outside the state in
charitable and humanitarian endeavors aimed at offsetting the byproducts of development and
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Foucault acknowledged a number of additional factors, like the collapse of feudalism, that
opened the door for the new form of power (Foucault, 2009, p. 329).
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capitalism, as well as the government and self-government of individuals through counseling
programs (Walters, 2012, p. 24).
Thus, the modern state combined the political power of the ancient Greek polis with the
pastoral Christian goal of guiding the private lives of individuals. Greek politics was focused on
commonalities between people, the universal nature of law and the public space. The Christian
effort aimed to bring what was not common, what was particular to individuals into the public
space. The relatively late-coming religious efforts even targeted the otherworldly souls of
individuals, attempting to lead them to salvation (Foucault, 2000d, pp. 300-311; 2009, pp. 115190). This complex combination even went beyond concern of material fact and physical
occurrence. The new sovereign as pastor must learn the complexities of and pay heed to the
“inner truth” of the subject (Foucault, 2000d, p. 333).
In the modern state, the earlier goal of salvation was secularized and rearticulated within
the framework of state politics. In this context Foucault wrote about the twin tendencies of
totalization and invidualization, which created “a modern matrix of individualization, or a new
form of pastoral power” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 334). A new form of political salvation replaced the
archaic and otherworldly eternal salvation promised by religion. The art of government
attempted to bring about political salvation in virtually all aspects of human affairs, and central
to the art of government’s project was,
a sort of complex of men and things. The things that government must be concerned
about . . . are men in their relationships, bonds, and complex involvements with things
like wealth, resources, means of subsistence, and of course, the territories with its
borders, qualities, climate, dryness, and so on. “Things” are men in their relationships
with things, like customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking. Finally, they are men in
their relationships with things like accidents, misfortunes, famine, epidemics, and death”
(Foucault, 2009, p. 96).
Each entry in this expansive list of “things” about which the state concerned itself could be
interpreted as relating to the security of the population, the modern state’s raison d’état.
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Raison d’État
The combination of government over individuals and the exercise of sovereignty was not
rooted in pastoral power. It came from another important concept in Foucault’s lectures on
governmentality, raison d’état. The concept may be familiar in the sense of national interest
taking precedent over ethical considerations. Foucault moved beyond the common notion of the
concept, seeing it as a critical point of emergence. It marked the emergence of the type of
governance typical of the state, as things were cast in terms of states, their actions, and their
conflicts. Raison d’état marked the merger of the art of governing individuals and politically
governing.
Foucault viewed the work of the great Florentine theorist Niccolò Machiavelli as
influential in the emergence of governmentality. “But far from thinking that Machiavelli opens
up the field of political thought to modernity, I would say that he marks instead the end of an age
. . . .” (Foucault, 2009, p. 65). As was customary for Foucault, he issued an invitation for a future
research program related to The Prince, which he himself never completed, “the history of the
text is interesting; or rather, it would be interesting the relationship between this text and all
those that followed it, criticized it, and rejected it” (2009, p. 89). Even lacking this investigation
Machiavelli played an important role in the formulation of governmentality.62 Foucault was, on
the whole, less concerned with appropriating Machiavelli in a novel way than with tracing the
reception of Machiavelli in political thought. Foucault wrote that Machiavelli “did not define an
art of government, but an art of government will be looked for in what he said” (2009, p. 243).
Machiavelli, then, was not crucial “because of what he said, but insofar as the debate is
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Interpretations and commentaries addressing both Foucault and Machiavelli are plentiful;
however, literature addressing the Foucault’s reading of Machiavelli is relatively sparse although
increasing as of late. For examples, see Curtis (2002), Holden and Elden (2005), Singer and Weir
(2008), Marasco (2012).
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conducted through him” and because of the way The Prince was a “constant point of repulsion”
(Foucault, 2009, p. 243; 289).
Initially, The Prince was not an object of repulsion, but this changed when early antiMachiavellians, like Giovanni Botero and Guillaume de La Perrière, objected to both its amoral
and irreligious nature. Anti-Machiavellian works formed “a positive genre, with its specific
object, concepts and strategy” (Foucault, 2009, p. 91). Machiavellianism created its detractors
who required the negative image against which to make their points. Foucault summarized the
Machiavellian caricature drawn by the anti-Machiavellians as follows:
For Machiavelli, the Prince exists in a relationship of singularity and externality, of
transcendence, to his principality. Machiavelli’s Prince receives his principality either
through inheritance, or by acquisition, or by conquest; in any case, he is not part of it. It
makes no difference whether the link that binds him to his principality is one of violence,
or tradition, or one established through the compromise of treaties and the complicity of
agreement of other princes, it is, in any case, a purely synthetic link; there is no
fundamental, essential natural, and juridical connection between the Prince and his
principality: externality, the Prince’s transcendence, is the principle. A corollary of this
principle, of course, is that inasmuch as it is an external relationship, it is fragile and
constantly under threat. It is threatened from outside by the Prince’s enemies who want to
take, or re-conquer, his principality, and it is also threatened internally, for there is no a
priori or immediate reason for the Prince’s subjects to accept his rule (Foucault, 2009, pp.
91-92).
This, however, should not be understood as an art of government. “Being able to hold on to one’s
principality is not the same as possessing the art of government” (Foucault, 2009, p. 92). The
prince’s ability to secure his exceptional position and retain control over his territory should not
be conflated with a true art of government capable of securing populations, peoples, and bodies.
Machiavelli, understood in this way, marked the “highest point” of ensuring the “safety
(sûreté) of the prince and his territory” (Foucault, 2009, p. 65). The concept of governmentality
addressed a “completely different problem that is no longer that of fixing and demarcating the
territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good and bad,
ensuring that things are constantly moving around, going from one point to another, but in such a
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way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out” (Foucault, 2009, p. 65). This
embodied the shift from territory to population, form the safety of the prince to the “security
(sécurité) of the population” and this represented the raison d’état of the modern state’s
governmentality (Foucault, 2009, p. 65).
The application of raison d’état was a birth-like event; it was the birth of the state, an
important step in the genealogical analysis of governmentality. Foucault likened the birth of
astrophysics to raison d’état’s birth creating the field of modern politics (Foucault, 2009, p. 276).
Prior to astrophysics, the Earth had been viewed as the center of the universe, the stars as gods,
and numerous subsequent incorrect iterations attempting to understand the cosmos. It was
astrophysics that permitted human understanding of the Earth and the universe as objects
compliant with scientific laws. Foucault’s point was that even though we cannot today imagine
stars as God’s, this was not always the case. It required a birth-like event, a Kuhnian paradigm
shift in understanding for this to become the prevailing viewpoint. This was similar to the case of
politics and modes of governance. Today, it is difficult to think of them in terms other than those
associated with states. This new “principle of intelligibility” was born of raison d’état, it was the
moment of the paradigm shift which provided the state as a “reflective prism” (Foucault, 2009, p.
287).
For Foucault raison d’état marked the era when authorities began acting like a state in the
modern sense. Government from this time onward was conducted “rationally because there is a
state and so that there is a state” (Foucault, 2009, p. 287). He wrote:
the state functions as an objective in this political reason in the sense that it is that which
must result from the active interventions of this reason or rationality . . . . What the
intervention of raison d’état must arrive at is the state’s integrity, its completion, its
consolidation, and its reestablishment if it has been compromised . . . . The is therefore
the principle of intelligibility of what is, but equally of what it must be (Foucault, 2009,
p. 287).
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Elements of states, like criminal justice systems, national militaries and tax regimes, previously
existed (Foucault, 2009, p. 247). However, it was the new rationality of raison d’état that
brought these already existent elements together and applied them simultaneously in new ways
as the state.
The state aimed to govern for an indefinite time (Foucault, 2009, pp. 259-260). It was not
preparing for any eventual final day, as was the case of Christian shepherds controlling their
flocks. The state’s task was further complicated by the fact that it existed within a world of
competing states, each attempting to secure its indefinite existence. It was a context of numerous
internal and external moving and competing parts that states must account for in order to be
successful and ensure their continuation. Like astrophysical bodies, the state existed in a context
of continual processes. The moving elements did not just entail material components but
nonmaterial concerns like competing ideologies and existential threats as well. Each state applied
its own political science to its tasks of governing and existed “independently of the prince or any
other holder of sovereign power” (Barry Hindess, 1996, p. 110).
The state abandoned traditional approaches to sovereignty based on traditional sources of
guidance, moving to “to an art of governing that finds the principles of its rationality and the
specific domain of its application in the state” (Foucault, 2009, p. 364). As with other concepts,
Foucault was concerned with the way raison d’état utilized emergent techniques in its practice of
the art of government. Having abandoned tradition, the state sought new ways to conduct its
affairs. It tried “setting up two major assemblages of political technology” (Foucault, 2009, p.
312). Both were oriented toward security. Together they required a new form of knowledge,
statistics, as in the case of liberal governmentality and security (Foucault, 2009, pp. 274, 315).
The first was crucial for states required balance in an international system of competing states.
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The state used “military-diplomatic technology that consists in securing and developing the
state’s forces through a system of alliances and the organization of an armed apparatus”
(Foucault, 2009, p. 365).
The second looked to the internal security of the state and involved police power.
Foucault was more focused on this internal dimension of raison d’état than on the outward,
international dimension. Some have pointed to this as the reason that much of the subsequent
work on governmentality has focused on the internal aspects of the state and why some view it as
an inadequate mechanism for studying international relations (Joseph, 2010; Selby, 2007).
Additionally, some commentators, like Hindess (1996, pp. 119-123), have viewed police power
through the lens of pastoral power, while others like Valverde (2007), have treated them as
distinct concepts. The relation between the two will become evident from the discussion of
police.
Rather than locating a new meaning of police as a concept Foucault returned to an older
meaning referring to works of von Justi, Delamare, and Turquet de Mayerne. These were
voluminous works concerning everything from commerce to mining and aimed at improving the
internal condition of a state through policy implementation, legislation, and law enforcement.
This understanding of police revolved around “the set of means for bringing about the internal
growth of the state’s forces” (Foucault, 2009, p. 365). The state needed to grow stronger and
more efficient to ensure its continued survival from within. To accomplish this task the state
required detailed knowledge of all internal events to maximize its resources. Police power was
similar to the procedures that had long occurred in smaller scale entities on a national level.
Techniques were applied on new levels “[m]aking the town into a sort of quasi-convent and the

	
  

251
realm into a sort of quasi-town is the kind of great disciplinary dream behind police” (Foucault,
2009, p. 341).
A component of this type of power was the administrative bureaucratic apparatus,
without which law making and law enforcement would not have been possible in the modern
sense. Foucault did not devote much direct study to bureaucratic administration or the state’s
monopoly on administration, preferring instead to examine specific settings like the prison, the
school, and the hospital (Foucault, 1973, 1977). Foucault’s notion of discipline began with
mundane concepts of administration of control over the physical body. Professional
administrative knowledge was not a given, but was formed over time through practices aimed at
controlling behavior. The administration of control like other professions were made up of
professional disciplines comprised of “groups of statements that borrow their organization from
scientific models, which tend to coherence and demonstrativity, which are accepted,
institutionalized, transmitted and sometimes taught as sciences” (Foucault, 1972, p. 178). Thus,
through experimentation administrative rules were created to govern bureaucratic approaches.
For example, bookkeeping standards evolved and included both empirical knowledge and
“administrative objectivity” (Porter, 1992). Foucault’s primary theoretical contribution was not a
complete account of the bureaucratic state, but rather the demonstration of how professional
administrative knowledge of administering control over the body was constituted.
John O’Neill (1986) suggested that the most fruitful approach to the study of institutions
would be to consider Foucault’s archeological forays into disciplinary power in conjunction with
Weber’s analysis of the bureaucratic state. In fact, O’Neill claimed that Foucault broadened “the
Weberian concept of administrative power into the embodied strategies of industrial power”
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(O'Neill, 1986, p. 57).63 However, Charles Alford (2000) warned that it was a mistake to
compare the two thinkers’ conceptions of disciplinary and centralized power. In distinguishing
himself from Weber, Foucault wrote:
One isn’t assessing things in terms of an absolute against which they could be evaluated
as constituting more or less perfect forms of rationality, but rather examining how forms
of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what role they
play within them. Because it’s true that “practices” don't exist without a certain regime of
rationality. But rather than measuring this regime against a value-of-reason, I would
prefer to analyse it according to two axes: one the one hand, that of
codification/prescription (how it forms an ensemble of rules, procedures, means to an
end, etc.) and on the other, that of true or false formulation (how it determines a domain
of objects about which it is possible to articulate true or false positions (Foucault, 1991b,
p. 79).
As Goldstein wrote, Foucault offered “historians a way of conceptualizing the relationships
between forms of applied knowledge and their external environments” (Goldstein, 1984, p. 184).
There was an important difference between police power and pastoral power. Pastoral
power’s goal was the protection of the individuals; police power’s primary goal was the
continuation of the state. While the shepherd aimed to preserve his flock above all else, the state
utilizing police power was willing to sacrifice its flock to ensure its own preservation when
necessary. The subsistence and happiness of the flock was necessary insofar as it was
instrumental to the state’s existence. Ensuring welfare prevented internally generated crises that
could have threatened the state. Police power, similar to pastoral power, has continued, even
outside of the contexts of extreme police states. The state would not hesitate to sacrifice its
people to defend itself in war. In Habermas’s thought, citizen compliance in this regard was
dependent upon the success of legitimation processes.
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Relatedly, Szakolczai (1998a, 1998b) traced connections between Weber’s history of science
and conduct of life, and Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical approaches to subjectivity.
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Diffusive police power was pervasive within liberal democracies. It could be seen in the
complex and often perplexing regulations aimed at producing efficiency and a harmonious social
order. At the national level any number of difficult to navigate federal regulations could be cited,
and perhaps the tax code serves as the most familiar example. Even local governments take part,
as municipalities enforce complex regulations even with respect to the collection of garbage and
recyclables. Non-governmental organizations wield similarly incomprehensible power as
neighborhood associations dictate everything from parking regulations down to the color of paint
applied to an individual home’s front door.
The state’s power and the operation of the military-diplomatic system and the police
power required knowledge at an unprecedented level of detail: enter statistics (Foucault, 2009, p.
274). Bridging both assemblages of power was concern over currency and commerce wherein
statistics was an unparalleled tool (Foucault, 2009, p. 365). Statistics equipped the state with
knowledge of its level of effectiveness; field usage provided knowledge of which techniques
were most effective in which contexts. Furthermore, statistics allowed states to view themselves
and their rivals in comparative perspective, thereby aiding in the preservation of an international
balance of power. The state’s emergent power assemblages would have been impossible absent
this newly developed mode of examination.
Police power armed with statistics made the enforcement of biopower all the more
effective. The state’s raison d’état permitted it to determine what was in the best interest of its
survival and sacrifice individuals in pursuit of that purpose. These observations raised a question
for Foucault, namely, how could the state have become more welfare oriented than ever before,
while simultaneously becoming more dangerous to its own people (Foucault, 2003, p. 260). His
answer was informed by Nazi Germany and was phrased as “state racism.” The racist state could
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divide its people along racial, religious, ethnic, or other lines. Some categories of citizens were
useful in furthering the state’s existence. Their lives were to be improved and their happiness and
the corresponding cooperation it bought were worth pursuing. Other categories were not useful
and could be discarded, all of which was done in the name of the state’s pursuit of its raison
d’état.
The emergence of the modern state was marked not only the birth of raison d’état, but
also by the birth of political economy as a concept. Foucault wrote
the new science called political economy arises out of registering the new network of
constant and multiple relations between population, territory and wealth; and this
corresponds to the formation of a type of intervention characteristic of government,
namely the intervention in the field of economy and population. In other words the
transition from the art of government to political science, from a regime dominated by the
structure of sovereignty to one ruled by techniques of government occurs in the
eighteenth century around the theme of population and consequently centres on the birth
of political economy (Foucault, 1991a, p. 101).
Thorough governmentality was dependent upon the ability to operate in an economic matter.
Regimes were required to master this new political science to improve the techniques by which
they governed. This was true of all constellations of governmentality, but economics took on
special import within one particular constellation: the neoliberal mode of governmentality.
Neoliberal Governmentality: Power Beyond the State
Governmentality was connected to the doctrines of neoliberalism, particularly its
approach to economics and the status given to economics.64 Foucault argued that the liberal
economic model entailed the state watching over the market economy and permitted intervention
only when it was absolutely necessary (Foucault, 2008, p. 86). However, in the most recent post	
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There may be other understandings of the concept of neoliberalism as well. Wendy Larner, for
example, identified several understandings of neoliberalism as policy, as ideology, and as
governmentality (2000). See Peck for an intellectual history of the concept (2008). Additionally,
see Harvey for a non-Foucauldian description of the state’s role within neoliberalism (2005).
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war period Germany faced a drastically different and unique situation, namely, the presence of a
market, but the absence of a state. Historically, the state existed and was limited to ensure that
markets developing within it were free. As Foucault pointed out “[t]he problem the Germans had
was to resolve the exact opposite: given a state that does not exist, how can we get it to exist on
the basis of this non-state space of economic freedom” (Foucault, 2008, pp. 86-87)? The
ordoliberals of the Freiburg School, including economists and jurists like Wilhelm Röpke,
Walter Eucken, Alexander Rüstow, and Franz Böhm, provided an answer that created a new
relationship between the economy and the state. It was characterized by a “circuit” that existed
“constantly from the economic institution to the state” (Foucault, 2008, p. 84). One key
characteristic of the resulting structure was that “[t]he term ‘politics’ can no longer be utilized as
if its meaning was self-evident; it must be the object of analysis” (Burchell, 1996, p. 38).
At the outset of his analysis Foucault noted certain similarities between the Freiburg
School and the Frankfurt School. Both had appeared in the 1920s, both were involved in the
political-academic problem in Germany during that period, both were shaped by experiences of
exile, both viewed Nazism as a significant phenomena which demanded explanation, and both
drew their starting point from Max Weber (Foucault, 2008, p. 105). Despite their similarities, the
two schools established very different programs. While the Freiburg school was reconstructing
the rationality of capitalism in order to prevent the social irrationality of capitalism from
endangering the system, the Frankfurt school was attempting to construct a new social rationality
to resolve capitalist irrationality (Foucault, 2008, pp. 105-106). The two schools also diverged
with respect to their accounts of Nazism. The Freiburg School believed that Nazism emerged due
to the absence of liberalism and a market economy. The alternatives were, for them, liberalism
and various forms of state intervention. The Frankfurt School, took a diametrically opposing
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approach by arguing that capitalism and fascism were causally linked (Burchell, 1996, p. 270;
Foucault, 2008, pp. 106-115).
This relationship raised an additional question: how could a free and dominant economy
be a state’s “guarantee and security” (Foucault, 2008, p. 102)? The question could be restated:
how could the principle of economic freedom simultaneously function as both the foundation
and limitation for a state? The ordoliberal answer was that the state should be conceived anew
and that the free market economy should indicate that state’s “internal regulation from start to
finish of its existence and action” (Foucault, 2008, p. 116). Foucault further explained that:
instead of accepting a free market defined by the state and kept as it were under state
supervision – which was, in a way, the initial formula of liberalism . . . – the ordoliberals
say we should completely turn the formula around and adopt the free market as an
organizing and regulating principle of the state, from the start of existence up to the last
form of its interventions. In other words: a state under the supervision of the market
rather than a market supervised by the state (2008, p. 116).
The economy was now set up as prior to and dominant over the state. This arrangement provided
legitimacy for the state and it served to make the state “acceptable to those who most mistrusted
it” (Foucault, 2008, p. 117).
The ordoliberal position was compounded by their understanding of the market as an
arena of ruthless competition, where it had previously entailed “free exchange between two
partners who through this exchange establish the equivalence of two values” (Foucault, 2008, p.
118). The result of this understanding of the market allowed the ordoliberals to call laissez-faire
principles into question as “naïve naturalism,” while competition, by contrast, “is absolutely not
a given of nature” (Foucault, 2008, p. 120). The notion that markets are unnatural permitted the
position that they should be tied to the state, rather than simply left to their own devices. The
market must be tied to the state since it could not naturally exist and required constant
involvement to persist. Foucault explained that:
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Government must accompany the market economy from start to finish. The market
economy does not take something away from government. Rather, it indicates, it
constitutes the general index in which one must place the rule for defining governmental
action. One must govern for the market, rather than because of the market. To that extent
you can see that the relationship defined by eighteenth century liberalism is completely
reversed (2008, p. 121).
Perfect competition did not naturally exist, nor was it likely to exist under even perfect
conditions. It was to be aimed for and enabled by the conditions resulting from political and legal
interventions.
Foucault identified three important results of the ordoliberal anti-natural position on the
market. First, the existence of separate political and economic realms was not possible. The
spheres of government and economics were necessarily overlapping, as the market could not
exist otherwise. Second, historically speaking, the state and the economy had always been
reciprocally linked. Third, capitalism could not be sustained by its own internal logic, since it
lacked sustainable logic. Capitalism was always dependent upon the institutional structure of the
state. Thus, the creation of a new state structure could create a new mode of capitalism. A new
economic order, recognizing the connections with the society and the state could be created
(Foucault, 2008, p. 160). Following from the third result, the ordoliberals rejected Sombart’s
hypothesis that a mass society would result from modern capitalism, claiming quite the opposite:
that uniformity was the result of the market’s enemies attempt to constrain it, if market freedom
were ensured mass society would not emerge (Foucault, 2008, pp. 146-147). They also rejected
Schumpeter’s claim that capitalism was necessarily monopolistic, instead believing that any
monopolist impulses could be controlled and need not be detrimental (Foucault, 2008, pp. 177178).
The creation of an institutional framework that would allow the free market to persist,
and entailed the diffusion of market principles into government, had certain implications for
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social policy. First, as principles of free market enterprise entered into all aspects of life, social
relations were to be modeled on economic relations. As a result, inequality must be permitted as
the natural result of unnatural competition. This was a “vital policy,” in Rüstow’s terms, after all,
individuals managing their everyday lives were engaged in a form of enterprise just as a firm
within the market (Foucault, 2008, p. 148; C. Gordon, 1987, pp. 314-315). A second and
connected implication for social policy was the necessary alteration of legal institutions and the
law. Entrepreneurship and market principles needed to be inserted into the core of everyday life.
The law must be redefined to ensure that the economic mindset was created and would become
pervasive. Intervention to maintain the existence of the market was not only necessary within the
market, but within all facets of life (Foucault, 2008, p. 160).
This arrangement required a new art of government, or governmentality, to function.
Foucault wrote that the function of government was now to ensure that an appropriate degree of
competition was permitted although this role “should not be identified with laissez-faire, but
rather with permanent vigilance, activity, and intervention (2008, p. 132). This constellation of
government and economics, the neoliberal constellation, entailed the control of market
rationality over government. Government, society, and politics now operated as markets and
their purpose was to secure the dominant position of competition, which played a “regulatory
role at every moment and every point in society” and allowed the “general regulation of society
by the market” (Foucault, 2008, p. 145). Peck called the permeation of economic principles into
non-economic areas of life “regulatory incursions,” which resulted from a “rediscovery and
reinvention of an Ordoliberal ethic” (Peck, 2010, p. 23).
In addition to the German ordoliberal-Freiburg model Foucault considered the American
neoliberal counterpart, the Chicago School. He considered a number of thinkers associated with
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American neoliberalism, such as Becker, von Mises, Hayek, Simons, Schultz, and Stigler.
Foucault explained that the important characteristic of the Chicago School was its expansion of
the economy into non-economic, in his terms social, realms of life. Again, the idea was that
economic forms of decision-making and mentalités were transposed onto non-economic spheres.
The distinction between the American and the German models was a fine one. The German
model sought to govern society in the name of the economy, while the American model attempt
to recast the non-economic social sphere as an economic domain. The economic mode of thought
became the principle that lent legitimacy to government action as government became an
enterprise in the economic sense, whose purpose was to support and extend to market style
competition throughout society (Foucault, 2008, p. 323).
American neoliberalism had two goals in expanding the scope of economics. First, it
contained a desire to understand why individuals behaved as they did in deciding how to allocate
their resources. The goal was to economically understand individual decision-making. It was an
“extension of economic analysis” and created “the possibility of giving a strictly economic
interpretation of a whole domain previously thought to be non-economic” (Foucault, 2008, p.
219). They believed that all decisions were economically justified and could be understood in
economic terms, that no realm of life was ordered by anything other than economic rationality,
or in Habermas’s terms instrumental rationality. Second, they wanted government to be critically
examined in economic terms and using free market concepts. These concepts and the rationality
contained within them represented “a sort of permanent economic tribunal confronting
government” (Foucault, 2008, p. 247).
Foucault considered two examples that were illustrative of the neoliberal approach. First
he considered the neoliberal theory of human capital. To fill out a theory of human capital, to
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understand labor, the neoliberals considered the vantage point of the laborer. This was necessary
because human capital is unlike other forms of capital in that the characteristics capable of
earning profits, the skills and knowledge, are inseparable from the actual laborer, unlike a piece
of capital whose owner can rent it out. The formation of human capital was dependent upon the
physical make-up of the laborer and his entrepreneurial investment to acquire valuable skills,
such as education and training. These were “innate elements and other, acquired elements”
(Foucault, 2008, p. 227). This approach transformed wage laborers into entrepreneurs operating
within a free market who were responsible for making autonomous investments to determine the
value of their capital. In other words “homo æconomicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of
himself” (Foucault, 2008, p. 226). Economics was no longer merely a means by which to analyze
processes, but instead had become the means of analyzing “the strategic programming of
individuals’ activity” (Foucault, 2008, p. 223).
Departing momentarily from Foucault’s analysis, let us turn to several other thinkers.
Consider Pierre Bourdieu’s description of the market relations between firms now operating at
the level of individuals within the workforce:
Competition is extended to individuals themselves, through the individualization of the
wage relationship: establishment of individual performance objectives, individual
performance evaluations, permanent evaluation, individual salary increases or granting of
bonuses as a function of competence and of individual merit; individualized career paths;
strategies of ‘delegating responsibility’ tending to ensure the self-exploitation of staff
who, simple wage laborers in relations of strong hierarchical dependence, are at the same
time held responsible for their sales, their products, their branch, their store, etc. as
though they were in- dependent contractors. This pressure toward ‘self-control’ extends
workers’ ‘involvement’ according to the techniques of ‘participative management’
considerably beyond management level. All of these are techniques of rational
domination that impose over-involvement in work (and not only among management)
and work under emergency or high-stress conditions. And they converge to weaken or
abolish collective standards or solidarities (1998).
Additionally, Wendy Brown (2005) explicitly noted the ways in which homo æconomicus
differed from citizen, as traditionally conceived. Citizens could ban together, address common
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problems, and achieve collective ends. Homo æconomicus, however, was only capable of
rationally calculating which actions would be to his own benefit, and interested in and capable
only of undertaking those things economically deemed personally beneficial. She wrote:
The model neoliberal citizen is one who strategizes for her or himself among various
social, political, and economic options, not one who strives with others to alter or
organize these options. A fully realized neoliberal citizenry would be the opposite of
public-minded; indeed, it would barely exist as a public. The body politic ceases to be a
body but is rather a group of individual entrepreneurs and consumers . . . (Brown, 2005,
p. 43).
Thus, becoming an entrepreneur had the effect of “depoliticizing social and economic powers”
and reducing “political citizenship to an unprecedented degree of passivity and political
complacency” (Brown, 2005, p. 43).
Implicit in this was the creation and endorsement of structures that institutionalized and
exacerbated inequality as the foundation for future human activity. Simultaneously, the
individual is portrayed as existing in a state of total freedom and autonomy. Seen as existing in
such a state, individuals are completely responsible for their own lot. They are responsible for
individually making decisions, which maximize their economic status, the value of their labor,
their strategic reserves, and the whole of their individuality as a business endeavor. Those who
fail to make the proper economic calculations have simply led a “mismanaged life” with no one
but themselves to blame (Brown, 2005, p. 42). This mismanagement would not just be
considered an economic failure, but a moral failure as well. If there were institutions, collectives,
or governments behind these individual failures blame is slow to fall upon them and their
consequences less severe. Consider, for example, the housing bubble and subprime mortgage
collapse in the United States. In the wake of these events the individual homeowners paid a
heavy price for overvaluing their assets or failing to negotiate more favorable terms, while the
financial institutions eventually revealed as the culprits continued to operate without long term
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repercussions or significantly altering their practices.
Returning to Foucault’s second example, consider the manner in which the neoliberal
Chicago School applied an economic analysis, using free market criteria, to criminality and the
penal system. Foucault was particularly interested in the work of Gary Becker, who seemed the
most extreme proponent of the neoliberal project on this subject (Foucault, 2008, p. 251). The
criminal is an entrepreneur “who invests in an action, expects a profit from it, and who accepts
the risk of a loss” (Foucault, 2008, p. 253). The criminal, as homo æconomicus, approached a
murder and a petty theft in much the same way as economic prospects. The function of the
criminal justice system was to create negative externalities sufficient to economically regulate
and deter criminal acts. As Foucault put it, “[i]t has to concern itself with a conduct or series of
conducts which produce actions from which the actors expect a profit and which carry a special
risk, which is not just the risk of economic loss, but the penal risk, or that economic loss which is
inflicted by the penal system . . . . In other words, it will have to react to the supply of crime”
(2008, p. 253). The penal system had abandoned the objective of eliminating crime, instead its
aim was market intervention to “limit the supply of crime solely by a negative demand”
(Foucault, 2008, p. 256). In this view, the criminal was a rational-economic individual, like any
other, and not a psychologically or biologically deviant personality. This represented a dramatic
departure from the previous conception of homo criminalis (Pasquino, 1991).
This approach to human capital and criminality was similar to the Chicago School’s
approach to other aspects of life. The individual was viewed as a economic actor whose behavior
could be manipulated through strategic “modifications in the variables of the environment,”
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since he would react rationally to them (Foucault, 2008, p. 269).65 It is worth noting, as Hindess
has, that the perception of neoliberal approaches may be contextually dependent:
Against the background conditions in which the great nineteenth- and twentieth-century
social policy regimes were set in place, many governmental programmes now repudiated
by neo-liberalism could plausibly be represented as promoting autonomy. Against a very
different contemporary background in which, at least in the more advanced Western
societies, the existence of a suitably calculable population is easily taken for granted,
these same programmes can be seen as undermining autonomy. Neo-liberalism is a
liberal response to the achievements of the liberal mode of government (1993, p. 311).
Neoliberalism and perceptions of it were, necessarily, dependent upon the contexts and the
historical transformations of governmentality that they entailed. Thus, the added responsibility
that came with the care of the economic individual of himself could be interpreted as an extended
exercise of autonomy. As Rose and Miller put it, this “language of the entrepreneurial individual,
endowed with freedom and autonomy, has come to predominate over almost any other in the
evaluations of the ethical claims and power and programmes of government” (1992, p. 200).
The goal of government was now “action at a distance” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 180).
The individual was free to economically weigh potential profits and losses and this could be seen
in all areas of life. O’Malley identified three processes at work in shifting from state-run, society
wide risk avoidance to private, individual risk avoidance, or as he termed it prudentialism. This
consisted of:
the retraction of socialized risk-based techniques from managing the risks confronting the
populace; their progressive replacement through the extension of privatized risk-based
techniques; and the articulation of this process with the strategic deployment of sovereign
remedies and disciplinary interventions facilitate, underline and enforce moves towards
government through individual responsibility (O'Malley, 1996b, p. 199).
Risk within the governmentality literature is not always understood in the traditional sense. For
example, Castel (1991), Defert (1991), and Ewald (1991) all viewed risk as a way of viewing
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Also, see Gordon (1991, p. 43), Burchell (1991, 1996), Hindess (1993, pp. 307-311), and Rose
(1996b, pp. 50-62).
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problems, in particular, a highly probabilistic abstract utilized in decision making, rather than
something concrete.
All of these decisions constitute what is contemporarily known as “power” which was
“assembled into complexes that connect up forces and institutions deemed ‘political’ with
apparatuses that shape and manage individual and collective conduct in relation to norms and
objections but yet are constituted as ‘non-political’” (Rose, 1996b, pp. 37-38). In one of the
earliest efforts to discover the political implications of Foucault’s work on governmentality
Jacques Donzelot worried that power would become the new driving force of history:
We would have then not a power and those who undergo it, but, as Foucault shows,
technologies, that is to say always local and multiple, intertwining coherent or
contradictory forms of activating and managing a population, and strategies, the formulae
of government . . . theories which explain reality only to the extent that they enable the
implementation of a program, the generation of actions; they provide through their
coherence a “practical object” (practicable) for corrective intervention of government
programmes and redirection (1979, p. 77).
The state would no longer be a driving force behind historical developments. Instead it would
only be “a support for technologies” or a mere “effect of governmental strategies” (Donzelot,
1979, p. 78). The state government itself was governmentalized.
Neoliberal governmentality adopted government from a distance as a key technique of
governance, as responsibility and the cost of failure shifted to the individual. This involved
technologies of subjectivity and the resulting freedom – if indeed the result was freedom – was
of a qualified sort:
not liberation from social constraints but rendering psychological constraints on
autonomy conscious, and hence amenable to rational transformation. Achieving freedom
becomes a matter not of slogans nor of political revolution but of slow, painstaking, and
detailed work on our own subjective and personal realities guided by an expert
knowledge of the psyche (Rose, 1989, p. 213).
Barbara Cruikshank provided an example by analyzing a unique technology of the self, the
emergence of American self-esteem movements (Cruikshank, 1996). She demonstrated that that
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the self-esteem model believed that a variety of public problems were the result of the
individuals involved lacking self-esteem. In Cruikshank’s work, and elsewhere, techniques of
community and self-help have been connected to the governmentality of poverty, drug addiction,
and alcoholism (Cruikshank, 1996, 1999; Rose, 1999; Valverde, 1998).
Self-esteem advocates and the corresponding California Task Force to Promote SelfEsteem and Personal and Social Responsibility constructed “a technology of subjectivity that
will solve social problems from crime and poverty to gender inequality by waging a social
revolution, not against capitalism, racism and inequality, but against the order of the self and the
way we govern our selves” (Cruikshank, 1996, p. 231). This represented neoliberal
governmentality altering the line between the public and the private spheres of life. Similarly,
Monica Greco wrote of the “duty to be well” (1993). Self-esteem, however, was dependent upon
the mode of assessment, rather than any objective concept. The self was continually assessed
against collective measures thereby creating a tenuous and constantly re-examined accord
between personal states and levels of esteem and the public goals of government (Cruikshank,
1996). Self-help serves as an example of governmentality as the internalization of the self or the
personality at the level of the individual.66 Governmentality of the self is also related to the
presentation, marketing, or sale of the self of the sort outlined by Dale Carnegie’s influential
How to Win Friends and Influence People, and the countless updates and spin-offs that have
achieved a degree of fetishism in the business world (1936).
Miller and Rose (1990) examined the way private, individual decisions were seized by
the entrepreneurial mode of market competition. Decision-making became based upon
cost/benefit considerations in all realms of life as the previously non-economic realms were
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William James (2009) identified this trend of internalization in his lectures at the University of
Edinburgh in 1901 and 1902.
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overtaken by economic mentality. All things were addressed as economic goods, including
employee health as “the quest for profit of entrepreneurs and the personal well-being of
employees could be brought into alignment through psychological expertise” (P. Miller & Rose,
1990, p. 21). Leisure, well-being, and self-fulfillment were economic considerations that served
the ends of economic efficiency. Self-determination became an economic resource to be
optimized. In short, “[t]hrough this loose assemblage of agents, calculations, techniques, images
and commodities, consumer choice can be made an ally of economic growth: economic life can
be government through the choices consumers make in their search for personally fulfilling
forms of existence” (P. Miller & Rose, 1990, pp. 25-26). The result was economic selfgovernment in accordance with the aims neoliberal governmentality. Miller and Rose closed one
work by concluding:
Political authorities no longer seek to govern by instructing individuals . . . Individuals
themselves, as workers, managers, and member of families can be mobilized in alliance
with political objectives, in order to deliver economic growth, successful enterprise and
optimum personal happiness . . . . Modern political power does not take the form of
subjectivity. Rather, political power has come to depend upon a web of technologies for
fabricating and maintaining self-government (1990, p. 28).
The governmentality of neoliberalism explains a political, social, and economic project
conflating those spheres, as well as the public and private into a single domain organized in
accordance with economic rationality.
Neoliberal governmentality is usually portrayed as an array of structures in which
individuals have no choice but to live their lives. Alternatively, Sam Binkley (2006) has
suggested that despite the neoliberal attempt to collapse all realms of life into one another, the
subject individual possesses the ability to maintain the borders between realms and chooses
when to move from one to the other. However, Binkley’s account was primarily concerned with
the control individuals can exercise as consumers. In fact, this ability may only exist because it
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was constructed by neoliberal governmentality and “defines a significant feature of selfgovernmentality” (Binkley, 2006, p. 345). The control and freedom presented to the consumer
may be of a trivial nature. Freedom of the consumer may be nothing more than the freedom to
choose from among a spectacular array of breakfast cereals. This would be far removed from
freedom as political freedom or collective self-determination. Furthermore, it is not clear whether
a case could be made for the ability of individuals to exercise similar control in maintaining
borders with respect to other spheres of life.
At the outset of studies on neoliberal governmentality there was disagreement between
those adopting that approach and those undertaking cultural studies. Ian Hunter (1988, 1993,
1994) argued that education for the lower classes was primarily concerned with instilling in
citizens the skills needed to effectively perform self-governance. It was eventually realized that
culture could be an incarnation of governmentality. Tony Bennett (1997, 2004; Jin, 2008)
explained how cultural institutions, like museums, could embody specific governmental
rationalities. Work along these lines demonstrated how governmentality could become manifest
in the rationality of planning and curating museums, and how such entities could influence the
subject and its relations through the organization of cultural institutions (Bennett, 2004). By way
of example, such analyses have been applied to everything from urban garden planning
(Certoma, 2013) to historical memorials (David, 2010).
Studies of neoliberal governmentality have gone beyond even the cultural arena. This
analytic framework has been applied to a massive array of topics to understand contemporary
government beyond the state and to push the limits of the concept. The purpose of such efforts
has been to understand political power through its mobile and changing manifestations.
Governmentality has been used to understand environmental protection against climate change
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through self-government via “carbon dieting” (Paterson & Stripple, 2010). It has been applied to
human pregnancy (Weir, 1998) and used to examine the international mobility of Polish sausages
(Dunn, 2005). It has been applied to visa regimes associated with the “international self,” and the
role of airports as centers to manage the risks of population movement (Salter, 2006, 2007). A
number of writers have focused on governmentality in emergency preparedness, risk assumption,
and organizational resilience (Amoore, 2009; Aradau & Munster, 2008; Collier & Lakoff,
2008b; de Goede, 2008). Jonathan Simon has used governmentality concepts to examine the
connections between the war on crime and the regulation of life (Simon, 2009).
Neoliberal governmentality and its market principles were present everywhere and
always. There was nothing outside of this expansive reach. Market logic permeated all aspects of
life: “the problem is not whether there are things that you cannot touch and others that you are
entitled to touch. The problem is how you touch them” (Foucault, 2008, p. 133). The ordoliberal
process of marketization and the dominance of the competition it entailed represented the core of
the neoliberalism that followed, and has been updated from time to time (Foucault, 2008, p.
117).67 Neoliberal government’s central and defining purpose was to promote the market, and
the market’s structures themselves extended into the government’s institutions. The market’s
freedom, for neoliberals, was greatly aided by the exposure of the government to competition
through the privatization of state activities (Foucault, 2008, pp. 143-144). Privatization would
move “the centre of gravity of governmental action downwards” (Foucault, 2008, p. 148). This
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Foucault drew fine distinctions between ordoliberalism, French neoliberalism, and American
neoliberalism (Foucault, 2008, pp. 192-193). Hindess (1997) argued that the fact that
contemporary strands of neoliberalism are distinctly labeled indicates that they are the result of
different developmental processes. Hall cautioned that the term neoliberal entailed “too many
things to merit a single identity” (2011, p. 706) Thus, Peck wrote that the concept only survived
through “continued mongrelization” (2010, p. 24). Similarly, Brenner and his coauthors labeled
it a “rascal concept” (2010, p. 185).
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permitted functions that were once carried out by government to be performed by market
competitors.
Foucault described the emergence of techniques of audit as an alternative path, should
privatization not be immediately possible. If a particular governmental function could not be
privatized then it could at least be transformed to operate via market principles, in other words,
governmental functions could be “de-statized” (Rose, 1996b). This resulted was a drastic
increase in “performance indicators” to measure and compare performance as market
competition became the dominant rationality (De Angelis, 2006, p. 219). This permitted an
“audit explosion” (Rose, 1999, pp. 153-155). The accountability of government was no longer
understood in terms of responsiveness to the political needs of citizens. The new governmental
accountability took the form of government being accountable to the market and being able to
justify its practices in market terminology. Accountable government is government that conducts
itself

competitively.

Graham

Burchell

noted

that

the

neoliberal

mindset

desired

“autonomization” via emphasis on “a kind of economic or enterprise model of action that
pursues a competitive logic” (1996, p. 28).
It is worth noting that the retreat of government and the onset of a free market, enterprise
model does not involve less government, as would be applauded by political conservatives,
rather it entails the retreat of the non-economic mode of government. Even in cases where the
government itself, in addition to operating in accordance with economic rationality, actually
shrinks, this does not indicate a decrease in governance. Larner used the term “market
governance” to represent this stability in the amount of governance, as well as to indicate the
new location of governance (1997). The result was a government, perhaps even a larger
government, under a new mode of operation. Mechanisms are created that function
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autonomously to bring about governmental results through the assignment of risk to the
“enterprise” or the individual entrepreneur, often times a government employee perceived in
marketized terms. These entrepreneurs are responsible for overseeing their own enterprises and
ensuring that they are economically competitive within the marketplace.
This competitive logic is maintained through governmentalized government which
constantly conducts surveillance of itself in the form of the audit. Marilyn Strathern argued that
the audit represented a new managerial practice, but is “a now taken-for-granted process of neoliberal government” that is the heart of that system’s “ethos” (2000, p. 3). Similarly, Peter Miller
identified the use of accountancy practices as a technology of neoliberal governmentality (2001).
This is a form of government self-assessment. “Where audit is applied to public institutions –
medical, legal, educational – the state’s overt concern may be less to impose day-to-day direction
than to ensure that internal controls, in the form of monitoring techniques are in place”
(Strathern, 2000, p. 3). Michael Power (1997) also demonstrated that the mundane technologies
of budgets, audits, and benchmarks were key to the neoliberal form of management, governing
from a distance, with the ultimate goal being the assurance that government is competitive to the
extent and in the manner prescribed by market logic.
It has been argued that neoliberal rationality is a highly specific rationality (Rose, 1996a).
This body of literature focusing on governmentality as an investigation into neoliberalism has
normally taken the form of overarching theoretical analysis, while examinations of the specific
techniques and constellations of the neoliberal art of government have been lacking. There are
obviously exceptions to this observation. Anthropologists James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta
(2002) broadened the geographic scope of governmentality as neoliberalism. They viewed the
state-centric nature of the understanding of neoliberalism as governmentality as a weakness.
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They aimed “to extend the discussion of governmentality to modes of government that are being
set up on a global scale” (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002, p. 990). They considered the extent to which
traditional state functions have been transferred to non-governmental international actors,
particularly in Africa. Additionally, Mitchell Dean and Barry Hindess (1998), and Larner (2000)
examined neoliberal governmentality within specific contexts – Australia and New Zealand
respectively. Consider the rise of NGOs in Eastern Europe and Africa, which have generated
both support and hostility. In contrast to the specificity of neoliberal governmentality, some
utilized it as a category to explain programs within a variety of settings. For example, Pat
O’Malley (1996a) attempted to apply the framework to indigenous forms of government.
The understanding of governmentality must also be extended in light of technological
developments, which create new spaces of human activity. These spaces have often not been
directly, intentionally, or specifically governed from a distance. Such spaces have, however,
been tangentially governed by constellations of power and technologies of the self that have
already been ingrained in individuals. Of course, all forms of governmentality have technological
dimensions and that technology periodically advances. As with previous advances in the
technologies of governance, contemporarily emergent technologies would always be fruitful
grounds for examination. Nigel Thrift pointed to the importance of such efforts as his analysis
stepped beyond existing realms of power in examining “other kinds of space/time/place that are
now coming to constitute a kind of permanent political shadow world as a result of the institution
of new kinds of political machine” (Thrift, 2006, p. 553). Considerations of this type would
circle the analysis back into discussions of panopticism and surveillance. These concepts are
certainly connected to governmentality, particularly neoliberal governmentality since
technological advances that drastically further the ability to survey have become most advanced
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in contemporary neoliberal states. However, Governmentality is itself a massive field of study
that has taken on a life, and utility, far beyond Foucault’s original scope. As Bröckling noted,
governmentality has become an “independent research field” (Bröckling et al., 2011, p. 9).
4.5 Conclusion
Foucault’s work, its legacy, and those who contribute to it by continuing to engage in
research using his framework still stand somewhat apart from mainstream political science.
Wendy Brown pointed out the paradoxical fact that Foucault’s impact
has been strongest on topics and thematics with which Foucault himself was little
engaged. Post-colonial and subaltern studies scholars, feminist theorists, critical race
theorists, critical legal theorists, and theorists of political subjectivity and of international
relations have made use of Foucault’s work on power, discourse and the body; however,
these were not Foucault’s own research interests (Brown, 2006, p. 76).
Foucault’s legacy remains most impactful in those areas rather than in traditional fields of
political science. At one point Paul Brass set out to write of the “Foucauldian Turn in Political
Science,” but could not do so and was forced to acknowledge that he did not think “such a turn
has occurred in the discipline” (Brass, 2000, p. 305). While the Foucauldian turn in political
science never materialized, Foucault has had more influence in social theory due to the links
between him and other influential thinkers in that field, Weber, Habermas, and Bourdieu for
example.
Despite failing to gain influence in mainstream political science the research program that
Foucault began, although left unfinished, can make a vital contribution to that field. Power, after
all, is of central concern in political science. Political science’s concern, however, is
understandably and traditionally limited to power possessed by state apparatuses and how the
state exercises that power. This traditional mode of viewing the world would be both outdated
and lacking in explanatory potential from a Foucauldian perspective. Indeed, the Foucauldian
approach to political power seems stranger when compared to traditional conceptions of the
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political. Due to its originality such an analysis of politics is necessary, if Foucault is to be
believed, because the very nature of politics has changed the modern world as power has been
exerted in more areas and has become more diffuse. The nature of politics and political power
has changed and so the conceptual target of political science has moved and no longer resembles
its former self.
However, portraying Foucault as a thinker concerned only with power existing outside of
political structures, in cultural arenas for example is a mistake for several reasons. First, Foucault
did explicitly concern himself with political constellations, as with governmentality’s concern
over the relationship of the state to the economy. Second, Foucault, and this chapter,
demonstrated that exercises of disciplinary power outside of the traditional political sense
functions for governmental ends and are capable of contributing to or even displacing traditional
concepts of the exercise of state power. The practices of government then can be understood as
existing along a conceptual continuum. Traditional state practices may still take place or they
may be supplanted by less easily perceived government from afar, or even manifested in our own
practices of self-regulation.
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION
In this closing chapter I perform two pressing tasks. First, I briefly draw connections
between Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault, as they were presented in the
preceding chapters. Without moving too deeply into lengthy repetition of what has already taken
place I point out areas of parallel between the three authors. Second, I translate these theoretical
parallels into concerns bearing upon the nature of contemporary politics. I provide examples of
real-world political manifestations of the theoretical diagnosis that has been conducted here
through the works of Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault. This second task includes an examination
of potential prescriptions that could remedy some of the negative aspects of the alteration that
has occurred to politics. Some of these are commonly held positions on political reform that are
not often viewed in the theoretical light presented here, while some are more radical reforms.
5.1 Parallels and Convergences
In the preceding chapters I analyzed the works of Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and
Michel Foucault, as well as the secondary literature, at length. Given what has already been
established in the previous three chapters it will be useful to explicitly identify some areas of
commonality between the three theorists. A brief recapitulation of some of the primary points is
in order to demonstrate the connectedness of Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault’s theoretical
positions. Each of these thinkers claimed that what is considered political has changed over time.
Arendt presented a notion of pure politics that existed only within the idealized Greek polis. Her
idealized conception of politics declined with the rise of the social, which incorporated
previously nonpolitical aspects of life into politics. Arendt theorized the Greek polis as the
idealized political realm; this was separated from all matters considered social. Arendt believed
that in the modern age the social had overtaken the political to dominate the public sphere, which
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was now a social sphere wherein private interests dictated public concern. The rise of Arendt’s
broadly construed social brought a number of things into the public, formerly political realm,
including: economics as both a subject and a mode of operation, private lives, life processes,
power as both a subject and mode of operation, conformism, and alienation. The rise of the
social re-defined politics and along with it freedom, while precluding the possibility of action,
freedom, or politics in the Arendtian sense.
Habermas portrayed a pre-structural transformation of the public sphere containing a
functional form of discourse, which developed the skills and conditions necessary for the
existence of a discursive political sphere. This bourgeois public sphere was, however, typical of
an epoch, and it eventually declined with the intrusion of private concerns. Habermas
characterized the emergent form of politics as non-ideal communication, either systematically
distorted or of a sort permitting only strategic action. This was diametrically opposed to the ideal
politics that would be possible under conditions allowing genuine communication and true
communicative action. A host of corrupting mentalities, influences, and interests had permeated
actual politics. Citizens were no longer equal members of a public sphere communicating in a
manner that would allow the force of the better argument to triumph and were instead opponents
to be manipulated, coerced, and conquered. In Habermas’s more mature work he constructed a
theory of communicative action that would bypass the corrupting influences of the social to
reconstruct genuinely communicative and truly political forms of action.
Foucault, along with a range of subsequent researchers adopting his methods and
terminology, similarly demonstrated a change in politics. Foucault described the genealogy of
politics and power, though he did not engage in the type of normative lament found in the
writing of Habermas and especially Arendt. Absent from Foucault’s account was any depiction
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of an idealized public sphere. He detailed the inclusion of biological processes in politics as well
as the state’s ability to capitalize on biology as a new means of control. Foucault’s development
of panopticism as a theory expanded the singular panopticon to the societal level. When
panopticism existed individuals knew that they could be under surveillance at any moment, and
so must behave at all times as if they were. Panopticism resulted in a disciplinary society.
Foucault’s wide-ranging concept of governmentality provided a means of thinking about the
constellations and locations of power as governance became more thorough and complete and
yet often distanced from the traditional state. Some constellations of power created a privileged
place for the economy, which provided a universalized mode of thinking and the standard by
which all areas of life were judged.
Arendt was the most idealistic of the three; the problems with the Greek polis have
already been noted, but she nevertheless portrayed it as a place where perfect politics took place
among a few select free and equal citizens. Habermas perceived a certain historical era as
producing an idealized form of bourgeois public sphere and sought to recreate conditions of
perfect communication capable of emulating a still idealized, although more inclusive, public
sphere. Foucault lacked movement toward any idealization. This represents an important
difference between the three theorists. While Arendt and Habermas could yearn for the
piecemeal return of some bygone era or theorize a solution to the difficulties they described this
was not present in Foucault’s thought. For Foucault the normative element was lacking, as his
was more a project of description than prescription. In Foucault’s account, then, it is not that
politics has necessarily changed for the worse, just that it has changed. If the change can be
described as a change for the worse it is because more control was now possible, rather than
because some ideal was being abandoned.
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Turning away from their notions of an ideal public, or lack thereof, I want to consider
their identifications of the changing nature of the political. Perhaps the most obvious and
pressing connection between the three theorists is their position on the inclusion of economics in
the political sphere. All three described the entrance of economy into politics as a sea change for
politics in the modern era. For Arendt this meant the inclusion of economic concerns that would
be more properly dealt with by administration or housekeeping than politics and, of equal
importance, the privileged status given the economic mindset. Similarly, Habermas described the
way both economic interests and the economic mode of bargaining and exchange had replaced
the political and communicative processes by which the force of the better argument stood a
chance of winning the day. Foucault also described an altered relationship between politics and
economics, as economics became a means by which governance could be exerted upon the
population and the individual. Foucault too saw the economic mindset as having taken over
decision-making in all areas of life, demonstrating how all decisions and actions could be
understood in economic terms.
The result of the privileged status of economics is that politics is primarily conducted
along economic principles; principles that Arendt identified as more appropriate for
administration carried out by a bureaucratic apparatus than the politics of free and equal citizens.
Individuals can primarily be understood as homo æconomicus rather than zoon politikon. As such
they enter into politics prepared to bargain and make trade-offs with an eye toward advancing
their private and subjective economic interests. Communicative political understanding,
conceived as understanding an issue from all sides, has been replaced by the project of advancing
private interests. Since the political sphere was now about the advancement of private interests
the mentality and mode of action attached to that ultimate end was now applicable. In addition to
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bargaining and exchange, manipulation and strategic relations became the norm, which were
previously prohibited in idealized political spheres. The relationships that were, for Arendt, not
permitted within the polis now become common in politics. This went beyond individuals of
equal ability and resources engaging in gamesmanship to gain a competitive advantage. As
individual’s and organization’s private interests and resources entered into play, differential
resources and abilities were utilized to construct a system benefiting economic interests. Thus,
the economic mode of action was regularized and institutions were structured to benefit these
interests. Different constellations of governance emerged to favor the field of economics, the
economic mindset, and economic interests.
Another important similarity in the account presented is the rise of conformism in the
contemporary age. For Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault conformism arose through the
normalizing of the population. Governmental control over life conditions brought all into similar
circumstances. Arendt believed that conformism left no possibility for political action. None
would engage in novel endeavors because all understood that to be abnormal was dangerous.
Thus, Arendt described the rampant self-censoring inclinations of Americans in an age when
pariahs felt a compulsion to become parvenus. Foucault explained this position in a different way
with the panopticism of society. All know that they may potentially be under surveillance at any
given time and so must behave at all times as if they are. These individuals will self-regulate,
self-censor, and normalize themselves, realizing that whatever is not normal is considered
dangerous. Individuals living under such conditions will behave rather than act. Public opinion,
or rather, public expectations can rule dangerously and tyrannically.
The current security apparatus that has become so prevalent in advanced Western
democracies is an all too literal example of panopticism. From CCTV monitoring for which
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London has famously acquitted itself to America’s NSA surveillance programs, panopticism is
obviously associated with security. I will set these examples aside for the moment; they will be
taken up again below when I consider other ways in which panopticism leading to conformism,
self-discipline, and self-censorship can be detrimental to politics. At the most basic level the
pluralism required for democratic politics could not exist when all held the same views. Arendt’s
notion of politics requires both equality and pluralism. If pluralism were quashed and only
equality remained, there would be little prospect for politics. Economic equality would not
necessarily be the death knell for politics, and would not be unless that equality became absolute.
After all, there is much to contest beyond economic matters. However, if opinions, viewpoints,
and thoughts never emerged as speech, and thought itself was eventually self-censored, that
would be detrimental to nearly any conception of democratic politics.
A part of this self-censorship or self-discipline is not only law abidingness or political
self-restraint in the face of McCarthyism or the more recent post-9/11 “for us or against us”
narrative. This pressure to behave was in many cases a pressure to behave in accordance with the
newly dominant economic rationality. Action was once located within the political realm of life.
Now self-regulated behavior was the norm in all areas of life. However, the appearance of
freedom was conjured in the economic sphere, which was connected to all areas of life. Although
beguiling to many, economic freedom and economic action was at all times constrained by the
institutional rules of the state’s preferred system. It was the freedom to behave as homo
æconomicus, to act as dictated by the economic mentalité, and to be free to apply this mode of
life to all spheres. Unsurprisingly, people seize this opportunity, for lack of any others, and
economics becomes more firmly entrenched in politics and the mindset dominant in individual
psyches. Freedom became the freedom to conform to social and economic norms and
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expectations. Arendt saw this as the end of politics and the beginning of the social realm.
Foucault described a process by which this system was self-enforced while allowing the
possibility of resistance. Habermas recognized similar problems associated with mass society
and attempted to promote a more pluralistic and just democratic society through his theoretical
models of discourse ethics and communicative action. Habermas also described the manner in
which instrumental rationality as well as its institutional representatives had colonized the
lifeworld. The idea of the lifeworld as theoretically distinguishable from the system may set the
thought of Habermas apart from that of Arendt and Foucault.
The result was a political realm dominated by economic concerns and mentalités, which
are self-enforced by individuals. Indeed, all areas of life can be seen as dominated by economics,
although if Arendt’s account is to be believed this was the case even in the Greek world of rigid
distinctions. Once the realm of politics was no longer a realm of action among those who were
truly equal, since individuals possess different resources and those resources are allowed to enter
into politics, it became a realm of not only economic relations, but a realm of force as well. In
Arendt’s account force was stricken from the political sphere. It was permissible only where
individuals were aneu logou. As described in Chapter 2, similar to economics, force became both
a subject and a means of politics. Politics became not only a realm of economic bargaining and
trade-offs to maximize economic goods, but a space of raw power, coercion and manipulation.
Absent a communicative public sphere, Habermas described the way communication became
strategic, manipulative, distorted, and coercive. In the pre-idealized bourgeois public sphere a
powerful lord could simply rule by dictate. In the modern world, at least in democratic states, to
dictate policies is not sufficient; instead, the appearance of communicative politics is created
even though such a politics is strategically and perhaps even systematically distorted. Foucault
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described the growth of the state’s internal police and the development of the political-military
complex, and beyond this the inclination, nearing obsession, to ensure security from enemies
both internal and external.
It is not difficult to paint a portrait of the state as security obsessed, or to list the
innumerable constellations of state apparatuses geared toward the assurance of security.
Certainly, security is a legitimate goal of the state; a state must after all ensure the persistence of
its population and itself if that is necessary to protect life. The Greek polis did this and any state
that did not would not be long for this world, especially in more volatile eras than the present.
However, this was not always the proper and primary focus of politics. More often than not
paying heed to security concerns is necessary to protect and maintain the political realm, but
protection from armed opposition was not the subject of politics. It may even be a political
matter when existential threats to the system arise, but it is not the only political matter, which
dominates everywhere and always. This may be a matter for the security apparatus and its
civilian leadership, a matter for properly publicly concerned experts. After all, how much
freedom could truly exist if the choice was between continuation or annihilation? If you have
nothing to hide you have nothing to fear. How can Achillean words and deeds be uttered and
acted upon if the choice is between the dichotomously Schmittian categories of friend or foe? If
you do not concede, then you are yourself a danger. This choice is strategically manipulative.
Security is set up as the primary political issue of the day and then in essence there is no viable
choice.
A distinction can be drawn here between persuasion and violence or force. Genuine
persuasion through speech which allowed the force of the better argument to carry the day was
the very essence of Arendtian politics and communicative action. Other means of persuasion

	
  

282
which relied upon raw power or manipulation rather than the force of convincing words were
antithetical to politics. This included modern beliefs like Mao’s that power grows from the barrel
of a gun. This notion of power was also characterized by Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz, the
idea that politics is war continued by other means. While persuasion and understanding
privileged the better argument exchanges permitting force enabled the position with the most raw
power at its disposal to triumph.
Force is used to dictate the outcomes of debates about the use of force, and
accompanying political concerns. The state’s apparatuses and with it the public concern, and the
political sphere have been oriented toward security. With those concerns force in the form of
coercion and manipulation override genuine discourse to achieve the outcome of a continued and
growing concern with security and the perpetuation of security as the dominant issue. Issues that
are not necessarily matters of security are either linked to security, subjected to the means of
force, or both. The most obvious example can be found in Cold War era economics when the
dichotomy between friends and foes was based upon the distinction between capitalist or
communist. Today, the private realm may be the only space left for some degree of freedom, yet
this too has been infiltrated by security as metadata, or as more intrusive information on phone
calls and emails is collected. The claim “if you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear”
brings about manipulative acceptance, and security extends farther into the remaining untouched
areas of life, and behavior is farther subjected to self-disciplining tendencies.
The result is a politics that in lieu of being a realm of freedom for the benefit of those
involved becomes a realm where all behavior is aimed at achieving desired outcomes, often the
promotion of private interests. In this realm of gamesmanship anything goes to promote
subjective self-interest or perceived self-interest. Politics is something to be won. Constellations
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of institutions are structured to restrict play and possible outcomes to a certain set. Discipline,
conformism and strategically structured choices ensure that most do not violate the rules or aim
toward undesirable results. Economic interests are promoted and the economic mindset
dominates. Consistent with this mindset advantages are pressed and this means taking advantage
of resource disparities. Genuine communicative discourse is discouraged since politically
understanding an issue from all sides would require questioning the correctness of individual
positions. In this form of politics security is employed as a focal point and force is employed as a
means.
The primary issues of the political realm become economics and security. With
economics not winning for one’s own position means giving something up, either in the form of
current resources or future profits. This is unacceptable to profit maximizing homo æconomicus.
Economic means are used to structure the game in certain ways, and individuals conform to the
rules, as doing so is required for success. Those who do not succeed have only themselves to
blame for being poor CEOs. Security is the other dominant issue of politics, and in security there
is no real choice possible, and so no freedom to dissent or strike out in a novel direction. When
dealing with issues of security and the use of force, ends can be sought by any means necessary.
The choice is between life and death and rules are only a hindrance in this ultimate pursuit. Thus,
force, manipulation, coercion, and any constellation of apparatuses may be employed to achieve
the only outcome that can possibly be chosen. Economics and security have become the two
issues and mindsets within the modern political realm and both have predetermined goals that are
sought by any means necessary. Thucydides’s depiction of life in nonpolitical spheres is now
true in all areas of life.
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Before proceeding I would like to note that this could be read as a bit conspiratorial,
though this was not the intent or the point. I am not arguing that there is some hidden elite class
of puppet masters pulling the strings. Disparities of resources, access, and abilities certainly
bring differing levels of influence, and this is made all the more important in a political sphere
where all advantages are utilized to increase profits or advance private interest. However, even
the most influential elites are playing the same impoverished political game. They possess
advantages that stack the deck in their favor in a political realm where de jure equality is negated
by relevant de facto inequality. Elites are more likely to have their private economic interests
advanced, win office, or have their interests more strongly represented by those in power. In all
of this they are still involved in a political realm that has changed drastically over time and is no
longer a space for freedom. They too must play the game and do not experience freedom in the
political sense, although their lifestyles are more extravagant and absent of poverty, hunger, and
above mere survival. Even the most powerful and influential will not experience politics in
Arendt’s sense of the highest form of human activity.
The existing system is beyond the control of any class of individuals. If politics was
collective self-determination based upon freedom, then none experience politics in the modern
age. We do not realize that the blob has swallowed us, that our communications are
systematically distorted, or that governmental and non-governmental apparatuses shape our
behavior and compel us to shape our own behavior. The changes to the political described here
are so pervasive and so ingrained that they are not recognized. Other possibilities for politics are
difficult to imagine. There is widespread alienation from freedom, from action, from politics, and
from public life, which was once highly valued. The alienation itself is taken as given; how could
it be otherwise?
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5.2 Practical Diagnoses and Prescriptions
In this section I briefly translate the theories that have been discussed to this point into
diagnoses of practical problems and present some limited prescriptions toward altering the
political for the better. Altering the conception of the political may be seen as either a recovery
of the spirit of some bygone age, or as coming closer to some more just and free theorized ideal.
Although the accounts of Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault differ in certain respects they share
some common underlying themes. If all three thinkers presented were reduced to simplistic
versions of their shared statements on the contemporary political sphere we would be left with
the following: (1) Private interests, especially economics, has become too influential in politics,
as well as other realms of life, as both a subject and a mode of conduct. (2) Power, coercion, and
strategic manipulation have become dominant in politics both as subjects and as modes of
conduct. (3) Politics has become about winning or achieving desired outcomes by shaping
individual behavior, rather than about freedom. These are obviously broad oversimplified
statements, but are central parallels between the works of Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault.
These theoretical claims can be translated into practical manifestations of the problems that
plague the prevailing conception of the political.
The questions of what is left of ideal politics or how to recover ideal politics cannot be
definitively answered. These are actually the wrong questions. More appropriate and answerable
questions would be something like: how can politics more closely resemble the ideals? How can
the problematic aspects of politics presented here be minimized? How can politics be
realistically changed to offset the negative aspects of the developments that have been detailed
here? These questions can be answered, and in answering them it may be possible to alter
politics for the better by permitting more individual space, more freedom to speak and act, and
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less influence by nonpolitical interests, among innumerable other things. Comprehensive
answers would be required to address problems on a national, if not global scale, and be
unfathomably complex. Rather than beginning with a project of such intimidating scope, I
consider some still difficult yet decidedly more comprehensible endeavors. Some such projects
have already begun or have been formulated elsewhere, if not undertaken in an effective manner.
However, they have not necessarily been understood within the context of combating the
developments described by the theorists that I have been considering.
The sociologist Erik Olin Wright has suggested one possibility, although it is large-scale
and perhaps too utopian for implementation. He proposed restructuring social institutions aiming
for emancipatory effects from a variety of contemporary ills, particularly in Wright’s mind, the
problems associated with capitalism (Wright, 2010, 2012).68 Such a large project is daunting,
however Wright has made some concrete, small-scale recommendations. For example, he and
others have pointed to participatory budgeting as one real world instance of empowering utopian
institutional design. In participatory budgeting politicians and technocrats relinquish some
control as neighborhood assemblies come together, debate, and elect representatives to take their
proposals to a city-wide budget council (Baiocchi, 2003; Fung & Wright, 2003; Wright, 2010
Ch. 6 ; 2012, pp. 9-10). This model started in Brazil, and much attention has been paid to its
original context, however, as Wright notes it has spread to other cities, including districts in New
York and Chicago (Wright, 2012, p. 10). Such efforts bring citizens back into discussions from
which they have long been excluded in favor professionals and technocrats taking care of them.
Proposals like these have only been implemented on the small scale and may only be
possible locally. Jefferson’s ward system may be a well-known example of this type of
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For a project of similar scope and approach, see Levitas (2013).
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structure.69 The difficulty of course is to ensure that small-scale, local participatory systems have
some substantive say in important decisions. Municipal budgeting may not be exciting enough,
or deemed important enough to draw widespread participation. Although perhaps if practices like
this became commonplace, then participation would increase as they come to be viewed as an
important component of democratic practice. Additionally, perhaps there could be some way of
incorporating larger-scale decisions into the local process or having local decisions speak to
bigger questions. This may represent the creation of a form of political glocalism, or the French
mundialization. It may be possible for technology to permit participation on a larger scale to an
extent never before possible. For online participation to be considered a public sphere the
interactions that take place there may need to become richer than they commonly are now. It
seems doubtful that communicative understanding could be achieved with exchanges of one
hundred-forty characters or less. Furthermore, for online interaction to be considered a political
sphere or to contribute to political decision-making elaborate security apparatuses would have to
be developed to ensure that the process was not technologically rigged. The anonymity
associated with online interaction would likely also need to be done away with. Additionally, the
successful implementation of more participatory systems may also require more extensive civic
education to ensure that individuals have a better understanding of the importance of their
decisions and how these decisions affect the whole of society.
The foreseeable objection to participatory budgeting, and other such suggestions, in this
context is that budgeting is itself an economic act and thus more properly administrative than
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Arendt was familiar with this proposal, but did not endorse it. She was dismissive of
Jefferson’s system in particular writing that it “would spell the end of general suffrage as we
understand it today,” and that it was impractically revolutionary (Arendt, 1963c, pp. 279, 250).
Arendt claimed that Jefferson himself understood these shortcoming and that is why there is no
mention of the system in his own formal writings (Arendt, 1963c, p. 250).
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political, in Arendt’s terms. How can politics be saved from economics or economic influence
lessened if economics remains a primary subject of politics? This question could be asked of a
number of Wright’s other suggestions, for example, solidarity funds, worker owned
cooperatives, and basic social income. Economics may not be the enemy of politics; rather it
may be the economic mindset and the controlling relationship between economics and the state,
along with virtually all other spheres of life that is problematic. Economic structures and
interests have acquired the power to dictate the rules of the game, but it may be possible to make
decisions about how to enforce those rules politically or to create economic structures that
operate by processes more closely resembling genuine politics. Wright’s suggestions would
move participatory democratic politics into a position to exert more control over economic
concerns at the grassroots level. This may be able to reign in the hold economics possesses over
politics. Even if economics, at least in some small instances, were democratized, the mode of
conduct within those political spheres would need to be something more ideal than strategic. The
ultimate goals of the individuals in those circumstances should be discovering the good of the
community through open, free, and equal debate and not promoting individual self-interest. This
would be hard to achieve, but would be more likely to result from debates between individuals
than debates between politicians trained in the arts of coercive rhetoric and dependent upon
funding from dominant economic interests. This subject will be returned to below.
Considering another proposal associated with Wright, namely, unconditional basic
minimum income, yields similar results. Unconditional basic income would provide every
individual legally residing within a state with a guaranteed income sufficient to keep them above
the poverty line with no strings attached (Wright, 2010 Ch. 7; 2012, pp. 11-12).70 The state long
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For a more in depth discussions of the proposal for unconditional basic income, see the essay
in Wright (2006), also see van Parjis (2013).
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ago entered into the social welfare game and yet does a poor job of providing for the basic needs
of its citizens. In fact, despite politics becoming a system of housekeeping it is desirable for the
state to be involved lest we find ourselves with an ideal polis occupied only by free billionaires
propped up by the labor of the masses who are unable to participate. The political sphere would
be better as an inclusive realm although the political freedom of the impoverished could be
questioned. The social question has become relevant and will always remain so after being let
out of the bag. Humanity may be better for it, but this does not mean that the social question
must dominate politics. Unconditional basic income would, in essence, be a way to answer the
question and hence remove it from political debate or at least lessen its pressing or all consuming
nature. Unconditional basic income would go at least part of the way toward ensuring equality
among those who meet in the political sphere. Similarly, Thomas Piketty’s (2014) recent
proposal for a universal progressive tax approaches the issue from the upper end of the wealth
spectrum. These types of proposals would not result in individuals becoming absolute economic
equals, or equal to the extent that they were in classical Greece, but at least there would be, to
borrow from Rousseau, none so wealthy that they could buy another and none so poor that they
are forced to sell themselves. The role of economic necessity in politics could be alleviated.
A similar case could be made for provisions like universal healthcare. To a certain extent
it would entail government involvement in healthcare, although government is already involved
in that area in that it creates a privileged place for economic interests. Universal healthcare could
be undertaken in the name of making citizens more equal and thus more likely to communicate
politically rather than being entirely preoccupied with satisfying their most basic needs. Overall,
a policy of meeting minimum basic needs would withdraw the basic needs of life from the
political agenda and diminish the effects of drastic economic inequality on political equality. The

	
  

290
extent to which the state guarantees the essential needs of life vary from local to local. The
widespread trend during the current austerity phase, following the global financial crisis which
began in 2008, has been to provide less to those who are most in need. Those economically
struggling to meet their basic needs of food, shelter, and health, for example, are unlikely to enter
into the political sphere as free and equal participants. An expansion of healthcare to include
more of the population would improve the prospect of a more equitable form of politics.
Guaranteeing the essentials of life would also free individuals from their dependence upon
private employers as the sole reliable source of such essentials. In short, the best prospect for
approximating an idealized politics is to travel farther into the social abyss originally responsible
for its theoretical downfall. Such concrete suggestions, which would enhance individual control
and participation, may indeed deepen democracy as their proponents claim. Individuals could
reclaim power from bureaucratic and technocratic apparatuses. However, along with the form
and frequency, the very nature of political debate would need to be altered.
Living near the once thriving industrial hub Detroit, I cannot help but consider recent
events there. Following years of mismanagement and corruption by any standard, the once
powerful city filed for bankruptcy. The state government appointed an emergency manager to
oversee the city’s finances. Citizens responded with disruptive, although short-lived, protests.
This represents the conflicting nature of contemporary movements and embodies the same
conflict present in propositions that would deepen democracy, like Olin Wright’s. Initially, this
type of movement is reactive, as any attempt to reclaim control over politics may necessarily be.
To require genuinely spontaneously generated action then, may be to require too much and set an
impractically high standard.
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Most paradoxical, however, is the fact that any ability to reclaim public control over
politics has been oriented toward economic control. In the case of Detroit, citizens
unsuccessfully demanded that financial decisions be returned to the realm of democratic politics,
instead of vesting such decisions in an appointed administrative position. Similar comments
could be made of anti-austerity protests in Greece and elsewhere. However, budgeting decisions
may be more properly considered administrative, rather than political. The fixation upon
economic subjects reflects the fact that it is the most readily accessible point at which public
debate can be brought back in. On these types of subject it may be possible for participatory
democratic politics to begin retaking control. Perhaps it could play the role of the non-political
bourgeois public sphere in Habermas’s work. It may be a space in which individuals can develop
discursive abilities that could later be applied to other issues. The fact that economic decisions
serve as a point of entry is both discouraging and hopeful. It is discouraging in that it
demonstrates that economics have so displaced politics that any effort to recover democratic
governance orients itself toward economics. Simultaneously, it is hopeful in that there are
citizens who want democratic politics to mean something, who want their actions in the public
sphere to have some impact upon their collective and individual lives. There is at least some
desire to escape from the social blob and regain control, even if administrative decisions are all
that can conceivably be controlled.
Contemporary social movements have recognized and attempted to weaken the hold that
economics exerts over politics. The now diminished Occupy movement, albeit poorly organized
and as a result incapable of conveying entirely coherent messages, held as its core the demand
that subjective corporate influence on government be lessened. More concretely articulated calls
for reform along these lines are embodied by common calls for political reform, such as
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overturning the Citizens United decision, i.e. limiting corporate campaign contributions, the
Court’s McCutcheon decision could be added to this, doing away with Super PACs and political
dark money, publicly financing elections, etc. These types of reforms may limit economic
influence in the political sphere; this would, in turn, limit the extent to which the economic
mentalité dominates political decision-making. Creating a context capable of offsetting economic
rationale and profit maximization for either public or private entities would be a crucial step in
altering politics. Reforms of this sort have been widely and popularly discussed, but have yet to
be seriously implemented. If anything the trend seems to be in the opposite direction, toward
more economic influence over government and entanglement with politics.
Another disconcerting development is the impending demise of internet neutrality in the
United States. The principle of net neutrality requires openness of the internet, that is the private
companies providing the internet connection would not be permitted to favor content of certain
types or from certain sources, or censor content. Without internet neutrality powerful private
entities would be free to make selected content more easily accessible, charge higher rates for
accessing unfavorable contents, or perhaps even censor competitors content. The end of net
neutrality may have relatively innocuous effects to the extent of having to wait longer for
entertainment downloads from certain sources. A worst-case scenario could see information
restricted as deemed economically beneficial by corporations. It is not a secret that individuals
gather a great deal of information from online sources. If an informed citizenry were important in
democracies, then the quality of participation would certainly be harmed by potentially restricted
access to information. Political news or information pertinent to voting decisions could be
controlled by private entities seeking to maximize their economic benefits. This would be
tantamount to economics not only being a subject and mode of politics, but economic control
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over what information about politics is available. This would impair individuals’ ability to make
informed and free decisions about politics.
Arendt took the position that the Roman obsession with the protection and renewal of
their political founding was a valid form of politics. In particular, she noted the Roman ability to
expand the political realm and make friends of enemies by expanding the scope of those included
in their political sphere (Arendt, 2005). Immigration reform, a much discussed yet rarely acted
upon issue in the United States, may have a similar impact. Immigration reform could be another
piece of strengthening the political realm. The greater the proportion of a nation’s population that
is comprised of legal or illegal alien residents who would like to engage in politics as citizens but
are unable to do so the more exclusive that nation’s political sphere. As is evident from the
previous discussion of Agamben, immigration can be fit into this theoretical framework in a
number of ways. The distinction among residents along legal lines is worth drawing. Legal
noncitizen residents are full citizens in the economic sense though not in the political sense. They
participate in the economy in the same manner as citizens; however, they are excluded from
participating in the political sphere. Illegal residents, who are also noncitizens, participate in a
shadow economy, where economic and political rights are often lacking. They too do not
participate in the political sphere. Opening the political sphere to more of these individuals
would make it more inclusive, thereby expanding political equality and plurality. This system of
permitting large scale participation in the official or shadow economic spheres while prohibiting
participation in the political sphere is vexing, especially since the denial of political equality is
motivated by economic, profit maximizing motives.
The argument could be that entrance into the political sphere is extremely valuable and
should be difficult to acquire. Alternatively, the argument could be that economic participation
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or economic citizenship is more important than political citizenship. Considering the first
argument, it would follow that withholding entrance into the political sphere is debasing any
noncitizen resident into a mass of aneu logon or a modern version of homo sacer. This is the
view expressed by those wishing to keep the political sphere exclusive. Citizenship is held aloft
as a good, which would be diminished if extended to some large number of others. Inclusion of
these people in the political sphere would both enrich their lives via politics and may enhance
politics by bringing additional viewpoints and individuals who hold citizenship in high esteem.
The second argument seems more consistent with the actual practice of current Americans. More
time and effort is spent participating economically, working, producing, and purchasing, than is
spent participating politically. This is routinely evidenced by low voter turn out and low levels of
political knowledge. The paradox is that Americans restrict entrance into the political sphere
(even those born with citizenship cannot enter until turning eighteen) while simultaneously on a
large scale opting out of participating themselves.
Expanding the political sphere to be more inclusive may by one part of politics, namely,
the creation and maintenance of political membership. Another possible path may involve the
protection of a founding, as was also the case with the Roman republic (Arendt, 2005). Could
constitutional fetishism, of the type alluded to by Louis Hartz (1955) represent a more pure form
of politics? To answer this it is necessary to determine exactly what an obsession with honoring
and protecting the founding would entail. It would require the constant maintenance, reappraisal,
and renewal of a political realm. It would need to be more than scattered holidays celebrating
independence or the birthdays of founding fathers. It would also require more than basic
education, though that would certainly be a necessary component. This would still leave open the
danger that politics would be reduced to nothing more than talk about what politics is, reducing
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the political to a realm devoid of content. Politics then must entail the maintenance of the
fundamental principles of politics, which permit the presence of other subjects.
In the American system, and other similar systems, the maintenance of the political realm
and adhering to the principles of the founding seems most obviously the realm of the judiciary.
More troubling is that it would confine politics to the highest level of judicial deliberations.
Restricting politics to what takes place in the Supreme Court, or similar institutions like the
German Constitutional Court would be problematic. This would be even less inclusive than the
polis of Greek antiquity. Politics in the United States could only be engaged in by a few elites
with lifetime appointments. A textbook understanding of the Supreme Court would meet this
criterion. Nine black robed Platonic guardians of the principles of the republic would debate the
merits of an issue and determine which possible outcome most closely preserves the letter of the
Constitution and the spirit of the founding. Even if we wished to restrict politics to this level
some would suggest that what takes place in the Supreme Court is not a politics aimed toward
understanding and achieving the most desirable outcome, but rather partisanship oriented toward
promoting some predetermined end. Attorneys and those organizations filing amicus briefs
normally advocate one side of the conflict. Even at this elite and exclusive level it may be that
this severely limited definition of politics does not take place.
Efforts to popularize the preservation of the founding have been neither inclusive nor
grassroots and have espoused an ersatz notion of founding principles and politics. I have in mind
the contemporary political movement calling itself the Tea Party. The movement of those calling
themselves Tea Party patriots gained popularity in recent years, primarily among extreme
conservatives, by purporting to desire a return to the founding American principles and strict
adherence to the Constitution. The problems with the Tea Party’s approach are abundant; among
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them are charges that the group is exclusionary, nativist or racist (Belk, 2012; Disch, 2012;
Walker, 2011); that they lack an understanding of the principles they claim to uphold (Wood,
2010); that they are backed by billionaires attempting to influence policy to their advantage or at
the very least strongly influenced by elites (Fallin, Grana, & Glantz, 2013; Skocpol &
Williamson, 2012); or that they are unwilling to compromise to even attempt to understand
alternative perspectives. If any of these charges are true, and at least a few of them seem to be,
then the Tea Party would not represent an effort to preserve the rules under which genuine
politics could function and instead is a manifestation of the symptoms of the problems of modern
politics. The challenge is to discern between genuine appeals to the spirit of a political founding
and self-interested appeals to strategic misinterpretations of a founding.
Even though the judiciary must necessarily be exclusive and the contemporary Tea Party
movement is plagued with problems, this does not mean that a preservation of founding
principles cannot be a component of politics. The problem is envisioning what such an inclusive
commitment of this type would look like, while acknowledging that the constitutional rules of
the founding have been necessarily altered and updated. The Roman approach of repetition of the
founding through imperialistic expansions is undesirable and has proven nearly impossible, as
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated. It seems necessary that the focus on founding
principles be primarily internally focused, although spreading the gospel of American democracy
abroad in a peaceful manner may be permissible. A commitment to founding principles could be
as simple as making the commitment to neither violating the laws or political institutions nor
tolerating their violation by others, as called for by Lincoln in his Lyceum address. More
fundamentally, debate about how to recover or reinstitute a more genuine version of politics may
be some component of that genuine politics. As already hinted at, this could involve not just the
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commitment to democratic principles, but ensuring that the political realm is more inclusive and
accessible to all, and simultaneously, ensuring that those who enter the political sphere do so on
an equal footing free from the demands of necessity and concerns about the life processes.
Concerns about the extent of equality or the nature of the equality required for a
functional political realm would veer into questions of distributive justice. Relevant here is Jean
Hampton’s notion of relational equality, which she traces back to Aristotle:
We want, he says, a society in which people treat each other as equals (no one should be
allowed to be the master of another or the salve of another) and in which these equals
treat each other as partners – or “civic friends.” The way to get that is to pursue not exact
equality of resources but sufficient equality to ensure that no one is able to use his greater
wealth to gain political advantage over others in a way that damages their partnership
(Hampton, 1997, p. 158).
Inequalities of resources that create inequalities in political relationships are undesirable and may
need to be offset to protect the integrity of democratic politics. This motivated Elizabeth
Anderson to argue that we should be “fundamentally concerned with the relationships within
which the goods are distributed, not only the distribution of goods themselves” (Anderson, 1999,
p. 314).71 So long as political relationships can be characterized as being relationships of equals,
then resource differences may not negatively affect politics. This position would shift the
question from one about the nature of equality to an empirical question about the level at which
resource inequalities compromise political relationships, or whether political relationships can be
considered equal under conditions of drastic inequalities.
The most pressing contemporary issues with respect to recovering a more genuine, albeit
idealized, version of politics, are related to the above-described issues of equality and access.
Both sets of issues speak to whether the contemporary political sphere will be an open realm or
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For other proponents of the relational view of equality, see David Miller (1997), Jonathan
Wolff (1998), Andrew Mason (1999-2000), and Samuel Scheffler (2003).
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whether it will exclude most individuals, while being accessible only to a handful of elites, as
was the case in antiquity. Such a political realm could surely not be considered democratic by
modern standards. In addition to questions of formal inclusiveness, e.g. citizenship, there are
questions of the actual effectiveness of inclusiveness, which are inseparable from questions of
equality. Although citizens may be included in the political sphere and de jure political equals,
inequalities could be so great or exclusion from certain opportunities so serious that they are de
facto unequals. Despite formal equality of citizenship some may be more influential or possess
enough resources and power to sway political apparatuses in their favor.
For example, one particularly important matter pertaining to informal inequality is
education. While all citizens may be formally equal, not having the same access to education
affects not only future economic prospects, but future political prospects as well. It is difficult to
envision a political realm populated by equals where some have far more advanced levels of
education. In extreme scenarios communication about issues and understanding of governmental
operation becomes difficult and manipulation more likely. Regardless of the distribution of
resources, individuals cannot be considered equal within the political realm if they do not all
possess a basic understanding of how that realm, and the institutions over which it is sovereign
operate. Of course, educational distribution is integrally connected to distribution of wealth. It
must be remembered that some inequality of wealth or distribution of resources is not necessarily
unjust or undemocratic as evidenced by the work of John Rawls, for example.
Additionally, Arendt identified forgiveness as a miraculous form of political action, one
she linked to the Christian tradition (Arendt, 1958, pp. 236-243; 2005, pp. 57-60). Forgiveness
entails the possibility of forming a new chain of events, rather than continuing to progress
through an already initiated sequence. Forgiveness could alter contemporary politics in a number
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of ways. Forgiveness as a political act on the part of a political entity may also be considered an
alternative to retaliation. Of course, forgiveness of trespasses should not be so extensive that it
endangers the existence of a nation. It could be applied to the debt of developing nations, which
could lead to a more prosperous future for those nations while making friends out of potential
enemies. This would also ensure that economics did not taint potential political relationships.
Analogously, the government could institute programs resulting in the forgiveness of domestic
debts to allow people to stay in their foreclosed homes, to aid those hindered by onerous student
loans, or other financial arrangements that threaten the ability to satisfy physical necessities. The
promises made in entering into contractual arrangements are also important, but when made from
unequal footing or when consenting to intentionally obscured terms that importance may be
reduced. Individual responsibility is still an important factor in a society where individuals
possess rights of self-determination; however, choices that are detrimental to politics may need
to be offset.
While creating a more inclusive political realm and encouraging a greater degree of
equality within that realm are important, those moves may be insufficient for creating a political
realm of the sort Arendt and Habermas desired. It would also be necessary to address the nature
of discourse in the political realm, which contemporarily more closely resembles strategic or
instrumental rather than political or communicative interaction. Each side of any given political
debate attempts to win over their opponents, or more realistically the undecided. Many support
positions that will most benefit themselves, rather than the best course of action for the
collective. Nearly anything goes in such efforts and coercion, manipulation, and bargaining are
the standard. Dialogical approaches of attempting to understand from all sides and support the
best option are exceptional occurrences. Correctives to the nature of the approach to the political
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realm would be difficult to enact. Creating a greater degree of political and economic equality
may help decolonize the political realm and make economic concerns less pressing. However,
while the opposing sides may be less contrary to one another under conditions of greater political
equality, absent a utopian socialist near complete equality there would always exist conflicting
positions.
Theoretically, Habermas pointed the way with his ideal speech situation and more
specifically discourse ethics (Habermas, 1996). It may be difficult to practically incorporate an
ideal speech situation into real-world political interactions. Habermas outlined an epistemic
procedure through which democratic processes could produce both reasonable outcomes and
result in collective learning (Habermas, 2006). In this procedure citizens communicating in civil
society and media operations in the political public sphere construct considered positions which
impact the deliberations of elected lawmakers. Several commentators have noted that this may
generate legal frameworks in which free citizens could live despite lack of agreement about what
they consider good (Bohman, 1996b; McCarthy, 1998). While this explains the legitimacy of
legal regimes in democratic societies, and leaves space for citizen input about which Habermas
was too skeptical in his early work, it would not necessarily result in communicative/political
understanding or a non-instrumental approach to behavior in the political sphere. Despite its
difficulties it seems that Habermas’s communicative approach may be the most fruitful among
those that have been constructed. The more that economic colonization, and money as a steering
media, can be offset in other ways, the greater the potential for communicative action and
deliberative democracy to return to the functioning of the political sphere Habermas described in
pre-structural transformation Europe.
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As for the disciplinary self-censoring society, this may be one of the most difficult among
a host of already exceedingly complex issues. The rise of disciplinary society is a bit more
enigmatic. A part of this enigmatic nature is due to the fact that disciplinarity appears to be
inextricably linked to security, the indispensible obsession of all states and of modern states in
particular. Perhaps it will be useful to consider disciplinarity, self-censorship, and conformism as
a divided issue, one component of which is associated with physical security, in the sense of
national security preventing military or terrorist attacks. The other component of discipline and
conformism would be unrelated to that security, in the sense of national security, would deal
with discipline and conformism resulting from governing from a distance or the tyranny of
public opinion.
First, consider discipline related to security. The panoptical nature of contemporary
government has only been furthered by revelations about the scope of domestic surveillance in
the United States, most obviously as conducted by the National Security Agency, although the
Central Intelligence Agency and other groups have been implicated as well. Technology has
enabled observation of individuals at any moment, and individuals must live every moment with
the knowledge that they may be under observation. This instills in the individual the importance
of self-regulation. Of course, there is a distinction to be made between those who would engage
in crimes against individuals or the state but refrain from doing so because of the knowledge that
they would be surveyed, stopped, and punished and those who self-censor so as not to be
ostracized or subjected to suspicion because of their political views. Some self-censorship is
useful while some is harmful. The extension of governmental-like power to nongovernmental
entities can be seen here. After all, individuals are surveyed not just by the NSA, but also by the
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companies that allow our emails to be sent, and market researchers tailoring advertisements to
make it more likely that we make a purchase.
These trends are politically detrimental to the extent that they create a system of
conformity in which individuals are incapable of or unwilling to engage in original speech or
action for fear of reprisal. When the pressure of public opinion and self-imposed conformity
become determinative of individual deeds, the political realm is endangered. This is a difficult
category to measure and even more difficult to counteract. Obviously, it would be problematic if
the power of surveillance were abused via application to nonviolent advocates of unpopular
political positions. Such was the case with J. Edgar Hoover’s surveillance of Martin Luther King
Jr., for example. The FBI’s surveillance of Dr. King would have been far more pervasive and his
cause likely hindered had Hoover had today’s technology at his disposal. The surveillance did
not deter King from advocating his unpopular political positions or from speaking great
nonviolent words or doing great nonviolent deeds. It is unclear whether potentially heroic
political actors are being deterred by the possibility of surveillance or the self-regulating
conformity that may follow from it. To the extent that they are then politics has been harmed.
Preventing security related disciplinary measures from harming the legitimate political
sphere would be a difficult task. It seems impossible to imagine a state without a massive
security and surveillance apparatus given the nature of the contemporary world, the persistence
of traditional security threats and the emergence of asymmetric security threats. The emphasis on
security is not likely to weaken and the answer may be a more targeted less broadly applied
surveillance with a strong system of oversight. The key would be to ensure that would-be
creative political reformers are free from reprisal, while violent subversives representing a threat
to innocent life can be deterred. Following from this the now common call to curtail surveillance
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would be beneficial to the political sphere. Even a decreased surveillance may be problematic as
the line between necessary and abusive must be drawn somewhere. Individuals near the
surveillance line may not be certain of which side they are located upon. Anyone advocating an
existentially threatening, although nonviolent view is likely to be perceived as a threat. To the
extent that this limits political debate and precludes novel possibilities it would be undesirable.
The limitation of surveillance would be an oversimplified step, however, there would still be the
constellation of governmental and nongovernmental factors leading to self-government and
conformity that would be difficult to parse through and would vary from context to context.
The current objections to pervasive domestic surveillance have been raised at the
grassroots levels and by political elites. This demonstrates that Foucauldian resistance can
operate even in the face of panopticism. There can exist counterdiscourse aimed at protecting or
expanding a space of freedom in the face of disciplining apparatuses. This has come from the
highest levels of government as Senator Diane Feinstein’s ongoing row with the CIA
demonstrates. Of course, freedom from having your emails read by the employees of security
agencies does not necessarily translate into political freedom. However, it is difficult to imagine
political freedom existing in a context where individuals fear reprisals for expressing unpopular
political thoughts that may question the current regime. Still, the freedom to organize peaceful
protests or to nonviolently challenge current practices or theories must be maintained to ensure
political freedom. The trick is to make the manipulatively constructed adage ‘if you have nothing
to hide, then you have nothing to fear’ into a reality. It must be emphasized that counterdiscourse
is nothing to hide, that creative or original thought must be encouraged rather than deterred or
feared. Perhaps this counterdiscourse could be considered genuinely political despite its being
reactive rather than spontaneous.
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The second component of discipline and conformity may be more related to governing at
a distance or social pressure to conform to modes of behaving and thinking. This discipline may
be even less required by the contemporary world than the security component, since it cannot be
argued that this form of discipline is necessary to preserve the very existence of democratic
states or protect the lives of their populations. Governing at a distance through the dispersal of
governance apparatuses to nongovernmental entities results not only in discipline, but selfdiscipline. This can be seen not only in the ability of private economic entities to shape
individual behavior as well as the pressure that can be exerted by collectives of individuals on
others. A result of this is conformism to behavior as economic agents, the reluctance to deviate
from that mode of conduct, and again unwillingness to be express views or take actions that
could lead to one being viewed as a pariah.
Combating this non-security discipline and conformism can be related to some of the
measures already mentioned. Relieving individuals of the necessity to behave as economic actors
and meet the expectations of the market and its actors may be useful. Perhaps guarantees of
satisfying the most basic of life necessities through measures like unconditional basic income
and universal healthcare would alleviate some of the disciplinary requirements of devoting one’s
efforts to behaving as homo æconomicus. Self-regulation as an entrepreneurial individual may be
less important under those conditions. Furthermore, collective control over the workplace or the
budgetary process, as suggest by Wright, could wrest control back from the undemocratic
entities that oversee the disciplinary society. Another possibility would be to decrease the
distance between government in the traditional sense and the non-governmental entities to which
governance has been extended. It may again seem paradoxical to call for increased government
control in this discussion. However, the functions of governance that are responsible for the
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disciplinary and self-regulated society have been extended to non-governmental entities, like
corporations, that are not subject to democratic control. The ability to counter this disciplinarity
embedded in the private realm would be beyond the control of even a properly functioning
political sphere. The reintegration of governance into government thereby removing governance
from private hands would at least permit the possibility of democratically controlling it. In short,
it may be necessary to subject the private corporation to increased political control to prevent it
from exerting undue influence over individual lives.
Conformism arising from social pressure in the Arendtian and Tocquevillian sense could
also be related to a suggestion already made with respect to the security component of discipline.
Counteracting this type of conformism requires the protection and encouragement of a plurality
of viewpoints, even unpopular ones, of understanding things politically, and of encouraging
creative and novel thinking about social, political, and governmental problems. If the ability to
engage in spontaneous and free speech and deed are considered political, then society must
encourage just such efforts. Novelty and diversity of ideas should be embraced and fear of
ostracism must not be allowed to interfere by necessitating self-censorship. Perhaps creativity
could be encouraged by alleviating economic necessity or lessening the disciplinary power of the
security apparatus and the influence of private entities possessing the power of governance that
demand self-regulation. Spontaneity and originality may also be encouraged by ensuring greater
de facto equality within the political sphere by limiting economic influence that results in
significant advantages or renders the system incapable of change.
However, something more may be required. Encouraging miraculous novelty in political
thought, speech, and deed requires thinking about politics in a different way. Politics cannot be
viewed as a means for achieving economic or security ends, as restricting thought to these
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standards of rationality and providing presumably predetermined ends will necessarily limit the
possibilities available. In essence, politics may need to be approached as an art rather than as a
more determinant science like physics or economics in the social sciences. I do not intend to
connote the art of government in the Foucauldian sense of the phrase and I will instead use the
phrase “the art of politics.” This would be opposed to the concept of politics as political science,
although I do not mean to imply that the government, its institutions, and the citizenry could not
still be studied scientifically, or that doing so would necessarily be antithetical to an art of
politics. The art of politics would be the mode of acting within the political sphere, the way
citizens and elected officials conduct themselves. The point would be to think creatively and
without constraint, save for not infringing upon the lives of freedoms of individuals. Within the
political sphere individuals should be able to communicate freely, creatively, and equally. For all
intents and purposes this would be consistent with the Arendtian notion of politics as well as
Habermas’s communicative action, and the more emancipatory elements of Foucault. This would
require institutions capable of promoting the proper sort of political and democratic education.
Historical examples like the settlement house movement spurred by Chicago’s Hull House could
be considered. The point is to create contexts in which it is possible to think artistically and
creatively about politics, and perhaps some of the suggestions discussed in this conclusion are a
first concrete step in that direction.
None of the potential remedies mentioned are complete remedies. They would all need
to be undertaken to offset the various transformations of politics. Furthermore, none of the
potential remedies are easy to implement and may be even more difficult to realize. The
practicalities of simultaneously harnessing the collective will, altering powerful institutional
arrangements, and changing the way of thinking about politics are difficult barriers to overcome.
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They would require tremendous structural and societal changes in the way the political entity
behaves, its make-up, and the way its individual members think. Irrespective of what steps can
be taken toward the realization of an inclusive political realm that can be truly characterized as a
sphere of free and equal individuals capable of meaningful action, the first step is simpler and
more achievable.
The first step in recovering the type of genuine or idealized politics which existed prior to
the transformations described by Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault, and to ensuring that the
political realm is a realm of inclusivity, equality, and hence freedom, is the realization that it may
not entail those characteristics. We must realize that politics has not always existed in its
contemporary form. As has been demonstrated through the examination of the theoretical works
of these thinkers, the political realm has not been a static concept or mode of behavior from time
immemorial. Politics used to mean something different than it does today. The changes may have
occurred for a variety of reasons, as outlined in the preceding chapters. It may be difficult to step
outside of the contemporary mindset and language to imagine a drastically different meaning of
the word politics and a perhaps unrecognizable political sphere. This endeavor may be necessary
prior to implementing any reforms. To return to Pitkin’s B-movie metaphor, our first step must
be to realize that we have been consumed by the blob (Pitkin, 1998). This theoretical blob that
has consumed humanity and displaced politics has grown to include aspects of Arendt’s,
Habermas’s, and Foucault’s thought, and as a result its existence will become even more difficult
to recognize if not completely unrecognizable.
Whether a recovery of the political, or a favorable alteration, is possible or desirable
remains debatable. Some possible initial steps in that direction have been touched upon here, the
first of which is the recognition of alternative conceptions of politics. There exists another aspect
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of this project that could be contested. After recognizing the possibility of an alternative
construction of politics, even if that alternative is more theoretical than historical, the question of
which alternative is more desirable must be addressed. We must evaluate whether it is worth
attempting to alter the contemporary notion of politics in an effort at recovering something from
the past. The decline of politics was regrettable to Arendt, and to a lesser extent Habermas, but
this is certainly not determinative. Beyond charges of naiveté, perhaps the normative lament over
the loss of true politics is mistaken. We may conclude that we are better off with the sort of
political realm that we currently have. We may prefer our contemporary meanings of freedom to
those of the past; we may prefer politics like those in the modern United States to the politics of
ancient Greece. I would not preclude the possibility that some may arrive at these judgments.
However, for such judgments to be meaningful we must understand the alternatives to be
judged. This requires the recognition that the political sphere could be different and necessitates
a comparison between its theoretical or historical incarnation and its contemporary counterpart.
This requires engagement in thinking about the nature of the political sphere, its history, and the
changes that have occurred. In short, in order for the judgment to be meaningful it requires
engagement in thinking about the political, and the alterations to it that have been discussed here.
Thinking on this matter is the first step in evaluating competing conception of the
political. This thought may itself be some rudimentary form of politics in the classical sense,
although it must certainly be followed by some form of action in order to be truly political in the
most genuine sense of the word.
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I explore parallels within the work of Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and Michel
Foucault. I examine the unexamined connections and commonalities among the works of these
three preeminent political theorists with the aim of understanding our common, contemporary
construction of “the political.” Specifically, I examine the way that each of these theorists
describes a condition wherein the very concept of “the political” has undergone significant
changes. I demonstrate how these thinkers converge around the notion that what was once
understood as “the political,” has come to include concerns, modes of thought, and forms of
action that were previously considered unpolitical. Each theorist approaches the problem from a
different perspective, describes different processes, and expresses different concerns; however,
they ultimately agree that a change to “the political” has occurred. I trace this common theme
through the different articulations provided by each theorist from Arendt’s rise of the social to
Habermas’s transformation and colonization of the public sphere to Foucault’s concepts of
governmentality and biopolitics.
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